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Six Days in June



JUNE 5-10, 1967



ISRAEL'S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL

BY ROBERT J. DONOVAN
AND THE STAFF OF THE LOS ANGELES TIMES



WITH 31 PHOTOGRAPHS

The People

General Dayan, Abba Eban, Arthur Goldberg,
Chaim Weizmann, El Kony, Ben-Gurion, Nasser,
Federenko, General Rabin, Eshkol, Hussein,
Abraham, Balfour, Kosygin, Johnson, U Thant

The Places

The Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, Suez Canal,
the Gulf of Aqaba, UN Security Council,
Moscow, Washington, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus,
Tel Aviv, Sinai

The Time, The Events

June 5-10, 1967 . . . the third Arab-Israeli War
1956 . . . the second Arab-Israeli War
1948 . . . the War for Independence
1917 . . . the Balfour Declaration
1897 . . . the first Zionist International Congress

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Its Past, Present, and

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Six Days in June

ISRAEL'S
fight for
SURVIVAL

by **ROBERT J. DONOVAN**
and the staff of the *Los Angeles Times*



A SIGNET BOOK

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To the memory of
TED YATES
and
PAUL SCHUTZER

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PRELUDE

JUNE 5, 1967

SHELLS BEGAN to fall on Jerusalem about 11 A.M. Since dawn the Israelis had been expecting them. School had been cancelled for the day and the children sent home or to bomb shelters. Adults not mobilized to fight had been told to take cover. The steady rain of Arab shells fell on vacant streets.

Across the frontier, the Jordanian army was well entrenched. Its artillery was carefully dug in on the hills behind the Jordanian sector of the city. For the moment, the Israeli army seemed powerless. Jordan seemed to have the field to itself.

The Israelis had taken precautions to preserve their treasures. The Isaiah Scroll, most important of the Dead Sea Scrolls, had been removed from the Shrine of the Book in the Israel National Museum. The famed stained-glass windows of the Hadassah Medical Center, designed by Marc Chagall, had been taken away for safekeeping. "I am not worried about the windows," said Chagall, "only about the safety of Israel. Let Israel be safe and I will make you lovelier windows." Most Jews, wherever they were, felt as Chagall did.

More than six hundred buildings in the Jewish quarter were damaged by shelling that day. Shells landed near the home of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. They exploded near the Knesset, Israel's parliament. In his room at the King David Hotel, news photographer Cornell Capa crouched beneath the window, lifting the corner of a curtain to snap quick pictures between explosions and bursts of gunfire. Next door, he could hear

observers directing artillery fire onto Jordanian strongpoints. It occurred to him that the observation point in the next room might be located by the Jordanians, or that his telephoto lens peeking from the window would be mistaken for a bazooka.

The Jerusalem Biblical Zoo lost ninety of its inhabitants, seventy of them parakeets, to the shelling. Most of the rest were birds but a baboon and a sea-lion were also victims. At the height of the bombardment, three orangutangs cried so bitterly that the keeper put them in a closed room to shut out the sound. (He said later one aged ten years in a day; all three dive for cover whenever they hear a plane.)

As tension mounted, blood was being volunteered faster than facilities could take it. The government set up ten mobile ambulance clinics on the main streets of the major cities to accept blood. One of those donating was Winston Churchill, grandson of Britain's wartime Prime Minister who was in Israel covering for News of the World.

The American consulate in the Arab city took three hits during the shelling and its windows were shattered by small arms fire. Two of its automobiles were wrecked. Staff members survived unharmed, and moved down to camp out on the ground floor of the building.

In Cairo, knots of people gathered to listen to announcements from public address systems or follow news accounts with transistor radios. Some announcements contained more hatred for the United States than information about Israel: "We will crush you and your imperialist interest in the Arab world. We will eliminate your bases. You can expect nothing but hatred and violence."

In Beirut, the wife of an American newsman found it already impossible to get transportation out of the city. Hordes of people converged on banks, and in foodstores the shelves were stripped bare.

In London, Israeli sympathizers decided to go to Israel to help. So eager were they that ultimately fighting broke out among them at the airport, when about three-hundred people learned that an El Al plane with a hundred sixty-two seats vacant had landed at Gatwick airport, 20 miles south of London airport.

At 2:50 A.M. that morning, Monday, June 5, a White House duty officer had phoned Walt Whitman Rostow to in-

form him of reports that war had broken out in the Middle East. Rostow reported to the situation room—a basement command center in the White House's West Wing—from which the president keeps in touch with developments all over the world. It could be only a border incident, he thought, perhaps not the real thing.

At 3:00 A.M., Gideon Rafael, Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, was awakened by a ring of the telephone in his Manhattan apartment at 300 Central Park West. Foreign Minister Abba Eban was calling from Jerusalem.

Rafael was instructed to deliver to the United Nations the following statement:

“I have just received reports that Egyptian land and air forces have moved against Israel and Israel forces are now engaged in repelling the Egyptian forces.”

Twenty minutes after Rafael called Security Council President Tabor, Tabor received a second telephone call, this one from Ambassador Mohamed Awad El Kony of the United Arab Republic. El Kony, too, had been awakened by a long distance phone call. It was from Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in Cairo.

El Kony told Tabor:

“Israel has committed a treacherous premeditated aggression against the United Arab Republic this morning.”

A few minutes before 4:30, Walt Rostow, still in the White House situation room, awakened President Johnson by phone to announce the beginning of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967.

– CHAPTER I –

WAR AGAIN

The Middle East: spawning ground for war. Zionism and the two World Wars. United Nations and the birth of Israel. The 1948 war. No peace with the Arabs.

THE MIDDLE East had seen war before, countless times.

Since antiquity, great civilizations have flourished both within it and on all sides of it. Across its seas and over its hot sands, their armies traveled in search of dominion, booty and glory. Within its confines, races rose to great triumphs, then perished by the sword. Bloodshed is not new to the Middle East. Whoever has made his home there has done so in the knowledge that he would have to risk his life to defend it.

The Middle East is at once both a great land bridge and a major sea route. It is a link between three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa. It is the point of intersection of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Eastward and westward, northward and southward, travelers have marched over it in search of wealth or adventure, converts or victims. Whoever controls it possesses great strategic advantage, both for offensive and defensive purposes. Since antiquity, men have met and died there to satisfy or to thwart the ambitions of those who would extend their sway over others.

Virtually barren desert, for the most part, the Middle East is devoid of natural barriers. It is made for swift maneuvers and quick adaptations. The Middle East is cut to order for great battles.

In modern times, two factors have given the Middle East new significance: oil and the Suez Canal. Some sixty percent of the world's known oil reserves lie beneath its sands. A large

proportion of the deep-sea traffic between the industrial nations of the world passes through the canal. The life or death of many of the nations of the contemporary world depend on who controls the Middle East.

Small wonder then that even today, men will fight for it, and die on its inhospitable soil.

Palestine is the hub of the Middle East. Named for the early Philistines, it has witnessed the war machines of the Romans, Mameluks, Ottoman Turks, Crusaders, French and British. Palestine is where Christ was born and crucified. In its soil have germinated some of the great religious ideas of all time. A religious symbol to Moslems, Christians and Jews, Palestine is a land whose fate grips the emotions of people as far away as Patagonia and Ceylon. When there is war in Palestine, the world pays attention.

In recent years, it is the Arabs and the Jews who have become the chief antagonists in the Middle East. Both have deep historical roots in the region. Both remember it as the scene of some of their civilizations' most brilliant moments. For both, it is holy.

The rival claims of Arabs and Jews go back to the Bible and the Koran for their authority.

Before Abraham died, according to the Bible, the Lord appeared to him and said: "I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession" (*Genesis* 17:8). Abraham had two sons. One was Isaac, to whom the Jews trace their origin. According to the Bible, God confirmed his "everlasting covenant with Isaac and, through Isaac's son Jacob, with every succeeding generation of Jews.

Abraham's other son was Ishmael, from whom the Arabs claim their descent. According to the Koran, the holy book of Islam, God promised Ishmael that he and his seed would prevail. Thus, the holy writs seem to promise conflict.

Long before the birth of Christ, the Palestine region consisted of the two biblical states of Israel and Judea. In the period from 800 to 600 B.C., both were crushed by Assyria and Babylonia. Their destruction led to the Diaspora, the historic dispersion of Jews throughout the Old World.

In the fifth century B.C., Jewish communities were reestablished in Jerusalem under the Persians. Later the Maccabees, a heroic Jewish family, delivered Judea from the Assyrians

and, in 142 B.C., founded a new Jewish state. Then the Roman Empire conquered and, in the aftermath of a Jewish uprising in 70 A.D., demolished the Second Temple, leaving only the remains that have come to be known as the Wailing Wall. In time, the Romans were succeeded respectively by the Arabs under Saladin, the Crusaders and the Ottoman Turks, who ruled from 1517 until their defeat by the Allies in World War I.

Thus, as the Jews point out, the Arabs never really possessed Palestine, except during the brief period under Saladin in the twelfth century. To be sure, Arab peoples always inhabited the region, but a few Jews always lived there, too. During the long centuries that Palestine was governed by Romans, Crusaders and Turks, however, neither Arab nor Jew could call it their own.

Still, for the Jews, Palestine has always had a special meaning. Scattered over the world, Jews have continued to look upon it as the Promised Land. A yearning for its rebirth as a Jewish state has remained eternally a part of the Jewish soul, never forgotten in song or prayer. All through the vicissitudes of conquest and empire, the few Jews who lived there helped keep alive the ancient claim of Abraham. But more significant, the Jew, wherever fate may have taken him, thought of Palestine as his ancestral home and never relinquished the sentimental claim that it was his.

Not until the mid-nineteenth century, however, did any prospect of realizing this claim appear. In the closing decades of Ottoman rule, an international movement was launched to restore Palestine as a Jewish state. The movement was called Zionism, after Mount Zion in Jerusalem. It originated in Eastern and Central Europe, where life was hardest for the Jews. It was there that the conviction ran deepest that the only way for the Jews to regain their happiness and dignity was to end their wandering and settle once again on the soil that had nurtured their culture and their religion. The immediate goal of Zionism was to resettle the persecuted Jews of Europe on Palestinian soil. The ultimate goal of an independent Jewish homeland seemed almost too grandiose to be more than a dream.

Toward the close of the century, under the growing horrors of persecution and the intelligent guidance of Zionist organizations, the number of Jews returning to Palestine swelled from

a trickle to a substantial stream. Behind the Zionists were much of the wealth and political influence that Jews could mobilize in the centers of power in Europe and America. Jewish philanthropists made indispensable contributions to the cause. Sir Moses Montefiore in Britain, for example, used his wealth to persuade Jews in Palestine to become farmers. Baron Edmond de Rothschild of Paris financed numerous Jewish agricultural communities. Jewish money helped to establish a major Zionist presence in Palestine, and to neutralize the impact of increasing Arab anxiety about the movement.

Among the youths of Europe who were early pioneers was David Ben-Gurion. Born on December 16, 1886, in Plonsk, a Polish town that was at the time a part of the Russian Empire, he went to Palestine with a group of friends in 1906 at the age of nineteen. As a farmer in Galilee, he began his long and arduous career in the service of Israel. Ben-Gurion was one of the thousands of young Jews who migrated from Eastern Europe with the goal of restoring Palestine, after centuries of neglect, to the "land flowing with milk and honey" that the Bible described. Under the most strenuous conditions, these pioneers—most of them of urban origins—made rich farmland out of the desert.

By the outset of the twentieth century, the British government, the most powerful Western force in the Middle East, was starting to feel the intensifying pressures of the Zionists. In 1902, Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary for Colonies, offered to give the Jews Uganda in Central Africa as a homeland. Curiously, some of the Zionists favored accepting it. But for most, the only goal was Palestine.

Finally, in World War I, the balance of power shifted dramatically in the Middle East. In December, 1917, British forces under Allenby captured Jerusalem from the Ottoman Turks and, in short order, occupied the whole of Palestine. This was the great turning point in the long struggle for establishment of a Jewish homeland.

As the war neared an end, Dr. Chaim Weizmann approached British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour with a request on behalf of the Jews. Weizmann, born in a small town in Russian Poland in 1874, was a distinguished chemist who had become a British subject and, during the war, had done highly important work in the British admiralty laboratories. All his life Weizmann had been an ardent Jewish nationalist; in Eng-

land, he became head of the Zionist movement. His war work had put Britain in his debt. It was in return that he asked Balfour for a pledge to the Jews.

On November 21, 1917, Balfour wrote Rothschild: "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people."

The Balfour Declaration, as the statement is known, became a key document in the Jewish claim to Palestine, even though, under shifting pressures in the Middle East, the British subsequently reversed themselves on the pledge. The declaration also became the signal for the eruption of bloody conflict between Arabs and Jews.

In a report of the Institute for the Middle East, published in 1959, it was noted that there was a time when there was "no such thing as an Arab-Jewish problem, when relationships between the two peoples were as normal as those between cousins." Under the Moslem influence of the ninth century, Jewish philosophy and religious practices developed. In Palestine, Syria and Spain, Jews gave help to the Moslem conquerors and were looked upon by them as allies. Scholars have found friendly ties extending over long periods. S. D. Goitein, Chairman of the School of Oriental Studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, is the authority for the statement that a full intermingling of Jewish and Arab life characterized the period from 500 to 1300 A.D. Other studies have shown that before World War I, Jews and Arabs worked together on such practical matters as the municipal governments of Haifa, Jerusalem and Jaffa. Even as late as 1919, Dr. Weizmann signed a friendly pact with Emir Faisal, representing the Kingdom of Hejaz, now part of Saudi Arabia.

This pact endorsed all necessary measures "to encourage and stimulate the immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale and as quickly as possible and to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land." Yet it was outdated almost before it was signed.

For World War I had provoked a vigorous resurgence of nationalist sentiment among the Arabs, as well as the Jews. Already the Arab world was reacting against the prospect of increased Jewish immigration into Palestine.

Shortly after the Weizmann-Faisal compact was signed, a general Syrian congress in Damascus, attended by Palestinian

delegates, denounced the Balfour Declaration. In April, 1920, a shadow of things to come was cast by anti-Zionist riots in Palestine, in which five Jews were killed and 200 wounded.

With some reason, the Arabs felt betrayed. They believed they had secured a promise from the Allies—in return for their assistance against the Turks—of the establishment of their own free and united Middle Eastern empire. Yet the League of Nations had given most of the Arab lands to Britain and France to rule as mandates, while the Balfour Declaration was incorporated into the League instrumentalities. Frustrated in their own imperial ambitions and increasingly apprehensive over the growing influx of immigrants from Europe, they became more and more hostile to the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

In May, 1921, 46 Jews were killed and 116 wounded in anti-Zionist riots. A commission of inquiry blamed the disorders on Arab fear of Jewish immigration.

In August, 1929, a dispute over religious practices at the Wailing Wall ended in communal conflict in which 133 Jews and 116 Arabs were killed. The clashes sprang from the fact that, according to the commission of inquiry, "the Arabs have come to see Jewish immigration not only as a menace to their livelihood but as a possible overlord of the future."

And so it went, with periodic violence, fitful Arab boycotts of Zionist goods and growing ill will. The British found it increasingly difficult to reconcile their obligations to Arabs and Jews. Foreshadowing the ultimate solution, a Royal commission under Lord Peel recommended in 1937 a partition of Palestine between the two peoples.

Meanwhile, the rise of Hitler in Germany gave new impetus to Jewish flight from Europe. But in 1939, just as Hitler's cruelties were becoming apparent to the world, the British issued a White Paper that partially reneged on the Balfour Declaration's promises. In deference to Arab feelings, the British established a limitation on Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Zionists were furious, but they were helpless to do anything about it.

When World War II broke out, the Middle East became even further divided. The Jews promptly signed up to fight with the Allies. The Arabs, on the whole, sided with the Nazis, with whom they shared common hatreds. The Middle East


became a region of conspiracy and intrigue, betrayal and bloodshed.

The Jewish community in Palestine—still only a few hundred thousand—mobilized its maximum strength for the war. Some 27,000 of its sons enlisted in the British army, to fight in a Jewish brigade that battled Germans and Italians in Europe. In Palestine itself, an underground army known as the Haganah had long existed to defend Jewish settlements. During the war, it became a small but formidable striking force. When Rommel's desert forces were approaching Suez, the Haganah responded to the British call for help and went into battle. When the danger of German conquest receded, it went back underground. The Haganah, having proven its fighting capacities, prepared for a war to establish a Jewish state. By V-E Day, the Jews in Palestine had come a long way toward readying themselves for the impending struggle for statehood.

Victory over Nazism left the Zionists stronger than ever to resume their struggle with Britain. The Haganah was now bolstered by more extremist underground groups, particularly the Irgun and the Sternists. Their most immediate grievance was the rigid British ceiling on immigration. Only 1,500 persons a month were permitted to enter Palestine, while hundreds of thousands of Nazism's victims waited forlornly in refugee camps in Europe. The Jewish activists smuggled thousands of refugees past the sentries into Palestine. Their aggressive tactics and their willingness to resort to violence, using pilfered British weapons, made life miserable for the British occupying force.

The Moslem attitude to these fast-moving events was predictable. Led by Egypt, seven of Israel's Arab neighbors formed the Arab League in March, 1945, to promote unity within their feud-ridden ranks. Their founding covenant reaffirmed their belief in the Arab character of Palestine. Before the year's end, the League had declared a boycott of Zionist goods. The Jewish presence in Palestine had become a rallying point for pan-Arab sentiment throughout the Middle East.

Meanwhile, statesmen talked in London of a plan that they hoped would create autonomous Jewish and Arab communities within the British mandate. But the Jewish underground was impatient. It spirited munitions into Palestine along with




refugees, and it shocked the world in July, 1946, when a bomb destroyed the British headquarters in Jerusalem's King David Hotel with the loss of 91 lives.

Britain, harassed at once by warnings from the Arab League and by pro-Zionist pressures in Western capitals, finally decided to unload the problem on the United Nations. A UN inquiry commission proposed that the matter be resolved by ending the British mandate and dividing Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states, with Jerusalem to be an international city. The proposal won approval at a stormy General Assembly Session in November, 1947, but the delegates from six Arab states rejected the idea and walked out. The Arabs denounced the plan's arithmetic, declaring that it gave the region's 678,000 Jews 55 percent of Palestine's land (although much of it was in the Negev Desert), while it consigned 1,269,000 Arabs to the remainder. The Arab High Committee vowed that Palestinian Arabs "will never recognize the validity of partition or the authority of the United Nations to implement it." Nonetheless, Arabs began to withdraw from land designated for the Jewish state.

Once again, vicious communal warfare flared, first in Jerusalem and Jaffa, then along the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway. Arab gangs and Jewish underground groups attacked and counterattacked. The Arab League pledged its support to Palestinian kinsmen and recruited a force of 3,000 volunteers to help them. The disintegrating British administration lacked both the will and power to stop the fighting. After two months, casualties on both sides had exceeded 2,000.

By mid-March, 1948, the UN Palestine Commission became convinced that it could not impose partition. Washington announced its opposition to forcible division of the mandate and on March 30 called for a truce, pending reconsideration of the issues by the General Assembly. Meanwhile, the British announced they would terminate their mandate on May 15.

Before the UN acted, however, it became apparent that Jerusalem's Jewish colony was in desperate straits, besieged and in danger of starvation. Orders were passed from David Ben-Gurion, organizer of the Haganah, that the siege of the old city be lifted. Levies of Jewish underground fighters were covertly transferred to Jerusalem from hard-pressed units



throughout the rest of Palestine. On April 1, the Jews launched their first coordinated offensive, with 1,500 tough, trained partisans. It was called Operation Nachson, named for the first Israelite who leaped into the Red Sea in the exodus from Egypt. To some, it had a similar miraculous quality. A clandestine order of light machine guns arrived at a secret airfield just in time for transshipment to Jerusalem. The weapons were indispensable to a victory that convinced both Arabs and British of Jewish striking power and morale.

Twelve days later, Israeli forces launched a new, broader offensive called Operation Jephtha, aimed at Haifa and Jaffa. Both cities fell to Jewish arms, and thousands of demoralized Moslems fled to neighboring Arab lands.

As the May 15 deadline approached, the situation became more tense. The Jews had set up a provisional government in Tel Aviv, in anticipation of the British departure. On Palestine's borders, meanwhile, armies from Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon gathered. At the UN, very little effort was made to avoid a major military confrontation.

On May 14, 1948, against this crisis setting, the provisional government issued the Declaration of Independence of the new Jewish state, and proclaimed that it would bear the revered name of "Israel." David Ben-Gurion was appointed Prime Minister, and Chaim Weizmann was elected president of the Provisional Council. Zion had become a reality. Only its survival was now in doubt.

At 6:11 P.M. (EDT) on May 14—eleven minutes after midnight May 15 in Israel—President Truman announced in Washington that the United States had recognized the *de facto* authority of the provisional government. At the UN, Russian delegate Andrei A. Gromyko denounced the timing as "ludicrous." But on May 17, a day after Israel applied for UN membership, a Soviet note extended what appeared to be *de jure* recognition. Within the week recognition followed from Uruguay and Nicaragua and three states then in the Soviet orbit—Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

A few hours later, using tanks and planes, the Arabs struck through to Jerusalem, where Jordan's tough, skilled Arab Legion overpowered desperate defenders and occupied the small Jewish quarter of the old walled city. But Jewish forces, built upon the Haganah organization, kept control of the road

to Jerusalem and the high ground of the Judean hills, which protected their outpost settlements.

The war confronted the United Nations with a grievous responsibility and a challenge. Its decision to end the British mandate had simultaneously triggered the Arab attack and speeded the birth of the militant new Jewish state. Despite half a year of effort, its partition plan was a manifest failure. A new settlement that included Israel was essential. But the UN had to move quickly before war had settled the outstanding questions in a manner that would satisfy no one.

On May 20, the Security Council dispatched Count Folke Bernadotte, a Swedish humanitarian-diplomat, as a mediator in the struggle. He arranged a four-week truce, effective June 11, but his proposals for a permanent settlement were rejected by both sides. Before hostilities erupted again on July 9, however, Israel negotiated deliveries of sorely needed military equipment, including a few aircraft. The ten days of war that followed produced an unbroken string of Israeli triumphs. In well-aimed thrusts, the Israelis captured Lydda Airport, broadened and secured the vital corridor from Jerusalem to the coast and ousted the Arabs from Nazareth in the north.

On July 19, Bernadotte secured a second truce, but it did not still the bitter ferment. Incidents were frequent. On September 17, Bernadotte flew from Damascus to Jerusalem, discounting a warning radioed from Haifa that he would be assassinated in the Holy City. As his car passed through a Jerusalem suburb it was halted by a jeepload of men believed to be Sternists. One tommy-gunner fired through the car window and shocked the world by fatally wounding Bernadotte. The Count was succeeded by his deputy, the widely respected American, Ralph Bunche.

Tactically, Israeli forces were in strong positions everywhere except in the arid Negev to the south, where Egyptian units were firmly entrenched. Egypt's reluctance to comply with a truce provision permitting Israeli convoys to supply farm settlements in the area sparked new fighting. Charging the Arabs with bad faith, the Israelis launched Operation Ten Plagues aimed at driving the Egyptians back into Sinai.

Like the afflictions visited on the ancient Pharaoh, the operation that began October 14 confounded the Egyptians. They

withdrew within days toward Gaza, a sliver of land bordering the Mediterranean that is now known as the Gaza Strip. Israeli units cleared Arab forces from all the Negev except the well-defended Gaza Strip. Then they bored on into the Sinai desert.

The advance was halted by Ben-Gurion after receiving an appeal for restraint from President Truman. The Egyptians, meanwhile, sued for an armistice, and all the other Arab states except Iraq followed suit in the spring of 1949.

Victory had cost Israel more than 5,000 lives. But it established the new nation as a force to be reckoned with in the Mediterranean world. In the course of the fighting Israel added 2,600 square miles to the territory that would have been allotted by the original UN partition resolutions, expanding its land by roughly a third. The territorial adjustments assured Israeli control of the vital railway from Tel Aviv to Haifa and the opening of a wide corridor to Jerusalem. Under the armistice agreement, the old city of Jerusalem was placed under Jordanian control, but Israel kept the western and southern suburbs. The historic Jewish capital thus remained a divided city, with a minimum of contact between the two zones.

The UN had appointed a conciliation commission to promote a final settlement in December, 1948, and admitted Israel as a member on May 11, 1949. But the Arab rulers remained irreconcilable.

While a mixed Arab and Jewish commission considered alleged truce violations, the leaders of the Arab League organized a boycott of Israel and of any firm anywhere in the world that traded with her. The boycott grew to include an embargo, maintained by Egypt despite UN protests. It also included, in direct violation of international treaties, a ban on passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel.

The Arabs focused the bitterness of their defeat on the plight of the 800,000 Moslem refugees who fled Palestine during the 1948 war. While the refugees lingered for months, then years, in UN-sponsored camps, Arab leaders refused to compromise their demands that these living reminders of defeat be resettled in Israel. With equal firmness, Israel insisted that it was not prepared, either economically or mili-



tarily, to permit a mass return of the refugees who had left of their own free will.

While it defended itself diplomatically at the UN and militarily on its own frontiers, the new state struggled to develop the machinery of self-government. On January 25, 1949, while war was still under way in the Negev, the Provisional Government conducted Israel's first elections. In orderly balloting, 120 members were chosen by proportional representation to serve in the first Knesset, Israel's unicameral parliament. Meeting three weeks later in Jerusalem, the Knesset chose the revered Dr. Weizmann for a five-year term as Israel's first President. Ben-Gurion became Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. The system Israel chose was democratic and free.

By the end of 1949, unprecedented immigration had brought Israel's population past the million mark. By May, 1952, the total was 1,350,000, double the figure at the time of independence. More than 300,000 of the new citizens were survivors of German concentration camps. Contributions from world Jewry and aid from the United States helped the new government accommodate the influx.

In 1952, the West German government agreed to pay \$822 million within fourteen years as World War II reparations to Europe's Jews. For Israel, it meant \$715 million, mostly in badly needed goods. The remaining \$107 million was for relief and rehabilitation of individual victims of Nazi persecution.

But though Israel grew and began to prosper, its position in the Middle East remained manifestly precarious. The Arabs never signed a peace treaty after the war, on the grounds that a treaty would entail recognition of the Jewish state. The end of fighting, they insisted, marked only an armistice. Over and over, they declared that Israel and the Arab states were still at war.

In May, 1950, the United States, Britain and France issued a tripartite declaration in an effort to preserve the stability achieved by the Arab-Israeli armistice. They promised to act diplomatically against any state that violated the 1949 frontiers. But neither they nor any other country promised to come to Israel's assistance with military power in case of a renewed Arab attack. Meanwhile, the destruction of Israel became an article of faith in the Arab creed. No Arab ruler could remain

in office without satisfying the demands of the masses for vows to drive Israel into the sea. Israel's armed forces remained in a state of readiness and at no time could they relax. On every side were hostile neighbors, apparently committed to no lesser achievement than wiping Israel off the map.

— CHAPTER II —

NASSER-KREMLIN ALLIANCE

The Cold War. Nasser's rise. Suez war. Soviet grab for power in the Middle East. Aswan Dam. The refugee problem. Palestine Liberation Army.

THE END of World War II brought drastic change to the Middle East: The crumbling of Western empires and the conversion of colonies into states, the decline of monarchy, the start of the Cold War and the birth of Israel. In the Arab world, the consequence was wrenching political change from Morocco east to Mecca.

New leaders brought new political concepts and ambitious new plans to the Arab world. Out of the hatred of Israel, they saw the prospect of building an Arab unity, however destructive its purpose. Perhaps it would lead to a modern Arab Confederation, a revival of the dreams of a triumphant Islam, dormant since Saladin died in 1193 A.D.

Nowhere in the Arab lands did those developments reach a swifter or more dramatic climax than in Egypt. They centered almost exclusively there on one man—Gamal Abdel Nasser. In the thirteen years of his one-man rule, Nasser elevated Egypt into a state to be reckoned with in the world's power councils. For this, Arabs were proud and grateful. It accounts, perhaps, for his remarkable capacity for political survival.

Nasser was born January 15, 1918, at Beni Mor, a village in Upper Egypt. His father was a middle-class post office civil servant. As a boy, he received a far better than average education, at a Cairo secondary school and then at Egypt's

military academy. He was graduated and commissioned in 1937, at 19 years of age, and went on to active duty.

Ambitious, energetic and politically astute, Nasser began in the early 1940's quietly assembling around him a clique of young officers imbued with visions of Egyptian greatness. By 1945, this group has coalesced into a secret "free officers" organization, with Nasser as its leader.

The 1948 Arab-Israeli war, in which the Arabs were resoundingly thrashed, broadened and solidified this organization, deepened its frustrations and sharpened its resentment against Egypt's ruler, King Farouk.

As an infantry battalion commander during the war, Nasser fought well on the Faluga front in Palestine. He was seriously wounded in the shoulder and earned the nickname "Tiger of Faluga" for his aggressiveness. He was also called "The Boss," for his natural capacity to command.

The Arab-Israeli war over, Nasser and his cabal of secret "free officers" returned home. Their organization was slimmed and disciplined more tightly. Their plotting intensified. It reached a climax July 23, 1952, in a neatly executed coup in which Farouk was deposed. The conspirators were headed, ostensibly, by General Mohammed Naguib, but Nasser was "the boss." In 1954, after assassins in Alexandria tried unsuccessfully to kill him, Nasser deposed Naguib, placed him under house arrest and took over openly as Egypt's ruler.

The Egypt that Nasser took over was no earthly paradise. King Farouk had been a gross, hedonistic man, in whose palace rooms were found piles of pornography.

Farouk's Egypt was moldy with corruption. While millions lived in crowded poverty, large and comfortable estates were held by a relative few, and some of these latter were absentee owners who resided in luxury in Cairo much of the time. The private enterprise system was peculiarly one in which the devil took the hindmost. It was in short an illiterate, backward state in which Nasser came to power.

In appearance, private habits and deportment, Gamal Abdel Nasser exemplifies many Arabs' concept of a leader. Tall and husky—six feet two inches and weighing over two hundred pounds—he exudes confidence, assurance and magnetism. A moderate in dress and in bearing, he personifies a detached dignity which Arabs admire but do not necessarily imitate. In thousands of Arab homes, Nasser's photograph is displayed

proudly. Arabs read his "Philosophy of the Revolution," scan their newspapers for reports on him, listen religiously to his Cairo radio. To many Arabs, Nasser is the personification of their hopes for restored grandeur, for righting their frustrations, for expunging the indignities they believe they have suffered.

Though Nasser is vocal, he has never been precise about what he wants for himself and the Middle East's millions of Arabs. His prime objective is the liquidation of Israel. Beyond that, his goals are unclear. In his "Philosophy of the Revolution," he wrote that he found in the Arab world "a role wandering around in search of a hero," and he appointed himself to fulfill that role.

To Araby's frustrated world of dreams and prejudice and illogic, of distortions and hopes for prestige and influence without the accomplishments to support them, Nasser has supplied promises and illusions of power and pledges of glory—few so far fulfilled except in oratory and bluster without content.

Nasser has written: "I have given the Egyptian people dignity," and in truth he has probably tried to better their lives. He broke up large estates and distributed plots to farmers, widened school attendance and inaugurated social welfare and medical programs for villagers. Nasser has attempted to transform his land—ravaged by disease, impoverished, illiterate, deprived of natural resources—into a modern nation. At best, the task was difficult. But programs have barely kept pace with Egypt's rising population, and inevitably they have been diverted by the attractions of war. For his efforts, nonetheless, Nasser has won the devotion and unswerving loyalty of his people. No matter what his political fate—or Egypt's—Nasser continues, to this day, to be idolized by the people of the Arab world.

Nasser's domestic economic programs began running into trouble almost as soon as they were undertaken. Advocate of a vague form of socialism, he launched a sweeping program of nationalizing Egypt's few productive facilities. He hoped, apparently, to transform a basically agricultural society into a regime based on state-owned and operated industry. But nationalization shattered Egypt's entrepreneurial system, and since Nasser could provide neither efficient managers nor

administration, the economy began to sag. He turned to the East and the West for economic help.

Here his politics and his ambitions began to collide. A sworn anticolonialist, he berated, denounced and finally made enemies of the Western nations that could have helped him. He showed greater interest in leading the postwar neutrals, whose trademark was hostility to the West, than in the tedious details of improving conditions at home. Meanwhile, his personal aspirations for Arab leadership mounted, and he undertook a policy of defiance and subversion of any Arab chieftains who declined to recognize his preeminence. Seeking help for his staggering economy, and arms for a rematch with Israel, Nasser started in 1954 to mortgage the Egyptian cotton crop for assistance from the Red bloc. By the mid-1950's, he had largely alienated the West and had left options open only to the Communists.

One of the key elements in Nasser's domestic plan was construction of a high dam on the Nile at Aswan, to produce electric power and to irrigate and open for cultivation one million acres of desert. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had offered help on the dam project.

But Nasser's increasing anti-Americanism and his growing anti-Western "neutralism" provoked the United States, on July 18, 1956, to withdraw its offer of a \$56 million grant. Nasser, said the American Government, was a poor financial risk since he had mortgaged his economy to Russia in exchange for weapons and aid. Furious, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, declaring he would use its toll revenues, estimated at \$200 million yearly, to build the Aswan Dam. The thesis was specious. The canal revenues are not even sufficient to offset chronic Egyptian trade deficits. But more important, Nasser's seizure of the canal triggered another Middle East war.

The United States, France and Britain (the latter two the major stockholders in the former Suez Canal Company) protested Nasser's nationalization move and proposed the establishment of some form of international association to operate the waterway. Nasser said he would view any kind of international control as "a form of collective colonialism" and, as the other Arab nations cheered, refused to accept it.

Meanwhile, Arab-Israeli clashes increased along Israel's frontiers. Britain and France began deploying military forces to the Mediterranean. Nasser called up some reserves. Israel

mobilized, as guerrillas under Egypt's direction stepped up their border forays.

On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces struck into the Egyptian Sinai and raced toward Suez. They occupied Sharm el Sheikh on the Gulf of Aqaba, gateway to the Israeli port of Elath. French and British air units began attacking Egypt on October 31, and Anglo-French ground troops landed near the northern end of the Suez Canal on November 5-6.

The same day that the Israelis punched into the Sinai, the United States called for an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council and demanded a cease-fire. The United States repeated the demand before the General Assembly on November 1. The following day, the Assembly endorsed the cease-fire call. Britain and France accepted it on November 6, the day after the Israeli campaign ended.

In large part the halting of the invasion and the early withdrawal of Israeli troops was due to pressure from President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles took a high moral position against the use of force and asked Israel instead to rely on UN guarantees for her security. A casualty of the war was Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who fell from power two months later because the venture had turned into a fiasco.

Though the Arabs had again been smashed, Nasser somehow emerged a hero. His pose as the victim of big-power aggression was accepted by his own people and the Middle East Arabs. Certainly the Egyptian army had shown itself no less inept than it had been under Farouk. It had been thoroughly beaten by Israel. But Nasser could claim that Britain and France had made the difference and demand the opportunity to take on Israel again.

Increasingly, Nasser turned toward Russia now for aid to sustain his faltering economy and weapons to rebuild his shattered army. He railed increasingly at the Western "imperialists and colonialists" as well as at Israel. More and more Cairo radio—by malicious goading and lying—inflamed Arabs from Morocco to Baghdad, not only against the West and Israel but also against the Arab rulers who refused to endorse his policies and bow to his leadership.

After the Israeli victory, Nasser undertook a campaign to buttress his role as a chieftain among the world's nonaligned nations. There were meetings with Tito, with Indian leaders,

with Algeria's Ben Bella and with Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, all accompanied by great fanfare to convey the impression that Egypt had become a major force in the world.

But all the while, Nasser was fomenting trouble—from the Congo to Yemen, in Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia. Inevitably, his enemies had to strike back.

In the Arab world, Nasser encountered increasingly stiff opposition from Jordan's King Hussein and Saudi Arabia's King Faisal. In an attempt to prove his strength and prowess, Nasser jumped into the Yemen, only to arouse scorn for his failure to put down the ragged royalist bands against whom Egypt's 60,000 or more troops proved ineffective. Farther abroad, too, Nasser's luck started to run out. The neutral world began crumbling with the death of India's Pandit Nehru and the loss of power of his friends Ben Bella, Nkrumah and Sukarno. In the wake of these changes, Nasser needed some dramatic move to restore his dwindling prestige.

The Arabs speak of themselves as one people, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf. Theirs is an emotional, religious and cultural identity steeped in historical grandeur. It has a political magnetism among the masses today, but in terms of practical application it has generally been disastrous.

The Arabs emerged from the desert a puritanical and fanatical people obsessed with conquest and promulgating the religion of the Prophet Mohammed, either by sword or by persuasion. In the seventh and eighth centuries A.D., they spread throughout the Middle East and fanned along the entire African coastline of the Mediterranean, into Spain and even into France. To the east, they conquered Persia and Afghanistan and pushed into China.

Much of the vast area of conquest remained in the hands of local warlords who accepted Islam. The Moslem caliphate itself was torn by dissension and civil war. The Arabs of the desert were independent-minded people who were able to accept discipline only in the holy cause of proselytizing Islam. Once the cause was gained, they began to fall apart. Even the Prophet Mohammed had to subdue the tribes around Medina by force before he could start his sacred mission.

There is a striking parallel between the Arab world then and now. Today, the cause is not proselytizing Islam, but de-

stroying the "usurper" state forced upon them by "imperialism." In times of great emotional upsurge the Arabs possess a unique ability to drop their own deadly quarrels and rally round the flag.

But the question is, How long can they stick together? The Arabs in the street are fond of referring back to the Crusades. They point out that the Crusaders were seventy years in the Holy City of Jerusalem, but eventually they were forced out. But this is not the twelfth century, it is the twentieth, the age of jet aircraft rather than knights in armor on ponderous Belgian horses. Nasser is not another Saladin, leading Moslems in a religious war against the infidels. Nasser is an Egyptian trying to rally the Arabs in a Crusade that is basically political, albeit with strong religious overtones.

Where Saladin had the great unifying force of religion behind him, Nasser must deal with a polyglot people of diverse backgrounds, all of whom call themselves Arabs. Physically, they vary from the black Sudanese with tribal marks on their faces to blue-eyed, red-headed and freckled Syrians.

Theoretically, they all speak the same language. But a Moroccan cannot understand when a Yemeni speaks. Religiously, they are broken up into two major sects and a dozen splinter ones, such as the Yazidi, who pay tribute to the devil in order to propitiate him.

They are spread across North Africa and the Fertile Crescent, in cities, mountains, rich delta lands, swamps and plains. Probably fewer than 10 percent still pursue the nomadic way of life from which the Arabs and the Islamic faith spring.

Except for Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, the Arabs live in artificial states whose borders were drawn by the colonial powers. This arbitrary division has long been a prime source of rancor among them, and border disputes abound. Yet the only real effort to achieve a political union between two sovereign Arab states broke up in a shambles in three years. This was the Syrian-Egyptian formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958, an emotional fusion that made no sense economically or geographically.

The rich variety of Arab life, the diversity of religion within the Islamic framework, the physical and geographical differences all contribute to the self-evident divisive tendencies in the Arab world. Everyone pays lip service to Arab unity, yet all go about their own way.

Still, the emotional concept of this unity is strong, and its mass appeal is Nasser's greatest political asset. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, Nasser's only real rival in the Arab power structure, has tried to substitute a wider Islamic unity in order to weaken Nasser's drawing power. On the popular level the effort has failed miserably.

Since the creation of Israel, Arab unity and destruction of the Israeli state have been inseparable themes. Sung from thousands of mosques every Friday and from Arab radios every hour is the theme that the Arabs must be united in order to do away with the Jewish state; perhaps never has a single people been so saturated with a single strident message for such a long time.

On a mass level, this has had a hypnotic effect. It has become a fact of life which cannot be challenged. Hence the Arabs everywhere accept unchallengingly the heated outpourings of Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs."

The Arabs have created a transistor-age mythology which would have done Hitler's propagandists proud.

The potency of radio Cairo to propagate myths is beyond dispute. During the Suez war of 1956, Cairo broadcast the story that a noble Syrian frogman had singlehandedly sunk the French warship *Jeanne D'Arc*. The story is widely believed in the Arab world today, despite the fact that the *Jeanne D'Arc* makes regular calls at Arab Mediterranean ports.

When Nasser charged that British and American planes helped Israel during the 1967 war, virtually every Arab believed it. They believed it in Beirut, where newspapers printed the American denials and made pointed references to the Soviet Union's silence on the subject, as much as everywhere else.

The Arabs have a strong tendency to accept what they want to hear, and to disregard the sense of critical analysis they apply so well to business transactions. Since 1948, they have been unable to accept the thesis that Israel is militarily stronger than the Arab states, which have oil and a population fifty times the size of Israel's. Since defeat defies explanation, the Arabs have swallowed the flimsy case that they have on each occasion of war with Israel actually been beaten by foreigners.

This tendency toward wish fulfillment is an overriding factor in Arab psychology. Shortly after the Egyptians signed up with the Soviets to build the Aswan Dam, a new popular song

zoomed to the top of the Arab hit parade. It was the "Aswan High Dam Song." Its first words were "We have built the dam." This was before the first spade of earth had been turned.

In a similar fashion, the Arabs convinced themselves that Russia would intervene to prevent any American help to Israel during the war. In this, Arab wish fulfillment came back to haunt them. Having told the masses that the Americans were flying sorties for Israel, Arab leaders then had to explain why the Russians had not intervened to stop them.

It is remarkable that the Arabs do not see the innate contradictions in these things. Thus when Nasser gave a royal welcome to King Saud, the former king of Saudi Arabia sent into exile by his fellow princes for incompetence and squandering the nation's riches, the immediate Western reaction was: why is Nasser wooing a man who will never again have power? But the reaction of the Arab public was: See how clever Nasser is, using that old fool Saud against his brother, King Faisal!

This does not mean that the Arabs will not eventually accept the Jewish state. Many Arab intellectuals tell of an eventual reconciliation in which an Orientalized Israel will be re-integrated into the Middle East, not as a Jewish state but as a Semitic one. But this would be possible only through wiping out its Zionist character. This seems highly unlikely.

The alternative is destroying Israel, by achieving political, social and economic integration of the Arab world. Some steps toward it have been taken, but they founder and break down over individual interests of the thirteen states.

The first step was the Arab League, founded in 1945 under British tutelage, but this soon developed into a tame organization, without executive powers. The League still staggers along, and has added new wings to its bureaucracy in the economic and social fields. But aside from such operations as narcotics control and the anti-Israel Boycott Bureau, it is little more than a meeting ground for the crosscurrents of Arab political, economic and cultural life.

A serious effort at Arab unity came early in 1964, when Nasser made one of his remarkable policy reversals and invited all the Arabs back under one tent, to concentrate on the prime objective, Israel's elimination. This evolved into what became known as "Arab summitry," and a total of three sum-

mits was actually held. Several interesting and potentially strong Arab organizations emerged from summitry, notably the United Arab Command. Budgets were set, contributions of the rich Arab oil states to the defense machinery of poorer states such as Jordan and Syria were fixed, and the whole rearmament operation put on a tight schedule. The objective was to have a coordinated and integrated Arab army equipped and ready to fight Israel by 1970.

But Nasser broke the policy out of anger with King Faisal, who was looming as something of a political rival. This turned out to be a disastrous mistake.

Nasser was forced into the hands of the extremists, otherwise known as the Arab "Progressive" bloc. This included Nasser's republican Yemeni satrapy, where such things as public executions by machine-gunning victims in the town squares are done.

Most important, Nasser played into the hands of Syria, whose left-wing Ba'athist Government had gone along but never agreed with the Arab summitry policy in the first place. Instead of a careful buildup, the Syrians wanted war with Israel at once—what they called a "war of popular liberation"

Translated, this meant arming and financing several groups of Palestinian commandos to conduct sabotage raids inside Israel. The Syrians started this up again in 1966, contrary to the urgings of the Arab summit policymakers who ruled that provocative raids into Israel should be suspended before they set off massive Israel retaliation. This was just what happened.

Thus the stage was set for the events which plunged the Middle East into war on June 5.

Seeds of the Cold War were sown in the Middle East long before the establishment of the state of Israel or Gamal Abdel Nasser's assumption of power in Egypt in 1954. The Czarist Russians long had a consuming interest in the region, stemming from strategic considerations, specifically from a desire for an assured outlet to warm-water ports on the Mediterranean and a greater influence in the countries on Russia's southern borders. Russia's Catherine the Great longed to acquire Turkish Constantinople and found there a new empire. Constantinople would have given Russia the port it wanted, as well as access through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorous to the Mediterranean. In the Crimean War, the Czarist armies of

Alexander were stopped just short of attaining Catherine's goal. Under Lenin and Stalin, the Communists seemed to lose interest in the Middle East. But after World War II, the traditional Russian attraction to the South began to assert itself once more.

The Western powers have had an even deeper interest in the Middle East, both strategic and commercial. France and Britain have historically attempted to retain a foothold in the region, at first largely to keep open their vital lifelines to the Far East. When the Suez Canal opened and the Arabian deserts began gushing oil, the old rivalries for Middle Eastern influence intensified.

To the United States, the Middle East represents a possible barrier against any Russian attempt to flank Turkey and India. During the World War II period, the Soviets made two moves toward the Middle East. They reportedly demanded of Turkey the right to install their own naval bases on the Bosphorous and on the Dardanelles. Later, Red Army units rolled south into Iran's Azerbaijan Province. In November, 1945, a Communist revolt erupted in Azerbaijan, and two autonomous Red republics were proclaimed, one at Tabriz and the other at Mahabad. Iranian army units, seeking to put down the uprising, were barred from the provinces by the Red Army.

Aroused by the strategic implications of Russia's actions, the United States insisted that the Soviet forces be withdrawn by January 1, 1946. They departed in May of that year and, within a few months, Iranian authority was reestablished in Azerbaijan.

For almost the next decade, occupied by problems in Eastern Europe as well as the triumph of Communism in China and then by the Korean War, the Soviets paid little attention to the Middle East. But with Stalin's death, policy shifted again. Nikita Khrushchev began expounding friendship with everyone—especially the revolutionary leaders of the world's new, underdeveloped nations. Prominent among them were the Arabs of the Middle East.

Khrushchev's plan was obvious. It is almost certain he had no immediate intention of trying to install Communist regimes in the Middle Eastern countries. They fitted none of the Marxist-Leninist qualifications. But he reasoned that the Middle East's new leaders, self-proclaimed "anticolonialists and antiimperialists," would work diligently to undercut Western

influence and prestige wherever they could. Such aims dovetailed precisely with the Kremlin's objective of making trouble for and trying to oust the Western powers from all their foreign outposts.

Spouting neutralism, anticolonialism and antiimperialism, Nasser was a perfect candidate for a leading role in Khrushchev's drama. In 1954, the Kremlin completed a trade agreement with Nasser that formalized the Cold War relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union. Nasser and the Russians had turned an important corner in Middle Eastern history.

Disturbed by these events, the Western Allies—led by the United States—decided on a counterthrust. They struck on a plan to extend their own anti-Soviet security line deep into Islam. With Turkey already committed to NATO, the allies negotiated the Baghdad Pact, to which Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Britain subscribed. Though the United States did not formally join, it assigned representatives to the pact's various economic and military committees. The alliance group became the "Northern Tier" defense system against Russia in the Middle East.

The Baghdad Pact was assailed immediately not only by Khrushchev but by Nasser, who called it a "conspiracy" to entice Arab states into the West's defense system. The Soviet Union promptly leaped over the "Northern Tier" and in 1955 arranged an arms agreement between Nasser and Moscow's agent-state, Czechoslovakia.

On July 14, 1958, the "Northern Tier" was severely undermined by General Abdul Karim Kassim's overthrow of the Iraqi Government in a violent one-day coup. Pro-Western King Faisal and Prime Minister Nuri As-Said were slain in cold blood. Kassim then signed a pact with Nasser, established diplomatic relations with Russia and other Communist states and signed a series of agreements to acquire Communist arms.

The Iraqi coup had immediate Cold War repercussions. On July 15, the day after the coup, the United States began landing Marines in Lebanon in response to the Lebanese Government's request for help against Moslem rebels reportedly supported by Nasser. The contingent ultimately grew to nearly 15,000 men. Four days after the American landings, British forces, escorted by fifty United States navy jet fighters, landed to secure the legitimate government in nearby Jordan. Moscow called the Marine landing a "direct act of war," and threatened

to take "necessary measures." Khrushchev called for a United Nations Summit Conference on the Middle East but later withdrew his proposal and nothing further came of it. On July 17, two days after the landings, Nasser flew hastily to Moscow for talks with Khrushchev. He reportedly asked the Soviet leader what Russia would do if the Western powers attacked Iraq or Syria. Cairo sources said Khrushchev replied he would send "volunteers" immediately to aid the U.A.R. if Nasser requested them. The Moscow-Cairo relationship now took on some of the character of a military alliance.

To win the favor of the Arabs, Moscow used a variety of devices—Grants and loans, trade and cultural agreements, the promise to build Nasser's billion-dollar dam at Aswan and, finally, Khrushchev's making Nasser a hero of the Soviet Union. But the device the Arabs liked the most was the Kremlin's new policy on Israel. Although the Soviet Union had been one of the first nations in the world to recognize the Jewish state during the 1950's, Moscow began drawing sharply away from Tel Aviv. Russia's new strategy already was to use Israel to turn the Arab states increasingly against the Western nations to implement its policy. The Soviet Union made its greatest contribution to unrest in the Middle East when Russia decided to furnish its Arab allies with limitless supplies of the latest military weapons.

Starting in 1955, Moscow stuffed arms steadily into the U.A.R., Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Algeria. The Soviets are estimated to have turned over to Nasser alone some \$1.5 billion worth of military equipment, including such choice items as submarines, SAM (surface-to-air) missiles, MIG jet interceptors and SU-7 jet fighters, one of the best planes in the world. Other Soviet arms shipments to Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Algeria are estimated to total at least \$1 billion.

Further, the Russians brought 800 to 1,000 Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi and other officers to the Soviet Union every year for military training and indoctrination, thereby assuring themselves of a corps of potential agents in the Arab states. The arming, training and indoctrination programs inevitably forged a tight link between Moscow and the Arab states, where the armies are normally the most powerful political forces in the country. In effect, Moscow was making the Arab countries into satellites.

Inevitably, Soviet weapons shipments to Nasser and his

friends forced the United States, along with Britain and France, into playing the same game. As Egypt, Syria and Iraq received more Red arms, such Arab states as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon—which were Nasser's enemies—turned to the West for weapons. Thus there developed a dangerous arms rivalry not only between Israelis and Arabs but among Arabs themselves.

The Arabs vied with one another in the vehemence of their anti-Israel campaigns. As its neighbors obtained arms from Russia, and the United States, Israel sought and obtained weapons from the United States, Britain and—notably jet fighters and air-to-air missiles—from France. For Israel, the weapons were defense necessities. To Nasser, they represented further evidence of a Western scheme to arm his enemies. To the United States, arms to any Middle Eastern nation, including Israel, built unwanted tension, but to the Soviets, the uproar was music. It increased Arab hostility to the West.

In an attempt to restore some sort of equilibrium in the Middle East, the United States made a new effort to emphasize economic aid. "Recognizing that during the next few decades the Near East faces a stormy period of social and political evolution," says a 1967 State Department memorandum on the U.A.R., "U.S. policy for the area centers on trying to make that process as rapid and orderly as possible. Consequently, the U.S. has provided the U.A.R. technical assistance, development and balance of payment loans and large quantities of agricultural commodities, especially wheat. U.S. aid . . . since World War II through June 30, 1966, when our last agreement expired, totaled a little over \$1 billion."

Breaking these figures down, the United States sold to the U.A.R. for Egyptian currency at least \$850 million worth of wheat to feed Nasser's hungry millions. Until mid-1966, when U.A.R.-American relations collapsed, the United States had been shipping to Egypt most of the 200,000 tons of food Nasser had to obtain abroad each month to feed his people.

In recent years, the United States also provided some \$70 million in grants and food aid to Syria, Nasser's more belligerent but also more economically viable ally. Syria also received \$80-150 million in loans from Russia, \$16 million from Communist China and \$87 million in financial assistance for construction projects from West Germany.

But, lamentably, American attempts to divert the belliger-

ence of the Arabs away from Israel, to dilute Soviet influence in the Arab world and to counter the massive importation of arms all proved futile. The Cold War persisted and even became worse, leading directly to the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and, ironically, to a massive defeat for the Arabs and for Soviet foreign policy.

For almost twenty years, the Middle East has contained one of those monuments to man's inhumanity that recur in history: the refugee camps where more than a million victims of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 sit and wait. What they are waiting for is unclear. The role they play is that of pawn in the relations between the Arab states and Israel. For twenty years, they have themselves vegetated, while their presence inflames already deadly hatreds. The refugee problem, real as it is, has been treated as just another weapon by those who have a stake in discord.

The war of 1948 forced 800,000 Arabs out of their former homes in Palestine. The Israelis maintain that the Arab League called on all Palestine Arabs to flee to avoid the "massacres" that Arab soldiers intended to inflict on the Jews. The Arabs reply that the refugees were seeking to escape such outrages as the slaughter of all the residents of an Arab village by Jewish terrorists on April 9, 1948. Whatever the reason for their flight, the refugees never have been able to return home—largely because of the refusals by Israel and the Arab states to cooperate in solving the problem. And now their number is estimated at substantially more than a million.

Originally, Israel declared that any resolution of the refugee problem had to be part of a peace settlement with the Arab states. The Arabs answered that there could be no peace settlement until the refugees were given back the homes and land they once occupied in Israel.

Israel has since shifted its position and has said it would consider negotiating a settlement without linking it to a peace treaty. In 1949, it offered to accept 100,000 refugees on a selective basis, though Israelis felt concern that repatriated Arabs might be a threat to the state's internal security. Israel has also accepted the principle of compensation for the refugees, and a UN conciliation commission for Palestine put at \$336 million the value of their former holdings. But the issue of compensation became lost in an intra-Arab argument over

that figure. Some Arab leaders insisted it should be \$5.6 billion. In fact, the Arabs have steadfastly refused any settlement which did not consist of the restoration of all Arab properties in Israel, a solution that the Jews have rejected as totally unrealistic. So the Arabs who fled Palestine nineteen years ago still are refugees, living miserably in barracks, shacks and huts, ill-fed and ill-clothed, wanted by nobody.

Jammed into fifty-four camps in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Jordan, they are batted around like shuttlecocks, burning with revenge and sustained by illusory dreams of regaining their homes. They are supported primarily by the United Nations Work and Relief Agency for Palestine Refugees, which has collected and spent \$558 million since 1950 to keep them alive. Of that amount, the United States contributed \$387 million, the Arab states \$13 million and Israel \$256,000. But the refugees' lot is pitiful and is not getting better.

The attitude of most Arab states toward the refugees was probably most precisely expressed in 1954 by Ralph Galloway, a former United Nations Work and Relief Agency worker. "The Arab States don't want to solve the refugee problem, they want to keep it an open sore, as an affront to the United Nations and a weapon against Israel. Arab leaders don't give a damn whether the refugees live or die."

There can be no argument that the Arab states have refused to resolve the problem. Egypt and Syria have consistently declined to accept the refugees as immigrants or to join any United Nations resettlement plan. By 1958, only nine thousand refugees had been assimilated by Arab states. Cairo and Damascus radio exhort the refugees daily in the most inflammable terms to war on the Israelis, to "Drive the Jews into the sea," to hate Israel, the United Nations, the United States and the West as their betrayers. In 1955, when Jordan's then pro-Western King Hussein was considering joining the Baghdad Pact, Nasser incited the Jordanian refugees into such wild and tumultuous demonstrations that the monarch shelved the idea. In the major refugee camps and concentrations in the Gaza Strip and on the west bank of the Jordan River, Egyptian and Syrian agents spread hatred and recruit the young people for terror and sabotage raids into Israel.

The most sinister development in recent years among the refugees is the establishment of a Palestine Liberation Organization and its military arm, the Palestine Liberation Army.

They are sworn to wipe out Israel and return the refugees to their former homes in the Jewish state.

The Palestine Liberation Organization was founded by one Ahmed Shukairy, a 60-year-old ultra-left Palestine lawyer with an Egyptian passport and self-claimed ties with Russia and Communist China. Shukairy dates his Palestine Liberation Organization back to the early 1950's, but it made no particular impact until a decade later. His army is estimated to contain some 10,000 to 15,000 men and is purportedly organized for guerrilla warfare in Israel. Palestine Liberation Army units have been trained in Syria, Egypt and Iraq, and are armed with Russian and Red Chinese light weapons. Shukairy's "soldiers" slipped into some of the Gaza and Sinai positions abandoned by the United Nations Emergency Force when it was withdrawn at Nasser's demand from Egyptian territory. On the eve of the war, June 5, 1967, Shukairy was trumpeting "We will wipe Israel off the face of the map and no Jew will remain alive."

By 1967, Nasser's fortunes at home and abroad were dimming, his policies proving futile. His jet planes, guns and apparent use of poison gas in Yemen were accomplishing nothing, except to arouse more Jordanian and Saudi Arabian opposition to him. His attempts to seize British held Aden with guerrillas were rebuffed. Syria, calling for war with Israel, was accusing Nasser of hiding behind the United Nations Emergency Force on Egypt's borders instead of attacking the Jewish state.

Then, with consummate boldness, and perhaps in desperation, Nasser demanded the withdrawal of the UN force and rushed his troops into the Sinai. Moving swiftly, he blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba and Israel's port of Elath.

The Arabs, to whom any move against Israel is a rousing battle cry, rallied unanimously to Nasser. Jordan and Saudi Arabia, forgetting Nasser's dogged attempts for years to bring down their rulers, stepped swiftly to his side. Pledges of anti-Israeli support came from all over the Arab world, from Kuwait to Algeria.

Then, almost magnanimously, Nasser announced that he wanted no conflict. But he added that if war came, his objective would be the "destruction" of Israel.

On the eve of war, he implied broadly that the Soviet Union had promised to back the Arabs against Israel. He seemed

anxious to prove to the Arabs that, thanks to him, they had a powerful ally in Moscow.

But now, events were moving so fast that control slipped from Nasser's hands.

– CHAPTER III –

ROAD TO WAR, 1967

Israeli-Syrian border clashes. Egypt deploys. The strategic picture. Israeli's superior combat-readiness. Nasser's military inefficiency. General Itzhak Rabin.

WAR RARELY comes suddenly, any more than a pot "suddenly" boils over. There are signs that statesmen and generals watch for and react to. Sometimes diplomacy heads off actual war. Sometimes it is tried and it fails—and then the outbreak of actual fighting is considered to have started suddenly.

So it was in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The signs were there in the continuing and increasing tension along Israel's 639-mile frontier, particularly the 47-mile stretch where Israel looks toward the fortified ridges of Syria, and, to a lesser degree, along the 329 miles where Jordan bulges deep in Israel.

There were fifty United Nations observers at ten posts on the Israel-Syria frontier, along which raids and counter-raids were common. UN observers, from six posts in Syria and four in Israel, compiled reports on violations, but they seemed unable to do much about them.

The UN file on border problems between Israel and her Arab neighbors was huge. Thirteen months before war broke, UN Secretary-General U Thant refused an Israeli request to list all such border incidents, saying that the list would be too long, and hence unusable. There had been more than 100,000 incidents since 1949.

Many were trivial—if attempts at sabotage and murder are trivial. But in the months before the 1967 war, the incidents became increasingly brutal and on an ever larger scale.

It was not one-sided. If Syria's ambitious colonels ordered brutal raids, Israel's people ordered counteraction just as vicious. If Ahmed Shukairy's rancorous Palestine Liberation Army terrorists sowed terror from the Gaza Strip and Jordan refugee villages, Israel's tough-minded settlers and army were capable of violent reaction. In November, 1966, one Israeli force lashed across the Jordanian frontier and struck Es Samu village, evacuating the people, dynamiting their homes. The UN condemned Israel for the raid and set the toll at 18 persons killed, 134 wounded and 127 buildings destroyed.

By January, the ugly confrontation with Syria had come to involve tank battles. Syria moved Soviet-built T-34's onto the heights overlooking the Sea of Galilee. The Israelis destroyed one of them in a two-hour battle on January 11. Syria and Israel traded artillery fire across the Hulah Valley. Syria claimed to have destroyed three border posts, an arms depot and a fuel station, and said that it had driven away Israeli fighter planes that sought to intervene.

On February 5, Israel warned Syria through diplomatic channels that if raids into Israeli territory did not cease, Israel would retaliate heavily. It did no good. Heavy firing broke out in early April. Israeli jets streaked into action and downed six Syrian planes. Three MIG-21's fell in Syria, the others across the Yarmuk River in Hashemite Jordan.

As Radio Damascus told their citizens, the action went this way:

An exchange of fire with enemy positions followed [earlier action] and our forces destroyed two more tractors and two tanks. At this point, the gangster state lost its nerve and at 13:40 sent its air force into battle and attacked houses of peaceful civilians. Our Syrian aces engaged enemy planes three times and shot down five enemy aircraft. At the same time, our artillery pounded enemy positions and completely destroyed emplacements in the following Israeli settlements: Kawash, Ain Jeep, Haon, and Beit Kasir.

Major General Itzhak Rabin, Israel's Chief of Staff who was to become famous in the lightning war in two months, was not as wordy. Despite previous raids, Syria had so far avoided frontal encounters with Israel, he said. But this time they had

gone too far. "Today," Rabin said, "they discovered they had erred a little."

The aerial encounter foreshadowed what was to happen in the June war. U.S. Intelligence officials read the one-sided results carefully. Russian shipments of recent-make arms in massive quantities to both Syria and Egypt had for the first time brought uncertainty—however small—into the high confidence of American military men in Israel's ability to cope with the combined weight of all likely Arab opponents. The April air battle results restored confidence in Israeli power.

As "a mark of esteem," the promotion date of Israeli Air Force Commander Mordkhai Hod, 40, to Brigadier General was advanced two weeks. The announcement acknowledged Hod's role in the Syrian air battle. His promotion made him one of eleven "Alufs"—ranging in age from 39 to 47—in the Israeli armed forces. "Aluf" is a biblical term for a leader of the highest rank.

Syria may have believed her own reports, or the results of the April battle may only have increased her bitterness and intensified pressures for revenge. She continued her militancy and shouted new demands for Arab unity in crushing the hated Jew.

Noses bloodied by Israel, Syria chanted to the Arabic world for a new affirmation of unity. It came. To Damascus in mid-May flew Lieutenant General Mahmoud Fawzi, United Arab Republic Chief of Staff, with other senior U.A.R. military leaders, for conferences with Syria's ruling military circles on how to smash the Jews, and how to unite the Arabic countries for a new Jihad (Holy War) for which a united military command had been created three years earlier by agreement between the U.A.R. and Iraq.

Troop movements began in Egypt. Tanks rumbled through Cairo streets, shunning bypass routes and taking routes apparently calculated to impress Western diplomats. Emboldened by \$1.5 billion in Russian military hardware choking his depots, Nasser called for withdrawal of buffering United Nations truce-keeping forces along the sandy, sun-scorched border. The United Arab Republic ordered mobilization—matched quietly by Israel—and announced on May 22 that Iraqi forces were flying to Egypt to join their Arab brothers. In Cairo, air raid sirens were tested, adding excitement to the vacations of several thousand American and European tourists whose big-

gest moments until then had been in spotting bargains in camel saddles.

Robert C. Toth, *Los Angeles Times* correspondent in Israel, was able to circumvent military censorship on the scope of the Israeli mobilization before hostilities. To keep the extent of the call-up secret, Israel said it had undertaken "partial mobilization." Censors would pass no other phrase. Deep in a story on war preparations filed three days before the fighting began, Toth inserted the phrase, "Israel's partial mobilization was Ivory-pure." The story cleared. On the foreign desk in Los Angeles, editors quickly realized Toth was referring to the Ivory soap slogan—99 and 44/100ths percent pure—and rewrote Toth's lead paragraph to say that Israel was "fully mobilized."

But even with full mobilization, it seemed that Israel was at a disadvantage in some respects. On paper, Arab strength appeared overwhelming—in manpower, in tanks, in jets. Most equipment was Russian-made, although both Saudi Arabia and Jordan had been recipients of U.S. military assistance in the continuing American effort to preserve a three-way arms balance in the Middle East.

Egypt also had what appeared on paper to be a deadly rocket potential. Nasser possessed an inventory of three classes of missiles, estimated to total more than one hundred. They were the Al Kahir (Conqueror), first test fired in 1962, with a range of 370 miles; Al Zafir (Victory), slightly smaller with a range of 230 miles; and Al Ared (Vanguard), a two-stage version of Al Kahir with a range of 950 miles. Each could carry a warhead of 1,000 to 1,500 pounds of explosives.

German scientists helped develop the rockets initially. But the experts who assisted in building the rockets knew little about modern guidance systems and, in 1965, the United Arab Republic tried to recruit 45 West German technicians trained at Litton Industries, a major United States electronics Corporation. As early as 1963, Israel had made representations to the Bonn Government about the Germans who were helping Egyptian arms-makers. The West German government persuaded 30 of the 45 electronics experts not to accept the Egyptian offer. The others went to Egypt but their results were unimpressive. The Egyptian rockets were so inaccurate as to make them useless without area-destruction nuclear warheads. Some experts believed Egypt might have fired them

only if Cairo herself were threatened by Israeli ground forces, and then only as a last-ditch, everything-but-the-kitchen-sink effort.

There were varying complications and comparisons of relative strengths in the Middle East. In general, estimates of outside Intelligence groups tended to err on the high side for both Israel and the Arab countries, counting, for example, self-propelled guns as tanks and assuming that if war broke out, each country would be able to put into immediate combat all equipment it was believed to possess. For Israel, this was not entirely an erroneous conclusion. For maintenance-starved Arab countries, it was an illusion.

For a comparison of strength at the outbreak of war, see the figures in the table on page 52.

Much has been written about Israel's capacity to build an atomic bomb. Unquestionably, Israel has the scientific knowledge and the industrial capacity to develop nuclear warheads quickly. Required is only a political decision to assign top priority to the project and the commitment of much of Israel's resources and technical manpower to the effort. Some believe Israel already has nuclear bombs, but there is no first-hand evidence. For the moment, Israel appears confident that it can handle its enemies with conventional weapons.

The Institute for Strategic Studies, which reports reliably from London on world military strengths, credited Israel with 350 combat aircraft, all French-made. Only 170 were first-line planes of recent make: 72 Mirage III-C interceptor in three squadrons; 18 Super Mystère interceptors in one squadron; 40 Mystère IV-A fighter-bombers in two squadrons; and 40 Ouragan fighter-bombers in two squadrons. Sixty Magister jet trainers could also be used in ground attack roles if necessary.

Egypt alone had 130 MIG-21's, plus 80 MIG-19's and 150 MIG-15 and MIG-17's, and about a dozen SU-7's, added to 40 obsolescent twin-jet II-28 light bombers. Russia had also provided Egypt with about 30 huge TU-16 strategic bombers, unnecessary and probably too expensive to operate for the limited combat ranges of a war confined to the Middle East, but given to Nasser probably because he wanted the big jets for prestige.

In administering its own military assistance or arms sales programs abroad, the United States tries to avoid such prestige gifts or purchases. Although the aim is not always accurate,

Comparison of Arab and Israeli Forces

	EGYPT	SYRIA	IRAQ	JORDAN	LEBANON	SAUDI ARABIA	COMBINED ARAB FORCES	TOTAL ISRAELI FORCES
MANPOWER active, reserve	310,000	115,000	82,000	70,000	11,000	55,000	643,000	300,000
Army	280,000	104,000	70,000	69,000	10,000	50,000	565,000	291,000
active	160,000	54,000		38,000		30,000		71,000
reserve	120,000	50,000		30,000		20,000		220,000
Navy	11,000 +5,000 reserve	1,300	1,800		200	1,000	15,300	3,000
Air Force	15-20,000	9,000	10,000	1,500	600	4,000	40 to 45,100	8 to 14,000
HARDWARE								
Tanks	1,400	600	300	250	150		2,700	800
Aircraft	550	150	200	80	50	60	1,090	approx. 400
fighters	400	105	95	61	39	50	800	190
bombers	70	28	44	0	0	0	142	103
transports	140	6	80	17	9	5	257	48
Ships	114	47	23	3	5	25	217	37

the goal is still to tailor military hardware both to potential threats and a recipient nation's ability to operate equipment with the least foreseeable drain on its economy or skill.

One American official with Middle Eastern experience contrasts the U.S. process with Russian practice. American equipment is given after long negotiations covering maintenance and spare parts requirements and careful U.S. attempts to evaluate whether and how much special schooling will be needed to operate and maintain the equipment. With Russia, the process often consists of Soviet military officers sitting down with Arab leaders who have compiled "shopping lists" which are compared with the Russian "availability list." If items on the lists match, the Russians are likely to turn over the equipment with few strings attached.

If Arab numbers seemed overwhelming, American military leaders were quick to caution that the numbers game alone was misleading in comparing Arab and Israeli potential. Professional evaluations of strength took great account of comparative morale, training and maintenance. On all three counts, Israel was superior by a large margin.

One factor illustrates the disparity. Egypt has just under 30 percent literacy; Syria, about the same; Iraq and Saudi Arabia even less. Israelis are for all practical purposes universally literate. The Israeli army is itself partly responsible for the high literacy rate. In the early days Israel was forced to gather in illiterate Jews from the African and Asian ghettos. The army became the biggest educational institution in the country, teaching dark-skinned Yemen and Moroccan Jews how to read and write as well as how to fight, and inculcating in them at the same time a devotion to Israel's survival.

If a nation is highly literate, training is fast and thorough. Skilled mechanics learn to operate complex equipment. Infantry noncommissioned officers in the heat of battle can read scribbled message orders. If the soldiery is illiterate, training must be on-the-job training. A truck driver, faced with a new mechanical breakdown, cannot read a maintenance manual to improvise a solution to the problem. Communication must be by voice and example.

Military experts also discounted the outpouring of military pledges to Nasser from other Arab nations in the final tense days of the confrontation with Israel. Iraq, for example, has

its own problems with a Kurdish minority in its northern mountains. Any larger-scale transfer of Iraqi ground troops would encourage the wild Kurds to strike out from mountain hideouts. Iraqi participation was expected to be largely token and symbolic and, so far as military effectiveness was concerned, largely in the form of aircraft participation. Only one Iraqi unit was airlifted to Egypt in time to move to the Sinai, and even that small-scale movement led to an increase in Kurd activity.

Faced with the constant threat of annihilation by an Arab ring tight against her borders, Israel spends heavily for defense—ten percent of her \$4 billion gross national product. This is a slightly greater proportion than the United States spends.

To get value received for this outlay, Israel relies on citizen soldiers who are paid only while training or fighting. Few Israeli soldiers live on government bounty, idly shining shoes in garrison, waiting for a war to break out.

With Israel's small size—7,800 square miles—and enemies poised in view on her borders instead of across long seas, mobilization must be effective immediately, and citizen soldiers must be able to sight through tank periscopes at opponents within hours of being called.

Moreover, the omnipresent threat is so large and the population so small that Israel could not afford a standing army large enough to defend it against sudden attack. The response has to be by a trained citizenry, men and women who can spend the rest of the time at tasks productive in the national economy.

Oddly, mobilization arrangements are patterned in part on a 3,000-year-old battle plan of King Solomon. King Solomon's old fortress at Megiddo was regarded as an archaeological curiosity because while it included storage space for food and wine for 5,000 men and assembly space for 300 war chariots, the stables were built for only 30 horses. More research revealed that the fort had a peacetime garrison of only about 100 men. If war threatened, 30 would saddle up the few horses in the standing army and charge around the countryside to rally farmers, summoning them to service in the fort where combat equipment was kept ready.

So it is with Israeli defense forces today. The regular army has only four 4,000-man brigades, one of them paratroopers, plus a separate armored command of division size. But the

reserve has another 24 brigades, one-third armored. It adds up to 60,000 regulars and about 204,000 reservists.

Again, however, military experts don't class the Israeli reservists as they do those of the Arab countries or even of the United States. Combat-readiness of the Israeli reserve and the mobilization potential is such that for practical purposes the entire force, regular and reserve, is credited to the battle potential of Israel the moment war breaks out, not after 30-day or 60-day mobilization periods.

In Israel, almost everyone serves. Wartime mobilization puts ten percent of the population in uniform, a feat matched by few if any other nations. The percentage has been higher—25 percent in 1948 during the first Arab war, when Israel had a much smaller population.

Universal military training claims all men and women between the ages of 17½ and 18½. Everyone serves except Arabs, mothers, the insane, pregnant women and women who take an oath that military service violates religious principles.

Conscripted women serve 20 to 24 months, men 26 to 30, depending on rank and branch of service, all at \$5 a month. With certain limited exceptions, no one may become a regular without having been a conscript. Nor can conscripts become officers or senior sergeants without completing basic conscription service.

After this basic service the Israeli becomes of use in national war plans. Released from active training duty, he is assigned to a frontline reserve unit until age 39, then transferred to a home guard or civil defense unit until the age of 50.

Reservists must take thirty days' field training yearly, plus one day a month for weapons training and target practice. Sergeants have six additional monthly training periods; officers, twelve additional monthly training days.

For effective mobilization, a reserve needs effective procedures. It needs equipment ready where it is likely to be used. A large part of the Israeli regular army is assigned to equipment depots and tank parks. Regulars keep weapons clean, periodically warm up jeep engines, spot-check engines and radio equipment, make sure that mobilization flashlights have new batteries and that first aid pack drugs have not aged beyond usefulness.

As reservists are mobilized, so are city buses. Israeli soldiers ride to battle in the same buses they might otherwise be riding to their office jobs. A reservist who in civilian life drives a tractor with a piggy-back trailer can expect on mobilization to drive the same vehicle — this time with a tank on the trailer to move to front lines faster without using fuel from the tank.

All private aircraft are mobilized into the air force, private boats into the navy, and heavy mechanical equipment such as cranes, generators and power winches, into the corps of engineers. In the 1956 Sinai campaign, ice cream trucks from Tel Aviv, plastered with mud for camouflage, carried rations to desert troops. It happened in 1967, too.

Reservists are mobilized by radio or code phrases on movie screens: "Open Window," "Electric Boiler," "Men of Work," "Wedding March." The flaw in the system is that it is self-disclosing; it becomes obvious that mobilization is under way. For mobilization on a more clandestine basis, taxicab drivers, telegraph messengers and mailmen are called to reserve headquarters to get mobilization orders prepared in advance. They are expected to know the names and addresses of reservists by heart.

Pinned against the Mediterranean by a noose of hostile neighbors, Israel enjoys one considerable geographic advantage: possession of tight interior lines of communication compared to the loose exterior lines of any alliance of Arabs that might wish Israel harm. Israel thus operates within a tight circle with supply lines running outward like spokes. An Arab alliance, on the other hand, if it wishes to shift troops around the Israeli frontier, must move long distances around the outer edge of the perimeter.

The peculiar boundaries that Israel inherited after the 1948 war negate some of the advantages of the interior position. Originally, the new nation was to have extended west from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River, a straighter border and one vastly more defensible than that with which Israel wound up. Instead, the frontier was drawn where tough Jordanian troops stood when firing ceased. They held a salient, pinching Israel to a narrow waist above Tel Aviv, one point just over seven miles across. Tel Aviv itself can be reached by long-range Jordanian artillery emplaced in the hills behind Fajja.

Holding the coastal sector opposite the Jordanian bulge is

vital to Israeli survival. To avoid being cut in two by a Jordanian attack would require 80,000 to 120,000 men fighting a purely defensive battle. Depending on Jordanian intentions — in 1956, Jordan elected to sit out the war — Israel must decide how to place its troops and reserve enough men from other areas to insure that the coastal waist can be held. Weakened defenses might encourage Jordan participation, which might otherwise not have taken place. Or Israel can elect not to defend but to attack in the hope of pushing Jordanian positions back from the coastal waist.

To the south, across the empty spaces of the Negev desert, Israel holds the port of Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba. Elath sits at the point of a triangle, with Egyptian Sinai along the hypotenuse and Jordan along the long straight side. The desert road to Elath, umbilical cord to populated areas on the Mediterranean, is under both Egyptian and Jordanian guns. An aggressive armor strike at many points across the southern Sinai would cut the cord and sever Elath from the Israel body.

These two geographic facts compel immediate decisions when war threatens, but decisions must be based, too, on what foe or combination of foes Israel faces. Egypt, obviously, is a likely opponent in any war. So a decision must be made based on Egyptian troop dispositions and on the defensibility of the port of Elath. Or a decision can be made not to defend but to attack Egyptian concentrations to spoil preparations for Arab attack.

The terrain where the two nations join in the southern Sinai is difficult but not impassable. Tanks can move. The problem is not so much with tactical units as it is with supply elements nourishing them.

To the north of Israel, the border with Syria is relatively defensible. In 19 years, Israel created a defense in depth which could hold the Syrian army. The same applies to the Lebanese border. The 10,000-man Lebanese army is not offensively oriented. It would be busy trying to prevent an Israeli offensive overrunning Beirut.

Both in 1956 and 1967, the critical task for Israel was destruction of the Egyptian army, the largest among the Arabs, and, under Nasser, the most bellicose. Critical for containing or destroying the Egyptian army was the northern Sinai, where

Egypt's Russian-made tanks posed the greatest threat to Israeli population centers.

To the north, Syrian tanks and guns were dug in on high ground. Unless Egyptian and Jordanian threats were eliminated first, Israel would be hard-put to concentrate enough forces to punch quickly through the Syrian defenses. A military decision there would take longer unless Israel could concentrate a large force.

Hence, in war, Israel's strategy is largely fixed by geography, modified by the composition and movements of whatever Arab alliance is arrayed against her. Two of the few strategic elements left to Israel are timing—whether to await attack—and choice of weapons for the initial blows.

In the decade since the second war against Israel, not a single major Egyptian military flaw was remedied. The army had more tanks, but it was not a better army. It remained a conglomeration of illiterate peasants serving upper-caste officers whose main interest in a military life was the path it provided to high office in a government ruled by soldiers. The same situation prevailed in the Syrian army.

Both Arab armies had been drained of many competent officer-technicians to operate essential government services which, under military rule, were directly run by men in uniform. Each army rested on a fragile national economic base. Among the Arab countries, Jordan alone stood to gain significantly from an Arab victory. Jordan might get direct access to the Mediterranean. But territory gained by either Syria or Egypt would be trifling compared to the vast areas of poverty and squalor already under their control. An Israel divided among victors would feed few additional Egyptian fellahin; it would add little to a Syrian national treasury depleted by expenditures for a major war. Only if the Arabs disarmed after crushing a fancied threat from Israel would the war result in economic and social development in a better Arab world. And disarmament would be the last policy the Arab world would pursue after the military glories that would attend defeat of Israel.

The Arab soldier, conscripted from his village on the Nile, was likely to be about 25 and illiterate, baffled by the world he was drawn into beyond his home, brutalized by noncoms and all but ignored by officers. He was told by constant propaganda

that he must hate a people because of their religion although he probably never encountered any of its followers. Also, if he were a devout Moslem and knew his Koran, he would perhaps sense that the hated religion provided much of the basis for his own belief:

Though that to come is better, and is everlasting.
For this of a truth was in the books of old,
The books of Abraham and Moses.

Trained with weapons from another country, the Egyptian soldier was sent into the desert—and it must be remembered that the Egyptians are not a desert people. Their life for centuries has centered around the Nile, not in the sand and sun of the desert. If war came, his officers told him to fight, but native shrewdness told him he stood little to gain from victory. He fought under orders to gratify someone else's pride.

The citizen-soldier of Israel needed no propaganda, no troop information and no education program to tell him why he fought. Israel fought for survival. The Israeli soldier could often literally look over his shoulder and see the home he defended. Where the Arab soldier could have little memory of persecution by any but his own kind, the Jew carried in himself not only the personal knowledge of the threat the Arabs constantly voiced but the family memories of the gas ovens at Auschwitz. Destruction may have been abstract to the Arab; it was personal to the Jew.

The cultivated Arab officer had more to fight for than his men. Were he successful, his country would offer him a greater career; more opportunity to advance as a government or a business leader. The path to riches and prestige might lie through Tel Aviv.

Typical of the Arab officer corps was the Egyptian commander Mohammed Abdul Hakim Amer, who bore the exalted title of Field Marshal. Amer was Commander in Chief of Egyptian armed forces in the 1956 war, when Israel humiliated Egypt in the Sinai. In 1964, he became Commander in Chief of joint Arab forces and assumed the title of Deputy Supreme Commander for the United Arab Command. Nasser himself held the title of Supreme Commander.

Amer, 48, had been an officer since 1939, but most of his

posts were political. He was Minister of War and Marine from 1954-58; then Vice-President and Minister of War for the United Arab Republic from 1958 to 1962. For the next two years, he was a member of the Presidency Council, becoming in 1964 First Vice-President for the U.A.R. He was presidential representative to the Syrian Region from 1959-61. Nothing in his long career indicated that he was the kind of tough, hardened officer qualified to command winning armies in the field.

The Arab officer did not really hunger for glory in battle. The glitter that attracted him was in the counting-house or the court. He saw less reason for ferocity than for survival. The standards by which he was judged depended little on his skill or aggressiveness in battle. An Arab officer not only could survive without fighting hard; he stood a much better chance of surviving if he fought only briefly—and of this many Arab officers were well aware.

The Israeli officer presents a far different picture. Israeli Major General Itzhak Rabin climbed to the top in a profession he had not selected willingly. Like many native Israelis, he had wanted to be a farmer. He graduated from agricultural school, but in World War II, at 18, he joined Jewish forces fighting for the British against the Nazis. He rose steadily in the ranks and by 1944 had become a deputy battalion commander.

After the war, he participated in the underground struggle against the British. In the last phases of the battle he was arrested with other Zionist leaders and held in jail for six months.

In the war against the Egyptians in 1948, Rabin served as Chief of Operations for the southern sector. He took part in Negev battles, and played a major part in the fight for Jerusalem. Rabin, then a colonel, met Gamal Abdel Nasser for the first time when Nasser was a liaison officer for an Egyptian unit surrendering to the Israelis in the desert.

Promoted to Brigadier General in 1954, Rabin served in the 1956 war with great distinction as Northern Sector Commander. Later he attended the Army Staff College in Great Britain and took a short course in modern warfare at Fort Bliss, Texas.

Rabin's boyish, freckled face, his modesty and apparent humility belie a daring career. If, in Israel's finest hour, Moshe Dayan was the strategic genius of victory, Rabin proved himself a brilliant battle commander, with a thorough grasp of the demands of a war conducted on many fronts. His state-

ment to the Israeli people and to the world after the battle summed up the situation:

The Egyptians are defeated. All their efforts are aimed at withdrawing behind the Suez Canal, and we are taking care of that. The whole area is in our hands. The main effort of the Egyptians is to save themselves. The bulk of the Egyptian forces are fleeing in disorder, and we have occupied most of Sinai. We have fought with our own forces and nobody has aided us.

Casualties in the 1956 war further illustrate glaring differences in the Arab and Jewish hosts. Few Arab officers lay among the sun-blackened bodies in the Sinai. Most officers escaped to pursue their careers in Cairo. On the Israeli side, a third of the casualties were officers and combat leaders, killed as they led their men. The experience was repeated in 1967.

Discipline in the Israeli army was loose. There was little saluting, combined with a sloppiness of uniform that would drive a Fort Bragg drill master out of his well-curried mind.

"It's all right to say hello to everybody when you meet," an Israeli soldier told one observer, "so why can't you say hello by waving your hand and saying 'shalom'? Who needs saluting?"

Battle discipline is something else.

And the Israeli army is a battle army. Orders are followed; commanders who are not aggressive and competent are summarily relieved on the spot and replaced by those who fight. The result is predictable. Israeli officers lead and Israeli soldiers follow.

– CHAPTER IV –

UN IN CRISIS

The echo of the guns. The Eban-El Kony tilt. Story of U Thant's withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force. Thant flies to Cairo. Gulf of Aqaba blockaded.

GIDEON RAFAEL, Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, was awakened by a ring of the telephone in his Manhattan apartment at 300 Central Park West. It was 3 A.M., Eastern Daylight Time, on June 5, 1967. Foreign Minister Abba Eban was calling from Jerusalem.

War had broken out an hour before.

Six and a half hours later, Ambassador Hans Tabor of Denmark hammered the gavel and called the 1,347th meeting of the United Nations Security Council to order.

"At 3:10 this morning, the permanent representative of Israel to the United Nations informed me officially, in my capacity as president of the council, as follows," Tabor told council members.

"'I have just received reports that Egyptian land and air forces have moved against Israel and Israel forces are now engaged in repelling the Egyptian forces.'"

Twenty minutes after hearing from the Israeli ambassador, Tabor had received a second telephone call from Ambassador Mohamed Awad El Kony of the United Arab Republic. El Kony, too, had been awakened by a long-distance phone call. It was from Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in Cairo.

"Israel has committed a treacherous premeditated aggression against the United Arab Republic this morning," El Kony informed the Security Council president.

For two weeks, Gideon Rafael and Mohamed Awad El Kony

had been the chief antagonists in an agonizing drama played out on the floor of the United Nations. Both scholars and lawyers, each had poured his energy and his guile into mobilizing the world community in support of his country.

Rafael had emigrated to Palestine from Germany in the early 1930's, had battled for the independence of the Jewish state and then embarked on such hazardous missions as the rescue of Jews from Nazi-occupied countries throughout Europe in World War II. He had participated in the Nuremberg war crimes trials, served as ambassador to Belgium and was Deputy General of the Israeli foreign office. Now he has a son, Amnon, who was on duty with an Israeli tank unit. Barely a month before the Mideast crisis erupted, Rafael was appointed head of the Israeli mission to the UN.

El Kony is a vigorous 60-year-old who has been a diplomat for four decades and who trains for his current assignment by taking fast-paced long walks about New York. Like Rafael, El Kony is fluent in German, French and English. Egyptian ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1955 to 1960, he also speaks fluent Russian. Behind his stony face and beneath his bare Yul Brynner skull, he possesses a tough and resourceful mind. El Kony has been his country's representative to the UN since 1964. For two weeks, the focus at the UN had been on the bitter rivalry building between these two men and the countries they represented.

The United Nations has been involved in the Middle East crisis almost from the birth of the organization, serving as the instrument of peace in two wars but regarded with suspicion by both Arabs and Israelis. The Security Council has held more than two hundred meetings on the subject, one hundred more than on any other. The General Assembly has held special and emergency sessions and devoted hundreds of hours of regular sessions. The council and the assembly have created a dozen special mediation, relief and peace-keeping operations.

Some cynics have argued that the Middle East would be better off today if the United Nations had never existed and the two sides had fought to the finish in 1948 or again in 1956. It can just as easily be stated in reverse: the United Nations would be better off had the Middle East never existed, for the crises of recent years have exposed the basic weaknesses of the organization.

The record, despite all the UN's efforts, is one of occasional

greatness and frequent frailty, with intransigence of the principals the major factor frustrating a peaceful solution.

The first great achievement of the United Nations was negotiation of the general armistice agreements of 1949 following the truce agreements of 1948. Had Israel and the Arabs abided by the various resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and their own armistice agreements, there would have been no 1967 problem.

The great points of friction derived from defiance of key resolutions of the United Nations:

—Defiance of the Assembly resolution of 1948 allowing the Palestine refugees to choose between repatriation, compensation for property lost, or resettlement.

—Defiance of the Security Council resolution of 1951 calling on the United Arab Republic to give Israeli ships free passage through the Suez Canal.

—Violations of the 1949 armistice agreements between Israel and its four Arab neighbors. The agreements prohibited any aggressive action, but there has been a constant history of Arab terrorism and of increasingly intense punitive responses from Israel.

—Disregard of the 1956 settlement of the Suez war, beginning with Israel's refusal to accept UN Emergency Force troops on its side of the frontier, and culminating in May of 1967 in Cairo's demand for the withdrawal of the entire peace-keeping force and reimposition of its blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba.

The deterioration of the Middle East situation, intensified by the split between the big powers, took place in the early years in spite of the unanimity of the big powers. That unanimity, which extended into the early 1950's, permitted the Security Council to adopt some forty resolutions. Since 1954, however, the Soviet Union has used the threat of its veto to bar any resolution critical of the Arab position, although the threat has been carried out on only five Middle East resolutions.

By November 24, 1966, when the Security Council voted to censure Israel for the brutal retaliatory raid it had carried out against Jordan settlements around Hebron, the Middle East antagonists were on a collision course. As the pressure



(Keystone)

A young Orthodox Israeli soldier in the Negev



(Wide World)

Israeli Chief of Staff,
General Itzhak Rabin



(Pictorial Parade)

Commander of Israeli air
force, General Moreday Hod



(Wide World)

General Moshe Dayan



(Manning, N.Y. Times, from Wide World)

Sympathy in New York—members of Jewish Youth organizations parade up Riverside Drive



And volunteers from London—one helper headed for a kibbutz takes his guitar

(Keystone)




Yael Dayan, daughter of Israel's Defense Minister, in 1956

(Wide World)



General Dayan during his visit to Vietnam last year

(Keystone)




(Central Press, Pictorial Parade)

Egyptian aircraft destroyed before they left the ground

A burned-out Egyptian fighter plane at El Arish

(London Daily Express)



AT THE
UNITED NATIONS:

Syrian Ambassador
George Tomeh with the
U.S.S.R.'s Federenko



(Wide World)



(Wide World)

U.A.R. Ambassador Mohamed Awad el Kony



(Wide World)

Israeli Foreign Minister,
Abba Eban



(Wide World)

Arthur Goldberg



(London Daily Express, Pictorial Parade)

Israelis on the road into El Arish



(London Daily Express, Pictorial Parade)

Cairo crowds greeted U Thant's peace mission before the shooting began with boos and cries of "We Want War"

Israeli soldiers view Arab captives in El Arish

(Peter Skingley, UPI)





(Keystone)

Israeli army at El Arish

Arab soldier surrenders in Sinai desert


(Central Press, Pictorial Parade)





(London Daily Express, Pictorial Parade)

Orthodox Jews in the Holy City, after Egypt's agreement
to cease fire



An Israeli casualty in
Jerusalem's Orthodox
hospital

(Wide World)



(Keystone)


Raising the Israeli flag at El Arish




(Peter Skingley, UPI)

Israeli navy torpedo boat patrols the Tiran Strait June 10

(Wide World)



Israeli soldiers rest
at Government
Building in Gaza



One of thousands of
captured Russian
machine guns

(Keystone)

General Abdul Moneim Hussney, Egyptian Military Gov-
ernor of Gaza Strip, after capture by Israelis

(Keystone)





(George Partogh, UPI)

Israeli troops bearing prayer books gather at the Wailing
Wall in Old Jerusalem



Israel's President Zalman
Shazar at the Wailing
Wall

(Wide World)



(AFP Photo from Pictorial)

The sounding of the *shofar* at the Wailing Wall by
Senior Chaplain of the Israeli army, Rabbi Shlomo Goren




(Wide World)

Gamal Abdel Nasser on television, announcing his resignation. He later reconsidered

King Hussein describes Jordan's losses in the war

(Wide World)



rose, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko made a mysterious visit to Cairo in early 1967. He arrived there March 29, talked to Nasser and other Egyptian leaders for three days, and departed. The visit inspired much suspicion and speculation but no facts leaked beyond the walls of foreign ministries in Cairo and Moscow.

Until that visit, most diplomats were convinced that the Soviet Union had assumed a restraining role in the Middle East in an effort to avoid diversion from the challenges it faced from China. That was the impression left earlier by Premier Alexei Kosygin's visit to Cairo in May of 1966. The defense pact signed in November between Syria and the U.A.R. reportedly was encouraged by Moscow to restrain the hotheads in Damascus. There was no evidence, during Security Council debates over the Hebron incidents, that the Soviet Union wanted to provoke more trouble in the Middle East.

Six weeks after Kosygin's visit, however, the Soviet Union was to be identified by Nasser himself as the purveyor of inflammatory allegations against the United States. "Even our friends in the Soviet Union told the parliamentary delegation which was visiting Moscow early last month that there was a calculated intention," Nasser told his countrymen.

The "calculated intention" was an allegation that the United States was secretly plotting with Israel to overthrow the government in Damascus by sponsoring an Israeli invasion of Syria.

United Nations officials knew nothing of any secret Soviet warning to the U.A.R. but it took no great skill to see that trouble was brewing.

Strung along the Israeli-U.A.R. frontier, from the Gaza Strip to the Gulf of Aqaba, were 3,400 members of the UN Emergency Force, established by the UN General Assembly after the Suez invasion of 1956. Along Israel's frontiers with Lebanon, Syria and Jordan were 133 officers from the armies of a dozen nations, members of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), created in 1948 to police the 1949 armistice agreements.

Secretary General U Thant sent a warning to the Security Council on May 8. The situation on the Israel-Syrian frontier, he said, is "extremely tense and unstable and could easily erupt again as it did last month." He ordered General Odd Bull,

Norwegian commander of UNTSO, to try new initiatives to head off a disaster

At that point, the other frontiers appeared normal. The long border with the U.A.R., patrolled by UNEF, was quietest of all.

But Cairo and Damascus saw danger again on May 12 when they chose to interpret a speech by Premier Eshkol as an intent to make war. "We may have to adopt measures no less drastic than those of April 7," Eshkol was quoted as saying. "We have furnished proof that we shall not permit our borders to be opened to attack. . . We do not recognize the limitations they endeavor to impose upon our acts of response."

But again, there was an irony, for the full text of Eshkol's speech seemed to be more an appeal for peace than a declaration of war. His conclusion was this. "The Arab states and the nations of the world ought to know that any border which is tranquil from their side will also be quiet from our side. If they try to sow unrest on our border, unrest will come to theirs."

These were the fateful few days, according to the Egyptians. "On May 13 we received accurate information that Israel was concentrating on the Syrian border huge armed forces of about 11 to 13 brigades," Nasser reported a week later. "The decision made by Israel at this time was to carry out an aggression against Syria as of May 17."

The "accurate information," actually misinformation, had been given to U.A.R. and Syrian Intelligence agents by Soviet Intelligence agents between May 10 and 13. On May 14 Nasser ordered the first deployment of U.A.R. troops in the Sinai. The next day his Chief of Staff, General Muḥammad Fawzi, flew to Damascus for urgent consultations with the Syrian military leaders.

The "information" from Soviet Intelligence was that Israel would attack Syria between May 17 and 21. It obviously had an inflammatory effect upon Nasser. The Soviets may have intended it that way. Their difficulty, as events were soon to prove, was not in inflaming Nasser but in controlling him once he was inflamed.

On May 16, Fawzi dispatched the letter that was to shake the United Nations to its foundations with a controversy that may never be resolved. The letter was addressed to General Indarjit Rikhye, the Indian commander of UNEF in the town

of Gaza. It was handed to him without any advance hint or warning on May 16 at 8 P.M. local time—2 P.M. New York time.

“To your information,” General Fawzi wrote, “I gave my instructions to all U.A.R. armed forces to be ready for action against Israel the moment it might carry out any aggressive action against any Arab country. Due to these instructions our troops are already concentrated in Sinai on our eastern borders. For the sake of complete secure [sic] of all UN troops which install OPs [observation posts] along our borders, I request that you issue your orders to withdraw all these troops immediately. I have given my instructions to our commander of the eastern zone concerning this subject. Inform back the fulfillment of this request.”

Rikhye flashed the message to New York, sending word to Fawzi that he could not carry out the order without authority of Secretary General U Thant.

Four hours and forty-five minutes after the letter had arrived in Rikhye's office in Gaza, El Kony walked into Thant's office on the thirty-eighth floor of the Secretariat Building. He had been summoned by the Secretary General within minutes of receipt in New York of the message.

Thant himself wrote the only record of that crucial interview. Ultimately, it became the focus of a controversy over the whole procedure followed in bowing to the Egyptian demands. The question that will never be answered is, simply, could the crisis have been avoided had the Secretary General not issued what amounted to an ultimatum in that brief rendezvous on the evening of May 16. It was an ultimatum in that it offered the U.A.R. an all-or-nothing choice. There would be a UN force and UN efforts to mediate, or there would be no UN force and the nations would be on their own.

The Secretary General asked first for a clarification of what he regarded as a “cryptic” letter from General Fawzi. Then Thant requested El Kony to tell his government that:

—The letter was in error from a procedural point of view because Rikhye could not take orders from an Egyptian army chief of staff or, for that matter, from anyone except the Secretary General.

—The intent of the letter was not clear. If it was a request for temporary withdrawal of UNEF troops, “it would be

unacceptable because the purpose of the United Nations Force in Gaza and Sinai is to prevent a recurrence of fighting and it cannot be asked to stand aside in order to enable the two sides to resume fighting." If, on the other hand, "it was intended to mean a general withdrawal of UNEF from Gaza and Sinai, the communication should have been addressed to the Secretary General from the government of the United Arab Republic . . ."

—If the U.A.R. wanted the withdrawal of UNEF, "on receipt of such a request, the Secretary General would order the withdrawal of all UNEF troops from Gaza and Sinai, simultaneously informing the General Assembly of what he was doing and why."

—A request for temporary withdrawal from any part of the frontier or demarcation line "would be considered by the Secretary General as tantamount to a request for the complete withdrawal of UNEF from Gaza and Sinai, since this would reduce UNEF to ineffectiveness."

El Kony agreed to send for clarification. In the next few minutes, in the early hours of May 17, Cairo received word that the Secretary General had given them an all-or-nothing choice on the presence of UN troops on Egyptian territory.

Up to this point, there had been no reference in Cairo, in Gaza or in New York to Sharm el Sheikh, the UNEF outpost that had assured the free passage of all shipping through the Strait of Tiran into the Gulf of Aqaba. Creation of that outpost, as part of the price for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in 1957, had ended the Egyptian blockade and had allowed Israel to develop Elath as a port. It was Israel's only access to the sea south of Suez and, because of the blockade of Suez, essential to the Israeli economy.

Diplomats at the United Nations were told by highly placed persons in the Secretariat that U Thant had not considered the ramifications of his "ultimatum" regarding the Gulf of Aqaba, and there is no evidence that Nasser had complete departure in mind when he asked UNEF to stand aside in the Sinai desert.

But on the following day, May 17, events overtook those who sought to control the situation.

U Thant told Rikhye to try to maintain his positions until the U.A.R. replied to his request for clarification, but at 10

A.M. local time the U.A.R. army started moving forward around border positions held by UNEF in the Sinai. In the early afternoon, U.A.R. troops occupied a UNEF observation post at El Sabba and moved in front of Yugoslav contingents in the area. They now stood between the UN forces and the Israeli frontier.

At 2 P.M. Gaza time, Rikhye received a new demand from Fawzi, for the evacuation of all UNEF contingents in Sinai within 24 hours. And, for the first time, UNEF heard mention of Sharm el Sheikh. Rikhye was given 48 hours to evacuate the UNEF contingent there.

As the cables flowed from Gaza to New York, the UN leadership realized that a critically dangerous situation had grown out of what many thought was an Egyptian bluff. Matters were further complicated by the physical danger to the Yugoslav contingents manning the UNEF posts across the Sinai and in Sharm el Sheikh.

U Thant sent another, more comprehensive message to Cairo through the Egyptian ambassador, threatening to order the UNEF troops out on his own authority unless the Egyptians withdrew. He further assured Cairo that UN observers reported "no recent indications of troop movements or concentrations along any of the lines which should give rise to undue concern." There was no move-up on the Israeli side of the line to justify Cairo's concerns that an attack on Syria or any other neighbor was imminent.

There was still no response from Cairo to U Thant's demand for clarification, though El Kony handed the Secretary General an *aide memoire* reviewing the U.A.R.'s understanding of the terms for establishing UNEF on its territory in 1956 and perpetuating it as a buffer force after the withdrawal of French, British and Israeli contingents.

At this point, on the afternoon of the 17th, U Thant for the first time consulted with the ambassadors of the seven nations furnishing contingents to UNEF: Brazil, Canada, Denmark, India, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. At this meeting, a new complication arose. There were broad hints from India and Yugoslavia. Nasser's partners in anti-Western "neutrality," that they would march their troops out without waiting for orders from the Secretary General in response to a simple nod from their friend, President Nasser. The full story of the meeting remains locked in the minds of the ambassadors there.

But this much is known. U Thant proposed an appeal to Cairo to allow UNEF to remain intact and was told, presumably by Yugoslavia and India, that this would be a violation of Egyptian sovereignty

By the time the seven-nation UNEF meeting adjourned, 24 hours had passed and U Thant still had heard nothing from Cairo in response to his ultimatum. The situation for UNEF forces in the Sinai continued to deteriorate. By the time U Thant reached his office on the morning of May 18, there were reports of U.A.R. soldiers forcing the Yugoslavs out of their positions

At noon, El Kony arrived with the answer.

"The Government of the United Arab Republic has the honor to inform Your Excellency that it has decided to terminate the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force from the territory of the United Arab Republic and Gaza Strip. Therefore, I request that the necessary steps be taken for the withdrawal of the Force as soon as possible. I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency my gratitude and warm regards."

The Secretary General called the ambassadors of the nations supplying troops to UNEF and, for the first time, added remnants of the UNEF advisory committee that had guided his predecessor, the late Dag Hammarskjöld. Much later, in a report to the Security Council on May 26, U Thant asserted that he "consulted with the UNEF Advisory Committee" and "the committee did not move, as it was its right to do under the terms of paragraph nine of the General Assembly resolution . . . to request the convening of the General Assembly on the situation which had arisen." Indeed, that is correct. But delegates who were present at the meeting were under the impression that they were not being consulted but, rather, informed, and U Thant's original memo to the United Arab Republic would seem to confirm that argument

U Thant immediately agreed to the withdrawal, but accompanied his agreement with a warning that, eighteen days later, proved to be the understatement of the year

"Irrespective of the reasons for the action you have taken, in all frankness may I advise you that I have serious misgivings about it for, as I have said each year in my annual reports to the General Assembly on UNEF, I believe that this force has been an important factor in maintaining relative quiet in the

area of its deployment during the past ten years and that its withdrawal may have grave implications for peace ”

Even at this point in the deteriorating situation, there was still hope

There was hope that Nasser was still bluffing, that he had pulled out UNEF merely to silence the criticism of his brother Arabs that, while he hid behind the United Nations, they were exposed to Israeli attacks. This ridicule came not only from the conservative Arabs in Amman and Jidda, but also from the radicals in Damascus, where most of the terrorist raids against Israel originated.

While Security Council members consulted informally, U Thant issued his first two formal evaluations of the crisis, a ten-page report to the General Assembly detailing the death of UNEF and a five-page report to the Security Council concluding with these words: “I do not wish to be alarmist but I cannot avoid the warning to the Council that in my view the current situation in the Near East is more disturbing, indeed, I may say more menacing than at any time since the fall of 1956.”

That warning was dated May 19, and made public the next day. It was at that point that the Secretary General decided to end his comparatively passive role and act. Minutes after the release of the Security Council report, Ramses Nassif, press officer for the Secretary General, called reporters into Room 226, the press briefing room in the Secretariat building.

“As already announced,” Nassif said, “the Secretary General was planning a trip to the Middle East including a visit to the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza and thereafter to Cairo towards the end of June and the beginning of July. In the present circumstances he has decided to advance his journey by a few weeks and he will accordingly be leaving for Cairo on the evening of Monday, 22 May.”

The curious wording was deliberately chosen to satisfy Cairo’s insistence that the trip not seem a mission to talk Nasser out of his decision. There was no hope of that in any case. At best, U Thant was expected to work out plans that would make the withdrawal painless and, perhaps, set in motion some pullback along the Sinai frontier, where Egyptians and Israelis were now muzzle to muzzle.

But in the minds of many diplomats, this was the trip that should have been taken five days earlier, when the first con-

fusing communication from General Fawzi arrived. Had U Thant acted at once, he might have exercised greater control over events. As matters stood, the Secretary General found himself praised by the Arabs and the Communists and damned in many of the capitals of the West.

"The Secretary General violated all canons of courage, good sense and responsibility by failing to take time to consult the General Assembly, which authorized the UN force, and the Security Council in order to weigh the legal contentions and to explore alternative ways of maintaining a UN peace-keeping presence in the area," said Senator Henry M. Jackson (Democrat, Washington).

"We are dismayed at the hurried withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Gaza and Sinai after ten years of steadfast and effective service in keeping the peace, without action by either the General Assembly or the Security Council," President Johnson said on May 23.

Even Israel joined in the criticism, despite the fact that Israel had barred UNEF from its territory and, reportedly, had rejected a plan to transfer UNEF to Israeli soil after Nasser ordered the peace force out of Egypt.

U Thant boarded a commercial airliner at Kennedy Airport on the evening of May 22, mindful of his limitations but hoping for the best. His hopes were shattered during the stop-over in Paris. He was handed a news bulletin which informed him that President Nasser had ordered reinstitution of the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel had said it would regard this as an act of war; the Arabs maintained that the war had never been ended.

What U Thant heard the next day in Cairo from Nasser and Foreign Minister Riad, by his own report, was little more than the world had heard from Nasser in his speech May 22 to the advance command of the U.A.R. air force, a command that was to lose more than any other in the resulting war.

"What is the meaning of the armed force's occupation of Sharm el Sheikh?" Nasser asked in his address that day. "It is an affirmation of our rights and our sovereignty over the Aqaba Gulf. The Aqaba Gulf constitutes our Egyptian territorial waters. Under no circumstances will we allow the Israeli flag to pass through the Aqaba Gulf."

The blockade, broken by the Israeli invasion of Sinai on October 29 and 30, 1956, was reimposed on May 23, 1967.

Premier Kosygin and President Johnson were deeply and immediately involved. Communist sources insist that Kosygin had no advance warning that Nasser would take this step. Mr. Johnson now had the burden of trying to discourage an immediate military response by Israel while, at the same time, working out a diplomatic scheme to protect the free movement of ships. Promptly he set forth the American position in the Near East, a position that was to become more ambiguous as violence approached.

"To the leaders of the nations of the Near East," Mr. Johnson said, "I wish to say what three Presidents have said before, that the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area. The United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine."

The President's message was timed with the first call for a meeting of the Security Council. The world was about to see a novel division of power blocs, and to hear a public polemic along Cold War lines that veiled discreet moves to bring the crisis under control.

On May 24 the Security Council held the first two of six sessions that were to be exercises in frustration and futility. The Council could not agree on a single resolution, barred even a statement of support for the appeals of the Secretary General, left unsaid all of the principles of the charter itself. The Council was totally unable to initiate any of the preventive action so clearly provided in the charter.

At those first meetings on May 24, the Council could claim an unwillingness to undermine the mission of the Secretary General, who presumably was deep in conversation with Riad and Nasser in Cairo. But before the second meeting adjourned at 6:15 P.M., members had already been told that U Thant would cut short his visit and would fly home the next day, almost 24 hours ahead of schedule.

Denmark and Canada, with American and British support, tried to win Council action on a resolution which would merely: (1) express full support for the efforts of the Secretary General to pacify the situation; (2) request all member states to refrain from any steps which might worsen the situation; and (3) invite U Thant to report to the Council on his return. It was scarcely an audacious declaration.

But the sponsors could not gain the nine votes from the

fifteen-member council necessary for adoption of even this resolution. In fact, they almost failed to convene the meeting at all. The Council met an hour and 24 minutes late, delayed by negotiations in which the United States had to use extraordinary pressure to muster enough votes to adopt the agenda and kill a plan to adjourn at once. Then, the first hour of the first session was devoted to the Chinese representation question, for, under the odds of alphabetical rotation, it was China's turn to preside during the month of May, and Liu Chieh, Nationalist China's permanent representative at the United Nations, was in the chair. It was the first meeting of the year, and this was the first year in which a majority of the Council members, nine in all, had demonstrated support for the seating of Peking and the ejection of Taiwan. So there was a recitation of hoary positions, and for the balance of the meetings in May, the Soviet and Bulgarian ambassadors omitted the customary, "Mr. President," except once, when the Bulgarian forgot.

The real objective of that first round in the Council was to discourage application of the Egyptian blockade and, at least, to postpone a showdown. El Kony was not fooled. He came before the Council to express his "indignation" and to say that it was "regrettable that the governments of Canada and Denmark saw fit to act on behalf of both the United States and the United Kingdom."

Given its divisions, the Council could only retire and await the return of the Secretary General. He stepped off his plane at 11 o'clock the next night, a grim expression on his face. Refusing to speak to reporters, he went home for a few hours' sleep before preparing his report.

It was a gloomy one. Almost half of it was devoted to justifying the way he had handled the request for the withdrawal of UNEF, including a cryptic statement of his own to the effect that "I had very good reasons to be convinced of the earnestness and the determination of the government of the United Arab Republic in requesting the withdrawal of UNEF." The best that U Thant could suggest was a breathing spell. "I therefore urge," he wrote the Council, "all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions."

On May 26, the same day that U Thant issued his report, the United States and the Soviet Union stepped up their private efforts to avoid a war. Nasser himself told the story after defeat:

"There were several factors before us, nationalist, Arab and international," he said. "These included a message from President Lyndon Johnson of the United States which was handed to our ambassador in Washington on May 26 asking us for restraint and not to be the first to open fire. Otherwise we would face serious consequences. The same night, the Soviet ambassador asked to see me urgently at 3:30 A.M. and told me that the Soviet government strongly requested we should not be the first to open fire."

The French weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur* later quoted Soviet sources as explaining that Nasser had been advised that the Soviet Union's commitment was to neutralize the United States, not to defend the Arabs from the Israelis. In its account of the Soviet diplomatic role, the French paper reported that a Moscow-Washington contact was arranged in the next few days to try for a compromise on the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. According to Soviet sources, President Johnson outlined to Kosygin a new plan for allowing shipping to reach the Israeli port of Elath. At the same time both the Soviet Union and the United States would pledge assistance to Syria and Israel. It is assumed that the proposal involved agreement that no Israeli flagships would be permitted through the Strait of Tiran, but that foreign carriers would have free access to the Israeli port. Kosygin asked for clarifications and was noncommittal.

This intriguing account has not been verified by other sources although it is known that frequent messages were exchanged between the White House and the Kremlin during the last two weeks of May.

Communist sources in France and at the United Nations in New York insist that a compromise on the blockade was in the works at the time the fighting started. But the explorations for preventive action in the Security Council during that week before the outbreak of war reflected no compromise. In fact, there was no sign of a desire on the part either of Israel or its Arab neighbors to come to terms, and no desire on their part to have the Security Council interfere.

The United States seized on a phrase from U Thant's last

report, his appeal to the parties "to forego belligerence," and interpreted this as an appeal to lift the blockade during the "breathing spell." Goldberg insisted that any council resolution must include this wording or a reference to this paragraph in the report of the Secretary General. He argued that a resolution that failed to refer to this section of U Thant's report would be interpreted as overt action of the Security Council in support of the blockade.

India, Mali and the two Communist members of the Council, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, were determined that no UN action be taken to disturb the blockade, even though the Soviet Union, itself dependent on passage through territorial waters for access to its Baltic and Black Sea ports, did not share India's enthusiasm for the Egyptian case. El Kony used these Council meetings to present a carefully documented Arab argument in support of Cairo's position on the Gulf of Aqaba. Ambassador Gideon Rafael of Israel reviewed the history of Arab threats and harassment against Israel over the past nineteen years. But, most important, the Soviet Union used the meetings to emphasize, over and over again the theme of American prejudice in favor of Israel. The Soviet position instilled the suspicion that the United States was acting in collusion with Israel, a suspicion which Moscow had been spreading in Middle East capitals for several weeks.

The ten nonpermanent members of the Council met repeatedly through this period, but they could find no unanimity. The Soviet Union was virtually inaccessible. When the presidency of the Council passed from China to Denmark on June 1, Tabor had to wait two days before Nikolai T. Federenko, the Soviet delegate, found time to see him. The United States draft resolution included a reference reimposing the UN Truce Supervision Organization along the Israeli-Egyptian frontier, though it had been renounced by Israel in 1956. India suggested that the Council be content with an appeal to all parties for restraint. "The missing vote in these negotiations was the French one," one diplomat confided later. "Every time there were consultations, each side came up with a claim that France would support them."

France had favored adjournment when Denmark and Canada called the Council into action after the blockade was imposed. France refused to reassert its support of free navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba until after Israel had won

the war. France, the supplier of the Israeli air force, was never to be challenged or criticized by name in the debate, and when one Arab referred to the ugly events of 1956, he was so sensitive that he referred to the erstwhile enemies as "the British government and the Guy Mollet government" (referring to the man who headed the French government in 1956). Even on the day of battle, France refused to cast the deciding vote on a ceasefire resolution when the Soviet Union backed out of the agreement.

Apart from the Moscow-Washington and the Security Council campaigns, the United States used a third diplomatic initiative to cool the situation. Washington sought to piece together a world maritime declaration on the Gulf of Aqaba that could set the stage, if all else failed, for a physical breach of the blockade by an international naval force. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson presumably discussed this with President Johnson when he flew to Washington June 2, then to New York on June 3, on a long-scheduled visit. Presumably he tried to put the finishing touches to a plan that would reassure the frantic Israelis. At the end of their deliberations, however, neither Johnson nor Wilson could give assurances as to when the declaration would be ready. Support for it was sketchy, and commitments to enforce it almost nonexistent.

So the final weekend unfolded.

The Security Council met for four hours to hear a fresh round of recriminations but the Soviet Union continued to avoid any direct commitment to support the blockade, while France tried to demonstrate its neutrality with a declaration regarding its historic ties to the Arabs accompanied by a commitment to "the existence of the state of Israel." And Ambassador Rafael of Israel warned: "Israel is determined to make its stand on the Gulf of Aqaba. Nothing less than complete noninterference with free and innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba is acceptable to the government of Israel."

Sunday, June 4, was a brilliant, sunny day, and the United Nations was almost empty. Senior officers took a day off. The Secretary General was still recovering from the extraction of a tooth that became infected on his trip to Cairo. Goldberg worked most of the afternoon in his office at the United States Mission, across the street from UN Headquarters. Tabor, as Council president, conferred by telephone with delegates, met others in his office, prepared cables for Copenhagen, then

retired late in his New York apartment. He did not dare take the time to drive to his suburban residence in Bronxville. The time was 1:30 A.M., Monday, June 5. He had one hour and forty minutes to sleep before the telephone would ring.

– CHAPTER V –

ACCEPTING THE INEVITABLE

Political pressures from Arab mobilization. Ben-Gurion and Eshkol. Abba Eban. The rise of Moshe Dayan. Israel's "hawks" prevail. King Hussein joins the "holy war." Arab unity.

AS THE armies of Arabs and Jews stood face-to-face across arid frontiers, a crisis was growing within the Israeli government. Pressures were building up in Israel, just as they were in the Arab states. Tempers were getting short. The people, apprehensive at the ring tightening about them, became impatient at the appeals for calm and reason their leaders were directing at them. A self-generating force was at work, pressing Israel forward to action. Within the government, this force was shattering old alliances and creating new patterns of power.

Israel suffers from a splintered body politic. If the Israeli government has been stable over the years, it has been at the price of unceasing bargaining and compromise among opposing political parties. A dozen parties and political alignments now possess seats in the 120-member Knesset, Israel's unicameral parliament. Because the dominant Mapai-Achdut Ha'avoda alignment holds only 45 of these seats, it is extremely vulnerable. When crisis comes, the government must submit to the demands of its rivals, if it is to survive.

The Premier of Israel is 71-year-old Levi Eshkol. When David Ben-Gurion, the grand old man of Israeli politics, turned the office over to him in 1963, he said: "Eshkol, don't always be a compromiser." Eshkol ignored the words. His skills at maintaining consensus, at arranging delicate balances,

at mediating between warring factions have helped Israel glide through crises that easily would have brought the downfall of a less cautious man.

Only a moderate could have held off war as long as Eshkol did. "It takes courage not to make war immediately on being attacked," he told his restless people after Egypt blocked the Gulf of Aqaba. "That is not a sign of weakness. It is not difficult for the situation to deteriorate into war, but we have to be strong enough to try all other means."

Under other circumstances, Israelis might have been willing to listen to Eshkol. If their nerves had not been quite so raw, they would have accepted his judgment. For Eshkol is a figure held in affection and respect. He was born Levi Shkolnik on October 25, 1895, in the Kiev province of the Ukraine. His father Joseph was a Talmudic scholar. Levi later Hebraicized his family name to Eshkol, which means "cluster of grapes." Although fairly well off, his family was not insulated from the pogroms that terrorized Russian Jews around the turn of the century. When he was ten, Levi recalls, the family barricaded itself for weeks for protection during a particularly savage pogrom that followed the Russo-Japanese War. In 1941, Levi decided to emigrate to Palestine. He arrived in Jaffa carrying only a knapsack and went to an agricultural settlement.

During the day Eshkol worked in the fields and helped build an irrigation pumping station. He moonlighted in the evenings as manager of a workers' kitchen. He took part in setting up two new agricultural settlements near Jerusalem and joined the Young Worker movement, which later became part of Mapai, the Israel Labor Party. In World War I Eshkol served in the Jewish Legion, where he met Ben-Gurion, one of the founders of the Haganah, the Jewish defense force. When he left the army he joined with some friends in founding a kibbutz (communal agricultural settlement) near the southwestern shore of the Sea of Galilee.

Over the years, Eshkol became a popular leader, and when Israel was established, Ben-Gurion named him Director-General of the Ministry of Defense. He was appointed Minister of Agriculture and Development in 1951, and the next year, Minister of Finance. For eleven years he charted and prodded and—where necessary—braked Israel's miraculous economic growth. He endorsed the highly controversial measures of devaluing the Israeli pound in 1962 and liberalizing export-

import policies. When Ben-Gurion resigned as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Eshkol was appointed his successor.

Before long, however, Ben-Gurion became disgusted with Eshkol's consensus rule and tried vainly to force him out. The old man, now almost 80, formed a splinter party, the Rafi, but was beaten nearly two to one in the 1965 parliamentary elections.

What makes the contrast between Eshkol and Ben-Gurion all the sharper is Eshkol's flat style. Ben-Gurion is a magnetic figure. His charismatic style, combined with a strong, handsome face sheathed by his copious white-hair, gives him a force Eshkol cannot equal.

A very earthy, intensely warm human being, Eshkol turns wooden on the speaker's platform. In the midst of a major speech at the height of the recent crisis, he had to shuffle for the right piece of paper and ask an aide for help.

For some time, Eshkol had been the advocate of a soft line in dealing with the Arabs, not so much because he was tolerant of the demagogy in Cairo and Damascus but because he favored improving Israel's relations with the Soviet Union, patron of the Arab states. Eshkol believed that a reestablishment of friendly contacts with Russia would not only reduce the provocations along the frontiers but, perhaps, provide the means for 2.5 million Jews in Russia to emigrate to Israel.

The Soviet Jewish community, with the exception of the Jews in Rumania, is the last big population pool on which Israel can draw to increase its own numbers. For years, one of the objects of Israeli diplomacy in Eastern Europe has been to negotiate permission for these Jews to migrate to Israel. Only in Poland—and, in the late 1950's Rumania—has this policy met with success. Eshkol's opponents acknowledged that his objectives were noble in seeking to placate the Soviets. Noble, indeed, but they argued that the policy defied present reality in Moscow. Eshkol persisted, however, in its pursuit.

Eshkol's chief ally in attempting to calm tempers in the Middle East has been his Foreign Minister, Abba Eban. More than many leading Israelis, Eban has shown a consistent desire to work with rather than against the Arabs to achieve Jewish goals. This has been obvious in his career both before and after Israel became a state.

Toward the end of World War II, he became chief instructor of the Middle East Center of Arabic Studies in Jerusalem. He

said he believed he could aid in "building a bridge between Jews and Arabs." In 1946 he joined the Jewish Agency for Palestine and specialized in Arab-Jewish problems in the agency's political department.

Eban participated in the fruitless negotiations with Great Britain for converting Palestine into a Jewish state, then served as a liaison officer to the UN Special Commission on Palestine.

Eban, a powerful speaker, played a prominent role in arguing the Jewish case before the UN's General Assembly and Security Council. Later, he was named UN representative for the provisional government of Israel set up by Ben-Gurion and became head of Israel's delegation after it was admitted to the UN in 1949.

In September, 1950, Eban took on the added job of Ambassador to the United States. At age 35, he was the youngest ambassador in Washington.

Eban's eloquence and the debating skill he honed at Cambridge qualified him for a prominent role at the UN, and the recurrent Middle East crises focused the spotlight on him. He was a highly effective international advocate, avoiding the passion of extreme statements. But this moderation has not necessarily been an asset in Israeli politics. In 1959, he resigned his diplomatic posts and ran for the Knesset as a member of the Mapai Party. He was elected and joined the cabinet in December as Minister without Portfolio. When his chief booster, Mrs. Golda Meir, resigned as Foreign Minister in January, 1966, Eban was named to succeed her.

The 1967 war has severely damaged Eban's political career. Long the consistent advocate of working through the United Nations, just as he had been an exponent of working with the Arabs, Eban found the ground cut out from under him by the extremeness of the Arab position.

Israel had shown it was no longer in a mood for compromise. The people had waited long enough for the negotiators to relieve them of the peril that waited on the frontiers. Now they acted.

The man to whom Israelis naturally turned for action was Moshe Dayan. Twice in the past two decades this balding, one-eyed warrior had played a vital role in the salvation of the Israeli people. Indeed, what the Israelis accomplished under his leadership in the 1956 Sinai campaign had perhaps

no parallel in Jewish history since the days of Moses, for whom Dayan was named.

To Israelis, Dayan represented not only military triumph; he was also a *sabra*. Dayan, that meant, was of the new generation, born on Israeli soil, unblemished by the painful experiences of growing up in Europe, cocky and aggressive, proud of his country not merely as a haven for the persecuted and a sentimental reincarnation of a Bible story but as a dynamic, progressive, self-sufficient force. Dayan was not a transformed European like Eshkol and Ben-Gurion and the other great men who founded the new state on the soil of Palestine. He was an Israeli through and through and, as such, he was an important symbol to the Israeli people.

Dayan was born on May 20, 1915, in the wilderness kibbutz of Dagan, in the hot and humid Jordan Valley south of the Sea of Galilee. When Moshe was 6 years old, his family moved to help establish the cooperative settlement of Nahalal, a swampy outpost even more primitive. There he learned to shoot Arabs as well as to plow a field. He also learned to speak Arabic fluently. By the time he was 12, Moshe was standing sentry duty against marauding Bedouins, and at 14 he began training in the Haganah. While Dayan was still in his teens, Captain Orde Charles Wingate of the British army was sent to Palestine to organize a group of Jewish commandos. Wingate, a small, scrawny Intelligence officer who later won fame as a leader of Burmese guerrillas in World War II, was a strange, unstable man who fought unorthodox battles. His job in Palestine was to stop Arab-Jewish clashes and he did this by organizing vigilantes into special night squads. Dayan was one of his first volunteers and, at the age of 22, became Wingate's second in command.

Then politics intervened. Fearful that the Palestinian commandos would use their new knowledge against Britain, the War Office recalled Wingate. The fear was justified. Dayan formed a commando unit within the Haganah, teaching his countrymen all he had learned under Wingate. Dayan has said: "Every Israeli soldier is a disciple of Wingate. He gave us our technique."

A shocked Britain, after outlawing the Haganah, captured Dayan in 1939 and sentenced him to five years in prison. In two years he was free. In 1941, London needed Palestinian



“Now here’s our plan . . .”

scouts to help fight the Nazi-backed Vichy French, then in control of Syria. Dayan led 50 cloak-and-dagger commandos who, disguised as Arabs, reconnoitered Syria for weeks. Dayan and his scouts gathered the information and then led the successful Syria attack.

Later in the war, during a battle for Lebanon's Litani River, Dayan was holding a telescope to his left eye when a bullet caught the eyeglass with a glancing blow, driving it into his eye socket. The black patch he has worn over his eye ever since has become his trademark as a leader.

After World War II, Dayan returned to farming and served in the Haganah reserve as a lieutenant colonel. He was recalled to active duty in 1948 in preparation for the end of the British mandate.

During the Arab League's war against the infant state of Israel, Dayan commanded on several fronts. As a brigade commander, he cut a dashing figure, leading a group of jeeps armed with machine guns to clear the Negev. His forces captured the Arab towns of Lydda and Er Ramle. Later, Dayan commanded the siege of Jerusalem. After the fighting, as the chief military delegate for Israel, Dayan signed the April, 1949, armistice with Jordan. Dayan remained in the army after the first war with the Arabs. In 1952, he attended the senior staff officer's school in England, which was a notable honor for a man who had advanced no further than agricultural high school at Nahalal. The following year, Dayan became Chief of Staff, with the rank of major general.

As the top commander, Dayan insisted that every Israeli officer be trained either as a commando or a paratrooper. He himself chose the latter and broke a leg in a jump in 1955.

A devoted student of the classical German strategist, Von Clausewitz, and of United States airborne tactics, Dayan was the major architect of Israel's stunning triumph in the Sinai campaign of 1956. It was then that he demonstrated his troops' mastery of his uncompromising philosophy of battle—speed, surprise and night movements.

After the 1956 war, Dayan ventured the logical prediction, "I think we have given them a lesson. A solution of the Israeli problem cannot be found through fighting; we have taken it out of their heads that they can drive Israel into the sea." Always politically ambitious, Dayan left the army

in 1958 to enter politics. He joined Premier David Ben-Gurion's cabinet in 1959 as Minister of Agriculture, where he showed himself as tough as he had been in the army. Overriding determined opposition, Dayan broke up Israel's large dairy cooperatives, which he contended were working against the country's best economic interests. There was much talk that Dayan was headed for the premiership. But when Ben-Gurion retired and subsequently quit the ruling Mapai Party, Dayan followed him and became a member of the opposition Rafi Party in the Knesset.

Despite his background in the military, Dayan rebelled against party discipline. Fiercely independent and outspoken, the former general soon became tabbed as entirely unpredictable. Such qualities are never admired by professional politicians, and it has been whispered that Dayan has authoritarian inclinations. Of late, however, observers have noted his tendency to adjust to the chaos and compromise of democracy, and he has even shown something of a talent for diplomacy.

Within Israel, Dayan has a reputation of being sternly austere, a man who never drinks or smokes and can't tolerate idle chatter. Yet foreign military officers who have met him on his frequent trips abroad report that on occasion Dayan can be great fun. "When he lets go, he really does it big," one American who knows Dayan well has said.

Dayan, who seems to have a penchant to be where the military action is, has made a careful on-the-scene study of the war in Vietnam and has written some highly perceptive analyses of it. "He's a brilliant tactician and strategist," Lieutenant General Lewis Walt, former commander of United States Marine forces in Vietnam, said of Dayan. "I'd hate to have him on the other side." Some British military experts have described Dayan's mastery of desert mechanized warfare as a combination of those of Field Marshals Erwin Rommel and Sir Archibald Wavell, the old foes of World War II.

Thus it was no surprise that Dayan was delighted to respond to popular clamor and accept the defense ministry that Premier Eshkol grudgingly and unhappily offered him on the eve of the 1967 war.

"Eshkol did not want me," Dayan said brashly to an American reporter. "The people wanted me. Eshkol was forced to accept me. When the crisis came, they offered me a post as Vice-Premier and military adviser to Eshkol. I replied I was

not interested in titles. If it was to be a Cabinet post, I wanted defense. If not, mobilize me and give me the forces in the Negev fighting Egyptians. I told them I knew the Egyptians and how to fight them. This offer made Eshkol happy, for he did not want me in his Cabinet. He wanted Yigal Allon [Labor Minister and a hero of the war for independence] as his Defense Minister. But when he proposed Allon as Defense Minister to his party secretariat, they told him, 'To hell with it—we want Dayan.' ”

Dayan was prepared for the job. Weeks beforehand, sensing trouble, he had, with Eshkol's permission, toured Israel's defense positions. Curiously, on taking office, Dayan made a statement that may have lulled the Arabs into believing the Israelis would not respond to provocations. "It is either too early or too late," Dayan said. "Either we should have reacted [to the Arab blockade] right away, or we should wait and see what are the results of diplomacy." But two days before the war began, Dayan said audaciously that Israel not only was willing to take the Arabs on alone but did not want the soldiers of any other country "getting killed here in order to secure our safety."

Once Dayan became Defense Minister, on June 1, he significantly broadened Israel's strategic objectives. It is reliably reported that he promptly scrapped a plan to seize only Gaza to use as a trading point for free passage through the Strait of Tiran. Instead, he gave orders to concentrate on taking all of the Sinai Peninsula.

Dayan gave strategic focus to the Israeli campaign, as well as top-level political sanction for striking for more ambitious goals. Had war come a week earlier it is quite clear that the Israeli attack would have been different, with far more modest ends.

As the military confrontation dragged on, the mood in Israel changed significantly. Dayan's assumption of power meant that the "hawks" had won over the "doves" in the Israeli Cabinet. At the end of the Cabinet crisis, Israel was far more determined than before to take matters into its own hands. Clearly, there was no longer much sentiment in Israel for accepting a disadvantageous compromise.

But at the same time, the Cabinet changes did not seem to strain Israel's political fabric. Eshkol and Eban were both by now prepared to accept the inevitable. Reluctant as Eshkol

was to welcome Dayan into the Cabinet, he did so graciously. He recognized Dayan's popularity and the stability he would give to the government. With Dayan's accession to power, Israel acquired for the time being a genuine government of national unity. In the words of one Israeli official, "Nasser made reality out of what had been a dream in Israeli politics."

In retrospect, it appears Dayan's call to the Cabinet meant that the die was cast. Israel was prepared for the moment when the Middle East would be plunged into war.

As May turned into June, the Arab world, in one of its periodic displays of unity, fell in behind Egypt's President Nasser. The demonstration was impressive. Unquestionably it upset Israel, which in the past had counted on Arab rivalry to neutralize some part of the potential opposition. Now, however, all the Arab chieftains were stepping into line.

Jordan cast her lot with Egypt on May 30, despite the imprecations that Nasser and King Hussein had been hurling at each other for years. The two leaders met in Cairo and, in the presence of Ahmed Shu Kairy of the Palestine Liberation Organization, signed an eleven-article defense pact which committed each to come to the aid of the other if attacked.

King Feisal of Saudi Arabia, a friend of the West, called a truce in his feud with Nasser, and on May 24 sent a force of 20,000 Saudi Arabian soldiers into Jordan near the port of Aqaba.

An Iraqi unit joined Egyptian soldiers at Sharm El Sheikh on the tip of the Sinai Peninsula, and more Iraqi troops moved into Syria to join forces of that country poised on the Israeli border.

In a Cairo radio broadcast, Nasser bragged: "Behind us there is the Iraqi army and the armies of Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan . . . the whole Arab nation."

The national airline of wealthy Kuwait airlifted an infantry brigade to Egypt. Old King Idris of Libya dispatched infantrymen, and the Sudan, proceeding with full mobilization, flew troops into Sinai.

In Algeria troops moved toward the Israeli border, and in Morocco, King Hassan II, known as a moderate, coupled a promise of military support with a call for an Arab summit meeting.

There was even a show of troop strength by President Habib

Bourguiba of Tunisia, who two years earlier had fallen from Arab grace by suggesting peace talks with Israel.

Nasser's success in whipping up his people against the United States obtained the testimony of Lieutenant (j.g.) Donald P. Irwin, who was aboard the U.S.S. Dyess when it went through the Suez Canal a few days before war broke out. Irwin described the peculiar charm of angry Arabs in a letter back home:

In case you've never been clued in, "anti-American slogans" is a euphemism for obscenity. Occasionally, Nasser or Johnson was mentioned, but usually the remarks were considerably more personal.

The sailors reacted perfectly, though. Ignoring the rioters, they paraded at quarters and tied the ship up smartly, pausing only to laugh occasionally at some particularly egregious fool or other who might have fallen off his boat in a spectacular war dance. More seriously and less haughtily, though, it did alarm me to see a real hate stare for the first time in my life and to feel despised for reasons utterly beyond my personal control . . .

We got the same screaming, Nasser-waving treatment from every Egyptian craft we passed all the way down . . .

Nasser did indeed seem to be in a commanding position. His troops held Sharm El Sheikh and effectively barred all vessels from the Gulf of Aqaba. To forestall any test of his determination, he announced that the Strait of Tiran was mined. It appeared that apart from perhaps the United States, none of the world powers was prepared to challenge him.

In the first days of June, Nasser received a letter from President Johnson offering to send either a high-ranking American to Cairo or to receive a high-ranking Egyptian in Washington. It was distinctly possible that Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey would go to Egypt. Such a trip, paying court to Nasser's power, would unquestionably have enhanced the prestige of the Egyptian president even further.

On Sunday, June 4, Nasser answered President Johnson by announcing that he would send Egyptian Vice-President Zakaria Mohiedin to Washington the following Wednesday. Mohiedin was known as a moderate. There was speculation

that he might be meeting with Johnson to make some sort of arrangement that would be palatable to the West. Nasser himself said that he would not initiate any war against Israel.

The Israeli Cabinet met three times on that Sunday. It is known that the Mohiedin visit to Washington was discussed by the Cabinet, and that many Israelis were apprehensive over a possible deal that would freeze the Arabs in their advantageous positions and exclude the Israelis from the Gulf of Aqaba. The Israelis were by now determined to accept no settlement that sanctioned Arab provocations. What was decided is not known but, within a few hours, Israel and the Arab states were at war.

The display of military unity arranged by President Nasser had a deep impact in the Arab world. Early in June, a popular song rendered by singer Um Kalthoum jumped to the top of the Arab hit parade. Its words were:

We are going back by force of arms.
We are going back like morning after the dark night.
Army of Arabism, may God be with you.
Oh, how great, splendid and brave you are.
The tragedy of Palestine pushes you towards the borders.
All are with you in the flaming battle.

The flaming battle erupted before dawn on Monday, June 5.

– CHAPTER VI –

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

Rostow wakes the President. Tuesday lunch group meets. Hot line. Congressional reaction. Hawks and doves.

AT 2:50 A.M. MONDAY, June 5, the duty officer in the White House situation room phoned Walt Whitman Rostow, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, to inform him of reports that war had broken out in the Middle East. It took Rostow only thirty-five minutes to dress and drive downtown to the White House from his home in northwest Washington. He went immediately to the situation room—a basement command center in the White House's west wing—from which the President keeps in touch with developments all over the world.

A former professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the author of no less than ten books on foreign affairs and economics, Walt Rostow was one of a band of academicians who had gone into government in New Frontier days to try his hand at working the levers of power. In 1966, he returned to the White House from the State Department to become Mr. Johnson's chief resident adviser on foreign affairs. He was known mainly in Washington as an optimist on the Vietnam War. Now, in those early morning hours, his attention had been drawn from the jungles of Southeast Asia to the deserts of the Middle East, and he was faced with the task of making some sense out of a few skimpy reports.

It could have been only a border incident, he thought, perhaps not the real thing. Walt Rostow did not know it yet but, according to later statements by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, the Israeli air attacks on Arab fields were already almost an

hour old when his bedside phone first rang. Slowly the reports came clattering into the situation room from the Pentagon, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, where top-level staffs were already at work. In less than an hour after his arrival at the White House, Rostow found one fragment in the swelling Intelligence reports that convinced him this was no humdrum incident. An intercepted Egyptian air force radio message contained the statement that some forward airfields in Sinai were inoperable. This suggested to Rostow a full-scale war was underway.

A few minutes before 4:30 A.M., Rostow awakened President Johnson by phone to tell him war between the Arabs and Israelis had broken out. Those who know the President say he was not surprised at the news. He arose, shaved, dressed and remained in his bedroom during those early hours. His first priority, even while the Intelligence reports from the battlefields were sketchy, was to divine the Soviet Union's intentions. Johnson had decided himself that, if at all possible, the United States would not get involved. But he had to know about the Soviet plans before he could make any commitment to noninvolvement for the United States.

- The President was not surprised and neither, it is reliably reported, was he really worried about the fate of Israel.

The outnumbered forces of Israel would acquit themselves well. The Intelligence community had predicted the outcome of the war before it began. When only days before war broke out, the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted a quick clean sweep for the Israelis, the President asked them to recheck their findings. They did and once again the report came back to the President that the Israelis would rout the Arabs. The Intelligence community's estimates agreed in practically every detail. For example if the Israelis struck first, they could destroy Egyptian air-power in 24 hours. If the U.A.R. struck first, the Israelis still could destroy the Arab air force in two or three days. They also predicted the Israelis would crack the Egyptian defenses in Sinai within two or three days unless they paused to regroup.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara were at their desks early. At 5:09 A.M., Rusk placed his first call to the President, and the two, with Rostow concurring, agreed that a diplomatic feeler to Moscow was appropriate. Through normal diplomatic channels, Rusk

dispatched a message to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

That began a day of what high officials in the Johnson Administration now look back upon as "jockeying for a position" with the Russians. "As soon as the war started," one said, "it stopped being a game of chicken between the U.A.R. and Israel and became a game of chicken between the United States and the Soviet Union instead."

With the message on its way to Moscow, the President ate breakfast while Rusk, Rostow and George Christian, the White House press secretary, drafted a public statement on the war. Meanwhile, the President scheduled a meeting of his "Tuesday lunch group" for 8:30 A.M. in the White House situation room.

The Tuesday lunch group had emerged in recent months as the most important foreign policy council in the United States government. Its name was taken from the President's habit of having lunch each Tuesday with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow and Christian. Rostow prepares the agenda and brings a stack of files for reference. The five men normally meet in the family dining room on the second floor of the White House, the walls of which are papered with scenes of Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown.

Recently, the five—along with so-called "added starters" invited when their expertise was wanted—had been restricting their attention to consideration of the Vietnam War. But during these last two weeks of May and the first week in June, the Middle East crisis occupied a large proportion of their time.

For the 8:30 meeting that Monday morning the President called in one added starter, William B. Macomber Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. He was invited because the President had decided to send Rusk and McNamara to Capitol Hill that morning to brief leading members of the Congress on just what the Administration was doing about the crisis.

A half-hour before the meeting, the President, still in his bedroom, received a call from Rostow. The message sounded portentous. The hot line had come to life in the Pentagon, Rostow told the President. Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin was sending him a message.

In all the history of post-World War II diplomacy, nothing

has indicated more clearly the world's capacity to destroy itself in an instant with nuclear weapons than the 1963 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to establish the hot line teletype circuit. It is a direct Moscow-Washington teletype line which allows the leaders of one government to reach the other quickly and surely. It is always open. The purpose of the circuit is to permit one country to check or double-check an incident with the other and avoid thereby the miscalculation or misinterpretation that could lead the world into nuclear war.

President Kennedy and Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev discovered the need for such a device during the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962, when it took several hours for each to receive replies to messages from the other. While they waited for messages to make their way through normal channels of communication, the world stood at the brink.

From August 30, 1963, to June 5, 1967, the line had been tested every hour on the hour—sometimes with baseball scores sent to Moscow from the Pentagon, sometimes with quotations from Turgenev's "The Hunter's Sketches" sent to Washington from Moscow. On New Year's Day each year, and on the first anniversary of the service, the line had been used ceremonially. But it had never before carried a message of substance.

The President and Christian rushed from the Presidential bedroom in the mansion to the situation room in the basement of the west wing to get a look at what the Russians had to say. The two arrived before the message came over a teletype line from the Pentagon. Within minutes, the message had been received, decoded, translated and placed on the mahogany conference table in front of the President.

The message was signed "A. Kosygin." It was short and to the point, but it still left the Soviet Union with room to maneuver in the diplomatic contest that could be as important for the United States and the Soviet Union as the shooting war was for Israel and its Arab neighbors.

It is known that the messages, which were to clatter back and forth over the line all week were considered of great value by the President. He now keeps the originals bound in a green notebook on his desk and he has told a friend about the exchanges: "We exchanged points of view on a cease fire. We let each other know we had obligations. We had to act like

the older brother and sister in the family and pour water on the fire. I think those exchanges helped."

The President, assisted by Rusk, McNamara and Rostow, immediately framed a reply, and off it went over the 4,883-mile hot line to the Kremlin. It was signed, "Lyndon B. Johnson."

"What was said in those exchanges?" a reporter later asked someone in a position to know "Did we tell them we would not get involved if they didn't?"

"No," the official replied. "That's too simple. That would have been soft diplomacy."

"At this point," the reporter asked, "when the hot line was used for the first time, how would you describe Soviet-American relations? Were we at the brink? Was it a situation like the Cuban missile crisis?"

"No," said the official, "during the missile crisis everyone knew we were at the brink. This time, we didn't know where we were."

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara made their promised trip to Capitol Hill that morning to brief impatient members of Congress. The two Secretaries were frequent visitors to the Hill. They spent lengthy hours of their valuable time supplying foreign policy experts in the House and the Senate with vast detail about American activity abroad. Their first meeting on Monday was an off-the-record session with Congressional leaders and members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. If the Representatives and the Senators, many of whom had rushed back to Washington from distant weekend retreats, expected to hear anything extraordinary, they were disappointed. Both Secretaries did a great deal of talking and said almost nothing.

With increasing frequency recently, Congressmen had complained that the Johnson Administration failed to keep them informed during a crisis. The complaints were that the Administration either neglected or was unwilling to supply information not already available from news reports.

Several members of Congress said after the Rusk-McNamara briefing that Mr. Johnson had flunked another major test of his promise to keep Congress informed. Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, grumbled openly at the lack of candor in the Administration's presentation to Congress.

Critics pointed out that there was no lack of briefings—there were a rash of them, Monday morning and throughout the week. But to an extraordinary degree, those who attended complained they did not learn much—and that is where Mr. Johnson's big weakness lay. Senator Jacob K. Javits, New York Republican and one of the harshest critics of the Administration's practices, insisted that in the most "secret" briefings thus far he was not told anything that was not already available on a wire service ticker.

One of the curious by-products of the crisis was that it suddenly elicited anguished demands for American help for Israel from some of those who had been the loudest critics of American help for South Vietnam. Representative William F. Ryan of New York, for example, had voted against an appropriation for the Vietnam war. But on June 5, addressing Congress on the Middle East crisis, he said: "Mr. Speaker, if diplomacy does not work, if the cease-fire is not achieved, and promptly, it is incumbent upon the United States to honor its commitment embodied in the Tripartite Declaration and in the statements of four Presidents and to do whatever is necessary to protect Israel in this hour of crisis."

Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, one of the Senate's leading critics of United States intervention in Vietnam, voted in March, 1967, against supplemental funds for the Southeast Asian war. On May 24, after the United Arab Republic had blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba at its mouth, the Strait of Tiran, Morse said: "An American ship, flying the flag, should go through that strait without delay."

This pattern was extensive, not only in Congress but in intellectual circles throughout the United States, where there remained vast opposition to the Vietnam war. "If you dig into the literary intelligentsia," said one White House aide bitterly, "you will find that the most outspoken anti-Vietnam people are on those different manifestos that were published calling for aid to Israel." His explanation was that "the liberals have developed an isolationism vis-a-vis Asia. It is based on the simple proposition that Asia is a loser—that we are not making any headway against filth, poverty and disease in Asia. On Asia their feeling is fundamentally defeatist. They look on Vietnam as a civil war in a remote region. Besides, who has Asian relatives?"

A bit of gloating in the White House over the seeming inconsistency of some of the President's worst tormentors on Vietnam policy was understandable. Even on the Hill, some of the Vietnam "hawks" saw fit to taunt those who were suddenly promoting a positive policy in the Middle East. But many of the most vigorous critics of Vietnam insisted there was no inconsistency in their pressuring the government to assist Israel. Vietnam, they contended, is in no way comparable to the Middle East. In each region the United States has a different degree of commitment, a different magnitude of interest. Conditions are different in the two areas of crisis.

Many pointed out a distinction between Israel, which clearly was trying to defend itself from hostile neighbors, and South Vietnam, which was, they argued, enveloped in a deadly civil war over social and economic issues. The United States could conscientiously support Israel in its struggle against foreign conquest, while necessarily staying out of a fight in which Vietnamese were engaged against one another.

From the outset it was clear in Congress that sympathy lay with Israel. For this there were many reasons. There is a substantial Jewish electorate in the United States, and there are virtually no Arabs. The Israelis were the underdogs, against an Arab world some fifty times its size. Israel represented democracy and progress in the Middle East, the antithesis of the image conveyed by the Arab countries. Finally, Israel was standing up to communism, while Nasser and his allies were behaving as agents for Communist control of the Middle East. Scarcely any sympathy could be found on Capitol Hill—even among those traditionally indifferent to Jewish problems—for the Arab side of the war.

Yet there was little sentiment for United States intervention in Israel's behalf, either in Congress or the press. Most members of Congress could not conceive of the United States taking on a second war, while it was so heavily engaged in Vietnam. The reaction against American involvement seemed instantaneous and all but total.

A few Congressmen and Senators appeared to favor joint American action with other major powers. They maintained that multilateral involvement would be less dangerous, less draining than intervening alone. But, according to Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, it was unlikely that the

Senators who favored some limited unilateral action and those who advocated multilateral action would, together, constitute a majority.

In sum, Congress was reluctant to get into the mess. If the fighting had turned in favor of the Arabs and the existence of Israel were threatened, the attitude probably would have changed. Events, however, never put the issue to a test.

Standing by as watchdog for Israel, ready to apply its own kind of pressure, was the influential Jewish community in the United States. The outbreak of fighting brought an unparalleled burst of emotionalism from American Jews. Many had eagerly looked forward to the showdown with the Arabs. Others had feared it. Some, like the Israelis themselves, felt both fear and anticipation. Within hours of the first shot in the Sinai, thousands of youths were clamoring at New York's Jewish Agency office to go to Israel. And the flow of funds for Israel that had begun during the fortnight of tension preceding the war suddenly became an avalanche. Jewish leaders said the response was far greater than during the 1956 Sinai war, and may have even exceeded the excitement of Israel's founding in 1948.

Adding to the emotional atmosphere was the frustration built up during the prewar period in most of the Jewish community by the hesitancy of President Johnson in dealing with the rising difficulties in the Middle East. Leaders of the Conference of Presidents, made up of the heads of twenty-one of the country's principal Jewish organizations, had met as early as January 16 with Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to warn the administration of its fears of war. Led by Rabbi Joachim Prinz, chairman of the Conference, they told Katzenbach of the attacks by the Syrian army and the Syrians' open challenge to Israel to respond in kind. The United States had a responsibility to warn the Arabs in "clear and unmistakable terms" against a continuation of terrorism against Israeli villages. All nations, the Jewish leaders said, should respect the borders and sovereignty of their neighbors. American Jews were unhappy that in the previous weeks and months, the government had done next to nothing to relieve tension in the Middle East.

On May 19, Rabbi Prinz sent a telegram to the President expressing the concern of the Conference of Presidents—in effect the Jewish establishment—about the imminence of war.

He asked Mr. Johnson to "make known to the world" the American commitment to the territorial integrity and security of Israel. Subsequently, Prinz called Walt Rostow, himself a Jew, and asked to see the President. Rostow urged him not to insist on a face-to-face meeting. He said it would seem as if the President were bowing to Jewish pressure. It would be more advantageous to the Jewish community if the President did not seem to be under pressure. But the apprehension among Jews continued to mount.

Mr. Johnson was not oblivious to Jewish power. He was well aware of the significance of the Jewish political establishment, especially in Democratic Party politics. A clear majority of the six million American Jews not only had been loyal Democrats for years but had been among the more generous contributors to the party in major cities. He also knew that the Jewish community had a political influence disproportionately more important than their numbers within the American body politic, partly because of its concentration in key industrial states. Jews were deeply interested in issues: inquisitive, contentious and influential. Furthermore they occupied important positions in the communications industry, which Mr. Johnson knew to be an essential factor in politics. Johnson was aware, moreover, of the moral commitment of the United States to Israel. Since its founding nineteen years before, every American President had supported Israel. Johnson dare not let Israel fall, however war-weary the United States might be.

The chief problem of the United States was to see that the war did not spill over into other parts of the world—above all, to avert a Soviet-American confrontation.

While the Israeli army moved forward into Sinai and the Arabs counted losses suffered in the early morning air raids, the diplomatic dust began to settle. In Washington, the Johnson Administration realized the opportunity had developed to curtail Soviet influence and prestige in the Middle East. The Israeli army might do just what the United States had been unable to accomplish over the previous decade.

(When the war was over, one administration official was to state his government's premise in these words: "We had this thing down to just what was going to happen for weeks beforehand. All the Intelligence and military people agreed that in a short fight the Israelis could easily handle all the fronts by.

themselves. Their Intelligence, training and maintenance of equipment and leadership were far superior to the Arabs. We knew that lots of the Egyptian planes were nonoperational and also that there was a lack of training and discipline in the Egyptian military. Their leadership was poor. It was surprising that the Israelis did as well as they did in the air, though. But all in all, it would have been a major surprise if the Egyptians had held.”)

By the time the UN Security Council went into session that Monday, the reports flowing into Walt Rostow’s situation room at the White House showed that the Egyptians were not holding.

By midmorning, American housewives watching the Security Council session on television during their coffee break were treated to the sight of United States Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg talking to his Soviet counterpart, Nikolai T. Federenko. The two were discussing terms, rather abstractly at that moment, for a cease-fire. The fortunes of the Mideast war were forcing these diplomats into the curious paradox of working closely to fend off a United States-Soviet confrontation that neither wanted, but at the same time to get the best possible conditions for their most favored nations: Goldberg for the Israelis, and Federenko for the Arabs.

Federenko, an urbane and sometimes witty man who looks and sounds a little like the American TV comic Henry Morgan, has in his day delivered some pointed and pungent speeches at the UN. Federenko is a career diplomat, a former Deputy Foreign Minister and expert on the Far East. He is well-liked but some of his fellow diplomats are wary of his sharp tongue and not quite sure just what lies behind a Western-style gloss that even runs to bow ties.

As for Goldberg, he was born August 8, 1908, the youngest of eight children of a Russian immigrant couple. His father, who delivered produce by horse and wagon on Chicago streets, died when Arthur was 3. At 12, he started working as a delivery boy for a shoe factory. He attended Chicago public schools, won his law degree at Northwestern and began practicing in 1929. In the late 1950’s, Goldberg first came to the attention of John F. Kennedy, then a Senator. Kennedy later appointed him Secretary of Labor. From there the road led to the Supreme Court, thence to the UN.

It was inevitable that Goldberg would be compared with his popular predecessor, Adlai E. Stevenson. Goldberg lacks the rolling eloquence of the two-time Presidential candidate, and Stevenson's ability to get to the point with a quick and telling thrust. Indeed, even Goldberg's friends concede that he leans toward verbosity or, as one of them put it: "There are times when Arthur just plain talks too much." His first speech at the UN General Assembly session in 1965 lasted more than one hour.

But Goldberg is perhaps unrivaled in the give-and-take of the closed-door negotiating conference, a tactic he learned the hard way when, as special counsel of the AFL-CIO, he tangled in contract talks with some of America's biggest corporations. He is a tough and shrewd bargainer. A leading labor lawyer, he was at first counsel to the United Steel Workers and the CIO, and, in 1955, played a major role in bringing about the merger of the CIO and AFL.

When Goldberg was asked to resign from the Supreme Court to take the UN job, it was believed that President Johnson's reasoning ran like this: He knows the Communists, and he knows how to bargain, when to give, when to be tough, and when to postpone issues he doesn't want to talk about. He is a first-class operator.

When Goldberg was named to the UN on Stevenson's death, the headline over a news story in Cairo's daily *Al Goumhouria* asked: "Why was a Jew appointed United States ambassador to the United Nations?" In Beirut, the newspaper *Al Shaab* attempted to provide an Arabic answer: The choice showed that Johnson, like Harry Truman, had adopted Zionist principles and policies, it suggested. "This policy leads the world closer to the brink of the precipice, but it is Johnson alone who will fall into it," *Al Shaab* predicted. But Goldberg did not seem to mind the frequent Arab jibes at his religion. In one argument, the Syrian delegate protested bitterly that he found it all but impossible to determine whether Goldberg or the Israeli representative was speaking. With tempers growing short, Goldberg snapped that the Syrian's assertion was "beneath contempt."

In the first round at the UN that morning of June 5, Federenko indicated that the Soviets simply wanted the fighting stopped. Soon, however, they stiffened and demanded that

Israel retreat to the positions held the day before. Goldberg, in behalf of the United States, refused to insist on an Israeli retreat and held out for a simple cease-fire. All day long, while the Security Council was in recess, the two men jockeyed back and forth. Their performance reflected the dilemma of Premier Kosygin in Moscow and President Johnson in Washington, neither of whom wanted differences in Middle Eastern policy to lead to an East-West rupture.

During the weeks in which the crisis was developing, the United States had done its utmost to acquire credentials as an unbiased outsider. To have done otherwise, the Johnson Administration reasoned, would have exacerbated the danger of Soviet-American conflict. Washington's position was based on a carefully-worded statement President Johnson read before television cameras on May 23.

The statement acknowledged that the United States felt Israel had a right to use the Gulf of Aqaba but then, equivocally, it said "the government of the United States is seeking clarification on this point." After the predictable affirmation that the United States opposes aggression, President Johnson stated that "the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that area."

This could hardly have been interpreted as going overboard for Israel. But it was sufficiently pointed to make those who understood the background of American policy believe the Administration was fundamentally on the Israeli side. Throughout the period of worsening crisis, the Administration steadfastly refused to clarify its stand.

On the Monday morning the war started, Mr. Johnson and his advisors decided the diplomatic posture of the government should continue to be founded on the May 23 statement. Christian and Rusk fell back on the statement so many times under questioning that reporters at the White House stopped asking what the United States response would be to a given set of circumstances.

At midday Monday, the first break in the Administration line came when Robert J. McCloskey, the State Department's press officer, met reporters for his daily briefing. Day after day, McCloskey stood before reporters at his regular 12:30 briefings and answered questions on such delicate subjects as

bombardments within the city limits of Hanoi or the Central Intelligence Agency's subversion of student organizations. In a town where reporters look on government spokesmen with skepticism, often with cynicism, McCloskey was well-liked for his honesty, his modesty and his knowledge.

On that first day of the 1967 Middle East war, there were reports of anti-American rioting in the Arab nations. The State Department was apparently concerned about the fate of American citizens in the war zone. One early report had twelve Americans locking themselves into a vault in an Arab capital to escape the violence of raging mobs. This incident was on McCloskey's mind when a reporter asked him if, in view of the anti-American sentiment rising in the Arab lands, he would reaffirm the United States' neutrality in the war.

"Indeed I would," McCloskey answered. "I would be more than happy to. We have tried to steer an even-handed course through this. Our position is neutral in thought, word and deed."

Newsmen took this as a formal declaration of neutrality of the type that expressed complete American indifference to the situation. In particular, it seemed to some that the United States was abandoning Israel to the mercies of its Arab foes.

"As soon as we saw that statement, we knew it could give us trouble," one of the men close to Lyndon Johnson said later. "We were well aware that the statement would inflame lots of people. No one had used that word 'neutrality' before." Not only did the statement become a domestic political liability but conceivably it could have provoked the kind of miscalculation which led to the Korean War in 1950.

By the time Christian finished his afternoon briefing, no White House reporter knew exactly where the United States stood. But because some concluded that Lyndon Johnson was about to sell out Israel, Christian called newsmen into his office a second time to explain that McCloskey had not meant "neutrality" but had been talking about "non-belligerency." While Christian was talking to reporters, the President called him and suggested that the easiest way out of the situation would be for Rusk to explain the whole thing.

A few minutes later, the Secretary of State, having just completed a background briefing for State Department reporters, arrived at the White House to say for the record that the "use of this word neutral—which is a great concept of international

law—is not an expression of indifference, and indeed indifference is not permitted to us.” That was enough to put the United States back in Israel’s corner.

But by this time, it was clear that Israel did not need help from the United States or any other country.

— CHAPTER VII —

THUNDER OVER NEGEV

The jump-off. Early Israeli air supremacy. Egyptian line pierced in Gaza Strip. Nasser and Hussein blame defeat on U.S. and Britain. The fighting in Jordan and Syria. Arab disaster.

IN THE dark hours of the morning of June 5, 1967, the thunder of artillery echoed over the Negev. War had again come to the Middle East.

Both sides were in a war mood. Neither was astonished to hear the booming of gunfire or the clatter of mechanized vehicles. Who fired the first shot is unclear. Each side blames the other, but it scarcely matters. Both sides had for some time been spoiling for a fight, and each was ready to respond to the slightest provocation. War came, as it were, by mutual consent.

By 8:15 A.M., Israel had launched three separate spearheads into the Egyptian lines. The main thrust pierced Egyptian defenses on the Gaza Strip, already softened up by a fierce artillery barrage. Israeli tanks—British-built Centurions carrying 20-pounder (83.4-mm.) guns and American Super-Shermans modified by Israel to wear heavier armament—plunged forward in waves, leading mechanized infantry riding open half-tracks. Even at this early hour, it appeared clear that the Egyptian defenders were no match for the hard-hitting, precise and determined Israeli forces.

But the first hours of the Israeli-Arab war were not so much noteworthy for ground activity as for the crucial action that was taking place in the air. Arab air power was being utterly, humiliatingly destroyed. Whatever capacities the Arabs might have had to carry on ground warfare, the fate of their arms

was sealed in those first hours by the annihilation of Arab power in the air.

For weeks, Israeli reconnaissance jets had been reported at high altitude over Egypt. The Egyptian air force, with its vast fleet of Soviet jets, was sluggish. Egyptian pilots scrambled, but they were clocked at reaction times of ten to twenty-five minutes—a fatal slowness in a region as small as the Middle East.

In retrospect, it is apparent that the Israeli pilots were not only clocking Arab responses but determining where responses did not occur at all—where electronic black boxes aboard the Israeli planes indicated they were not caught by radar impulses. These were the gaps in the Arab warning network.

The Israeli jets took off in the pre-dawn hours of June 5. The people of Tel Aviv heard the angry sound of jet engines from airfields around the city, as the Mirages and Mystères roared out over the Mediterranean. Then it was still—in Israel.

But over Egypt, it became chaos. Sweeping in from the north and west at low altitude, from the directions they were not expected to appear, the Israeli planes became an umbrella of destruction.

At the big Abu Suweir Air Base near Ismailia on the west bank of the Suez, Egyptian MIG pilots were drinking coffee when the Israeli jets streaked in and blasted the interceptors lined up on the runway. The Egyptian search radar was not even operating. Some say it had broken down; others, that it simply had not been turned on for the day.

The six Egyptian air bases on the Sinai Peninsula, closest to Israel, were major targets. After the first minutes of the war, they were no longer a threat. Planes hit the bases at El Arish and Bir Gifgafa in northern Sinai, and quickly annihilated whatever targets they found at El Shatt, Ras Sudr, Abu Rudeis, El Tor and Ras Umm Sidd on the western and southern shores of the peninsula. At Cairo West, a military airfield, the Israeli planes destroyed at least one of the fleet of huge TU-16 strategic bombers so dear to Nasser's big power pretensions.

After-attack reconnaissance photographs showed the deadly accuracy of the young pilots—average age, 23. Radar and anti-aircraft sites were destroyed, and aircraft sitting either wingtip-to-wingtip or in revetments were hit dead center. So familiar were the Israelis with the Egyptian targets that they wasted few bombs on dummy airplanes laid out by Egyptian ground crews

to draw fire. At least one after-action report indicated that Soviet advisors, even before the war started, had expressed contempt at the unrealistic appearance of the dummies.

The accuracy of the Israelis was attained in some cases by low and slow approaches, to make sure that rocket strafing and bomb drops hit the proper targets. Some planes even came in "dirty," flaps down, wheels extended, to cut speed.

Part of the lethal accuracy of the Israeli pilots was credited by reporters to a "secret bomb" which hit the parked craft dead center and left other nearby installations untouched. The secret bomb was described in Washington as probably similar to the American Bullpup air-to-ground missile with television guidance. The Israeli pilots' slow, low target runs provided accuracy far above that which Americans experience with Bullpups, however, when making attack runs at high speed against dense anti-aircraft fire in North Vietnam.

If Israeli tactics made for accuracy, they also made for vulnerability. A reported nineteen Israeli craft were downed, many by converging walls of small-arms fire thrown up by Egyptian defenders recovering from their surprise. One Israeli pilot ejected near the Nile Delta town of Zagazig. Radio Cairo said villagers rushed to the scene. The downed pilot pulled a pistol but he was hacked to death by villagers. The Red Cross later confirmed the killing.

Altogether, Israel hit twenty-five Arab air bases in the first hours of the war, ranging from Damascus in Syria to the Egyptian field at Luxor, far up the Nile almost to the Aswan Dam. Egypt had concentrated its big bombers there. Their expectation was that they would be safe.

The dimensions of the air victory were stunning. It was the sheer magnitude of the defeat which brought Egypt and Jordan to claim that American and British planes helped in the raids. To the Arabs, it was unbelievable that the small Israeli air force had within hours swept their Russian jets from the skies and brought absolute and almost unchallenged air superiority to Israel.

Brigadier General Mordkhai Hod, Israeli air force commander, was later to say: "We made mincemeat of their air forces. This was beyond my wildest dreams!"

Initial Israeli claims to have destroyed 410 Arab planes in one day seemed incredible. Total reported Egyptian losses exceeded, in some cases, the numbers of planes of specific

types believed to have been supplied by the Russians. Israel said it had destroyed 300 Egyptian planes, as well as 60 Syrian, 35 Jordanian and 15 Iraqi aircraft. The destruction of one possible Lebanese plane was also cited, but it remained listed as a "possible," not a confirmed kill. Considering Lebanon's lack of aggressiveness during the brief war and the curious Israeli refusal to attack it, the claim remains suspect.

The world was at first skeptical of the Israeli assertions.

Battle reports, it was noted condescendingly, are peculiarly subject to exaggeration. But the reservations began to disappear on the second and third days of the war, when it became clear that Israel commanded the skies. The Arabs could mount no winged retaliation for the Monday raids.

The United Arab Republic on the day of the big strike, made grand claims on destruction of Israeli raiders. First they said 23, then 44, then 75. By nightfall, the claim was 86. Few believed them. In time, it was obvious that the Arabs could not confirm a fraction of the kills they claimed.

Early Arab claims that the air war was being fought on even terms caused very little concern in Israel. Tel Aviv radio even joked after one Radio Cairo broadcast, claiming heavy Israeli aircraft losses.

Broadcasting in Arabic, Tel Aviv Radio said, "Two Egyptian MIG 21 aircraft fought each other. One Egyptian shot down his Egyptian colleague. Then our air defense shot down the second aircraft."

The Israeli air task was made easier by the Egyptian practice of concentrating aircraft of one type at a single field, instead of dispersing them. The practice was probably related to maintenance shortcomings. It enabled Israel to assign raid priorities to the home fields of fighter-bombers, interceptors or large transports, according to which battle need was most important at the moment.

Most of the Arab airpower was destroyed on the ground. A few planes were shot down, including Antonov transports believed carrying antiaircraft units and troops across the Sinai to Jordan.

But Jordan was herself under attack. Raiders streaked across the Jordan River and struck fields at Amman and El Mafraq. King Hussein's headquarters were hit. The King even displayed a bomb fragment as a souvenir.

According to some reports, the clouds of Israeli planes

heading for Jordan touched off "the Big Lie" of United States-British participation in the attacks. Hussein apparently was carried away by what the Jordanian radar was tracking. The Jordanian king got the idea that he was watching American aircraft coming off a carrier of the Sixth Fleet, and he protested excitedly to American ambassador Finley Burns.

Burns immediately cabled Washington asking for an urgent clarification. His messages were repeated automatically to the American embassy in Cairo. Washington's reaction was fast. In barely two hours, Burns had a flat denial to hand to King Hussein.

Meanwhile, however, Hussein had telephoned Nasser to tell him of his conviction that American planes were involved and to report his "evidence" of having seen it on radar. This may have been the Nasser-Hussein conversation intercepted and recorded by Israeli Intelligence and later submitted to a New York "voice-print" analyst for verification that the two Arab chiefs were indeed devising the accusation which has already become a village myth in the Arab world: that two super-powers had to join the Jews so that they might beat the Arabs.

As furnished by the Israelis, the recorded conversation was as follows:

"Hello—His Majesty is ready? The President is coming.

"Hello, Amman, is His Majesty ready?

"Hello, His Honor the President is ready.

"How are you? I hear His Majesty, the brother wants to know if the fighting is going on along all the fronts.

"Yes. Shall we include also the United States? Do you know of this, shall we announce that the U.S. is cooperating with Israel?

"Hello, I do not hear, the connection is the worst—the line between you and the palace of the King from which the King is speaking is bad."

The conversation then went:

NASSER: Hello, will we say the U.S. and England or just the U.S.?

HUSSEIN: The U.S. and England.

NASSER: Does Britain have aircraft carriers?

HUSSEIN: (answer unintelligible).

NASSER: Good. King Hussein will make an announcement and I will make an announcement. Thank you.

Do not give up. Yes. Hello, good morning brother. Yes, I hear.

HUSSEIN: Mr. President, If you have something or any idea at all . . . at any time.

NASSER: We are fighting with all our strength and we have battles going on on every front all night and if we had any trouble in the fighting, it does not matter, we will overcome despite this. God is with us. Will His Majesty make an announcement on the participation of Americans and the British?

HUSSEIN: (answer not intelligible).

NASSER: By God, I say that I will make an announcement and you will make an announcement and we will see to it that the Syrians will make an announcement that American and British airplanes are taking part against us from aircraft carriers. We will issue an announcement. We will stress the matter. And we will drive the point home.

HUSSEIN: Good. All right.

NASSER: Your Majesty, do you agree?

HUSSEIN: (answer not clear).

NASSER: A thousand thanks. Do not give up. We are with you with all our hearts and we are flying our planes over Israel today. Our planes are striking at Israel's airfields since morning.

HUSSEIN: A thousand thanks. Be well.

Iraqi planes, part of the token participation by that country in the common Arab effort, raided Natanya in Israel on the first day. In retaliation, Israeli planes struck across Jordan and penetrated deep into Iraq to strike a military airfield at station H-3 on the Kirkuk petroleum pipeline. Six Iraqi planes were destroyed on the ground. The damage the Iraqis caused in Israel was minor.

While Israel moved to implement the classic strategy of gaining air superiority first, Israeli ground troops moved ahead, largely without aircraft cover. Nor was there time to sweep for Egyptian mines in plastic containers that defy magnetic detection. In Gaza, Israeli troops met Egyptian infantry, well dug-in, and Soviet tanks, including the late-model 36-ton T-54, first manufactured in 1955 and a significant factor in crushing the Hungarian revolt in the streets of Budapest in 1956. The

Egyptian tanks were dug in as stationary artillery, their thinner hulls protected by the Gaza sand and only their armored turrets vulnerable to direct fire. The Israeli army punched through, alone, on the ground and without air support.

A "Mother Courage" type showed up. Russian-born Olga Klein, 57, short, stumpy, ran a grocery in Tiberias when the government requisitioned her truck. She went with it. The truck was used as an ambulance attached to a field hospital. She drove, loaded and unloaded medical supplies, filled in as kitchen help and nursed the sick. Said she had done the same at Stalingrad during World War II.

In Gaza, once Egyptian defenses were breached, the Israeli attackers split into two forces. One column veered to the left toward El Arish down the Mediterranean coast. Its objective was to crack the center of the Egyptian strength on the paved two-lane road that parallels the shore to El Qantara el Sharqiya on the east bank of the Suez Canal. The other Israeli column bore right to mop up and secure the Gaza Strip, home for 430,000 Arabs, most of them refugees. The Israeli attack reportedly trapped 10,000 Egyptian soldiers in Gaza. Throughout the next two days Egyptian snipers and Palestinian commandoes continued desperate resistance in Gaza. The town was not considered secure until Tuesday and, even then, some firing continued, particularly from the clustered hovels of Palestinian refugees, which the Israeli troops sealed off but did not enter.

But not all Gaza residents were committed to the war. A reporter asked one of the Arabs what he most wanted. He was a taxi driver, father of ten. All he wanted was "to eat and to work." What did he think of Nasser? "Nasser is good, Israel is good, America is good, Britain is good, Canada is good, India is good, Anything is good."

Gaza was also the main base for Ahmad Shukairy's Palestine Liberation Army. As expected, it disintegrated under Israeli attack. Shukairy himself barely escaped capture in Jerusalem by Israeli soldiers. He shuttled among Amman, Damascus and Beirut, then disappeared from sight. The sudden Israeli victory ended the immediate threat of the P.L.A. as a military force, but most of its skulking irregulars remained clearly unreconciled to their defeat.

The drive on Monday into Gaza City was punctuated by a fierce skirmish in which one of the most poignant episodes

involved not soldiers but two American journalists. The two men from *Life* Magazine—Paul Schutzer, a photographer, and Michael Mok, a reporter—were riding in separate Israeli half-tracks when the column ran into mortar and machine-gun fire.

“In my own half-track,” Mok wrote later, “the bursting shells first wounded the machine gunner, who sits in an elevated position up front. Blood welled down his face and made the stock of his weapon slippery, but he pressed it into his cheek and kept firing.

“The driver, taking evasive action, maneuvered the heavy vehicle like a Dodge-em car at a carnival. The tracks threw up clouds of Negev dust that choked and blinded the troops who were blazing away with their Uzi submachine guns at dug-in Egyptian soldiers, now firing on us from all sides.”

Presently Mok noticed that another half-track had been set afire by an enemy shell. As the fire soared skyward with a fierce crackling noise, Mok thought, “I hope Paul has a picture.” Then the thought hit him: “Good Christ, what if he is inside . . .”


Schutzer was a Jew and a Zionist, passionately devoted to Israel. He was able to accompany the attack with Mok only because he had appealed to Dayan, an old friend.

When the fighting had ended Mok made his way to an aid station where he found a soldier called Dov, who had been riding with Schutzer.

“Mike,” said Dov, “I don’t want to tell you this but your friend is dead. Do you understand? Paul is out of it now . . .”

Two other newsmen were killed that first day of the war. In Jerusalem Ted Yates of NBC was in a group in the lobby of the Intercontinental Hotel in the Jordanian sector when gunfire crackled through it. The others ducked. Yates, as was his habit, looked to see what was happening. A bullet wounded him fatally in the head. Ben Oyserman, a London-born Israeli free-lancing for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, was killed by a land mine on the road to Gaza.

Egypt had concentrated 900 tanks in the Sinai. The terrain favors a defense line halfway across the peninsula. Egypt chose not to put its main positions there but to push them eastward next to the Israeli border. It was a fatal error. Once Israel’s tanks and mechanized infantry penetrated the line they were in the rear of the Egyptian troops, whose retreat was cut off.



Times map by Harlan Kirby

Egypt was to lose 700 of its tanks, brand-new Soviet T-55's captured in working condition, before the campaign was over and Israeli troops stood poised on the Suez.

The vehicular carnage was spectacular at the eleven-mile-long Mitla pass, funnel from the central Sinai to Suez. In one winding two-mile stretch, the highway was virtually paved with blackened metal—tanks, trucks, jeeps, guns—pounded into scrap by Israeli fighter planes. In some cases, vehicles lay atop one another, as if crazed drivers had tried to barrel through the huge, burning traffic jam.

The Sinai approaches were littered with still other Egyptian equipment, some blasted by gunfire, some charred by napalm, some still intact. Israelis found tanks abandoned with shells still in the guns, as if the Arabs could not take the instant needed to fire a final round already loaded before joining the general retreat on foot.

More than a hundred Egyptian artillery pieces were counted in the Sinai, not including the pass. There were thousands of trucks and jeeps, hundreds of tanks.

In Jerusalem there had been threats of an outbreak on Sunday. Jordanian machine guns fired bursts from two different sections. The sounds echoed sharply down crowded Jaffa Road, main boulevard in Israeli Jerusalem. Some pedestrians, tense from the crisis atmosphere of the preceding fortnight, bolted for cover. Others, accustomed to the sound of gunfire in the Holy City, took little notice. A few minutes later, Jordanian guns fired on a small buzzing Israeli plane.

Arab radio charged that the Israeli plane had attempted to photograph Jordanian troop positions. Israel denied the plane had violated Jordan's air space. Jerusalem had gone to bed Sunday as it had for two weeks, uneasy, expecting the worse.

Three hours after the first fronts opened in northern and southern Sinai, the eastern front in Jordan was in flames. Israel had indicated to Jordan that it would refrain from attack if Jordan did not join the general Arab crusade. But Jordanian troops, under an Egyptian commander, began shelling Israeli-held Jerusalem. Israel launched a quick and relentless campaign that was to end in clearing the ancient city in a short, vicious street-fighting battle capped by poignant scenes at the Wailing Wall in what had been Arab territory. Although the campaign against Jordan made King Hussein's troops crumble

even before the Egyptians, it was not an indication that the Jordanians were lesser fighters. Instead, it was a measure of the heavy effort Israel put into the eastern front against soldiers considered the best of the Arab world.

Israel could not afford to devote less than a maximum effort against Jordan not only because Jordan's territory almost cuts Israel in two but also because King Hussein's desert country is the gateway through which other Arab forces might be poured if the Arabs truly united and honored all their troop pledges.

Fighting started in Jerusalem at 11 A.M., three hours after it started in the Sinai. It started as a war of rifle, machine-gun and mortar fire in the city, then spread into a war of tanks and artillery in the Jordanian bulge as Israeli units moved in to hammer Arab positions.

An American woman reporter, sitting in the King David Hotel lobby when firing began, stayed until a shell whistled in and exploded in front of the hotel. Everyone was ordered to a basement shelter. There, the reporter found several Englishmen already comfortably settled in, gin and tonics in hand.

Soon the hotel crowd was joined by fifty passengers of a bus driven by Moses Malach. He had been driving from the German quarter when the war in Jerusalem began.

"As soon as I heard the noise," Malach said, "I stepped on the gas. I drove as fast as I could, zigzagging like crazy."

He had left the bus in the middle of the street outside the hotel.

The mortar and artillery bombardment from the Jordanian sector was intense. No part of the city escaped. More than six hundred buildings in the Israeli sector were damaged. Shells landed near Prime Minister Eshkol's home. Glass panes in the Israel Museum were blasted out by concussion from exploding shells. The Church of the Dormition, southwest of the old city and said to be the scene of Christ's Last Supper, was hit early. A shell punched a hole in the church dome.

The bombardment continued, and at 1:30 P.M., Jordanian troops moved into the demilitarized area controlled by the United Nations. Arabs occupied Government House, headquarters for the UN Truce Supervision team, located south of the old city on a hill called Mount of Evil Counsel.

The U.S. consulate in Jerusalem ordered Americans to use

the first available commercial aircraft to leave the country. Many did.

Rumors, later proved false, circulated that both the Hebrew University and the museum on Mount Scopus had been shelled. In fact, the Jewish enclave inside the Jordan sector had been quickly taken by Arab troops without damage.

From the Jordanian vantage point, it appeared that all of the Israeli sector had been hit. It lay under a pall of smoke boiling skyward in the west. The streets in the Arab sector were deserted. The Mandelbaum Gate, sole connection between the two parts of the city, was closed. The area around it had been heavily hit.

An Egyptian general, Abdel Moneim Riad, arrived to take charge of Arab military operations, as provided in the mutual defense pact signed a week earlier between Nasser and King Hussein.

The King took to the Jordanian radio to tell his people: "This is the battle of destiny. We are at the beginning of the decisive battle which we hope will end in victory. Either we shall live in honor or die in honor."

(When it was over for Jordan two days later, the King said 15,000 Jordanians were dead. A different King Hussein, unshaven and exhausted, declared, "Israel won with overwhelming strength. I hope people all over the world will recognize the efforts this country made to defend its soil.")

One Israeli citizen who did not flee to the shelters on that first day of battle was Jerusalem's Mayor, Theodore Kollek. Riding in his green sedan with his flag flying from the right front fender, Kollek visited nearly every sector of his city to inspect damage, comfort the frightened and give encouragement when it was needed. Once his driver hesitated before an open space that was under heavy fire.

"Drive through it," Kollek ordered. "If our time has come, it has come."

His car was only hit once. A bullet cracked through the rear trunk.

During the first hours of the battle, the Jordanians had the best of it. But during an afternoon lull in the Arab bombardment, the forces of Israel struck back. They moved into what had been no-man's-land and drove the Jordanians out of Government House. Then at dusk, the Israeli air force began its work in Jerusalem. Earlier in the day, it was occupied with the



“U Thant — Disregard my previous wire on pulling out
U.N. peace force — Regards — Nasser.”

primary strategic job of destroying Arab air power. This accomplished with devastating thoroughness, Israeli pilots were now prepared for the battle of Jerusalem. The jets swooped in at darkness Monday, flashing their Star of David insignia over the Judean Hills. A magnificent display of nighttime bombing followed. The sky turned crimson.

Israel's parliament, the Knesset, met that first night in its building just over a mile from the Old City. Shells burst all around, but legislators rejected proposals to adjourn to the basement, considering it beneath the dignity of such a body. The lawmakers were in high spirits, for they knew that Israel's air force had already shattered Arab air power. They celebrated by drinking lemonade in the blacked-out chamber.

Dawn Tuesday, second day of the war, found two armored Israeli columns moving out into what developed as a classic pincers movement to seal off the city. One moved to the east around the north side of the Old City toward Mount Scopus, dominating Jerusalem. The other moved south of the old walled area into the Jordanian sector, fighting hill to hill. Despite Israeli air cover, slashing at Jordanian defenses, Arab resistance was fierce. Each hill had to be taken.

Often this required dangerous house-to-house fighting. Afterward, an Israeli sergeant-major recalled, "You go into a room, and it leads to another room. There are steps going up to yet another room, or steps going down. And so on and so on. Anywhere in this maze, a suicide squad sniper may lurk. Some of them have thrown away their uniforms and have put on pajamas."

As the Israelis took the Jordanian section of Jerusalem, Arab soldiers scurried to get into business suits, hiding their uniforms. When they managed the switch, their deception failed more often than not. Israeli soldiers laughed at them.

Israeli radio warned all residents of the Jordanian Sector to stay indoors. Anyone looking out could be shot. White cloths were to be displayed outside houses to indicate the command was understood.

Western correspondents in the National Hotel in the Arab Sector—where newsmen were ordered by military authorities to stay put—went to the roof early Tuesday to survey the war scene. Hearing the clatter of tank tracks on the deserted cobblestones below, they looked down. It was not a Jordanian tank,

but an Israeli tank. A few minutes later, an Israeli column followed the first tank down the street, moving cautiously.

Next a squadron of Mystères thundered across the sky toward Mount Scopus. The jets went after Arab troop positions near the Augusta Victoria Hospital at the foot of the hill. Each of four attack bombers dropped two napalm canisters on Arab positions. Israeli soldiers could soon be seen charging up the southern slope.

A small Israeli police detachment, stationed on the hilltop under 1948 partition arrangements, and escorted daily for nineteen years to their post by UN personnel, had dug positions there. Israeli soldiers occupied the positions, their weapons dominating the valley passage to the old city below. Defense Minister Dayan had tea atop Mount Scopus that day.

During the evening hours, U.S.-built Patton and Sherman tanks of the Israeli army moved through the streets into assault positions on two sides of Arab defenders emplaced south of the mountain.

The final assault to win the Old City began at dawn that Wednesday. Artillery began shelling Arab-held Jerusalem. Israeli soldiers, jammed into bright blue civilian buses, rolled southward toward the Mount of Olives while other troops attacked Jordanians still putting up a determined fight on the slopes of Mount Scopus. Arab machine guns sputtered from a wooded area on the southeast part of the hill. A burst of Israeli artillery silenced them.

On Wednesday morning, the Israelis did not know what they were likely to encounter in the Old City of Jerusalem. They were ordered to use no heavy weapons, to preserve the holy monuments within. As dawn broke, an Israeli unit, led by a colonel riding a half-track armored vehicle passed through the Mandelbaum Gate and quickly headed southeast. It dodged gutted tanks, shell craters and Arab soldiers, dead and dying. One Arab lay crumpled in a gutter. Another's mouth was open in a final scream. He lay on propped elbows beside his shattered Land Rover. Flaming gas from the vehicle had charred his right leg. A third, with a useless bazooka at his side, stared sightlessly into the morning sun in the direction of the road that overlooked gently swaying olive trees in the Garden of Gethsemane.

Off this road and through St. Stephen's Gate the Israeli unit rushed. Finally in the Old City, it sped down Via Dolorosa—

where Christ carried the Cross on the way to Calvary. The street was lined with eucalyptus trees and barbed wire. At 10 A.M., the column reached the gigantic Moslem Mosque of Omar, where two Israeli soldiers raised the Star of David above the shining gold dome and blue-hued mosaic walls. They stood in the flagstone plaza and in front of the Wailing Wall, holy to Jews for centuries.

"There was almost no fighting," the colonel commanding the column said. "There was sniping, but that's not fighting after these last two days."

Five minutes after the unit arrived, a delegation composed of the Arab governor, a kadi (Moslem religious judge) and other officials met the Israelis and promised there would be no more shooting.

Shortly after the walled area was secured, Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol and Defense Minister Dayan arrived to join soldiers in the first service at the Wailing Wall, conducted by Rabbi Shlomo Goren, senior chaplain for the Israeli defense forces.

Unmusical it is, but the sound of the *shofar* had a beauty of centuries that morning. The hollow blare of the ram's horn echoed off the time-worn stones of the Wailing Wall.

"Praise the Lord," Rabbi Shlomo Goren intoned from the Torah. "Praise servants of the Lord, praise the name of the Lord. Trust in the Lord Israel, for He is thy strength and thy shield. He has heard thy supplication. He has become thy salvation. Give thanks to the Lord, for He is good and His steadfast love endures forever."

Peering through his glasses, his graying beard quivering with emotion, the senior chaplain of the Israeli armed forces declared: "We have taken the City of God. We are entering the Messianic era for the Jewish people. And I promise to the Christian world that we are responsible for, we will take care of the holy places of all religions here. For all people, I promise them, we will take care."

Joy among Jews in Jerusalem was unbounded. They left shelters to watch the Israeli soldiers. They wept, in joy and in triumph. Crowds cheered at Sabbath Square as the soldiers who had liberated the West Wall went by. The old men among them, deeply orthodox, cheered too but looked embarrassed. For they were cheering those they had reviled so often for lack of orthodoxy. The divinity students at Yeshiva cheered

wildly, relieved to be able to join wholeheartedly for once in a general celebration.

Sporadic firing by snipers continued the rest of Wednesday and well into Thursday. Despite the firing, many Jews insisted on visiting the holy places. Finally, on Thursday afternoon, Chaim Herzog, newly-named military governor for the area taken from Jordan, pleaded with Jews to stay away. Two had been killed by snipers. Three others, all children, had stepped on land mines and died.

Israeli units soon began clearing the west bank of the Jordan River, moving on Bethlehem and Nablus. Nablus was taken in midafternoon on Wednesday. Bethlehem fell shortly afterward. Four shells struck the Church of the Nativity, reputedly built on the site of the manger where Christ was born. Three burst against the thick walls but one hit the roof and started a fire. It was put out by a bucket brigade composed of 60-year-old Greek Orthodox Bishop Pella Klavvios and two monks.

With the fall of Nablus, the fate of Jordan west of the Jordan River was sealed. In less than three days of savage air and artillery bombardment and vicious ground fighting, the bulk of the Jordanian army was destroyed in the 2,000 square-mile pocket west of the river.

The Ramalla radio on the Jordan side of Jerusalem was reactivated Thursday A.M., June 8 by engineers of the Israel Ministry of Posts. The engineers were veterans of the Ramalla Broadcasting Service of the British Mandate days. The Israel flag hoisted above the station was a sheet with a Star of David painted by hand by Signaller Gad Holzman.

When they stormed Mt. Zion, Israeli soldiers arrived in an Arab camp, hastily abandoned by enemy troops who left everything behind except their weapons. The area was crisscrossed by drainage ditches, which even had footpaths crossing them.

Beds in each of the 12 tents were neatly arranged. Gleaming mess gear, clothing, and other personal articles were neatly laid out on the beds, and at the foot of each stood a pair of highly polished boots.

Occupants of the camp had been ill-prepared for battle, but they were ready for inspection.

Jordanian PW's were well-guarded when taken inside Israeli borders and for good reason. As some went by in a truck, an Israeli man said to a sentry "Give me 15 minutes with them.

They killed my two brothers in 1948 and whipped me – see the scars on my back.” The sentry had nothing but contempt for the Jordanians. “They are a bunch of cowards. They curse Hussein’s father and Nasser’s father and call blessings on Moshe Dayan and Ben-Gurion.”

But despite this intense feeling, Jordanians were treated well.

When Israeli troops began moving into Jordanian territory late Monday night, they came upon an 11-year-old Jordanian girl with a bad wound in her neck. She was taken back to Sha’arei Zedek hospital and “died” on the operating table. However, with the aid of an “ambu” resuscitation machine, the girl was revived.

Arab occupation of Sharm El Sheikh—resulting from the demand that the United Nations leave the heights dominating the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba—was the stated cause of the 1967 war. Sharm El Sheikh was thus important, militarily and symbolically.

Israel expected to fight for Sharm El Sheikh. A coordinated attack was planned. Torpedo boats would sweep in and land commandos. Paratroops would drop in and seal off retreat.

At 10 A.M. Wednesday, paratroopers prepared to drop. But Sharm El Sheikh was deserted. The commando squads held Sharm El Sheikh and the paratroopers were landed peacefully at a nearby airstrip. The Arabs had fled north into the desert. Paratroopers complained they had been cheated out of a combat drop which would have entitled them to wear a red ribbon with their paratrooper insignia.

In the Sinai, armored columns were racing toward the Suez along all three of the roads that cross the desert. On the way, they passed long columns of tanks and trucks knocked out by Israeli airpower. Egyptian soldiers had discarded their shoes in their hurry to retreat, presumably in the belief that the boots impeded progress in the soft desert sand.

Pilots reported bands of Arab soldiers straggling toward the west all over the peninsula, with Israeli columns already far in front of them, between the Egyptians and the canal.

By nightfall, Israel held all three natural routes across the Sinai, including the Sinai’s only railroad running along the Mediterranean coast. The war on two fronts was all but won. Israeli casualties were not immediately reported; neither were Egyptian. But it was apparent that thousands—perhaps tens of

thousands—of Egyptian soldiers were wandering aimlessly across the dunes, lost in their panicky retreat from the Israeli juggernaut.

The Israeli advance overran an Egyptian surface-to-air missile site in the Sinai. The capture included nine intact Russian-built SAM-2 missiles, like those used against United States planes in North Vietnam. Israeli commanders said there was no evidence to indicate Russian advisers had been present at the site to help operate the complicated radar equipment used for SAM-2 guidance.

Israeli jets were already using the base at El Arish in the north of Sinai, taxiing contemptuously past burnt-out MIG-17's left smashed on the field. Ground troops were poised on high ground twenty-nine miles east of Suez, dominating all approaches to the canal. Israeli salvage squads scoured the battlefield, recovering Soviet tanks, many in working order, as well as hundreds of operative trucks abandoned by their drivers.

On Thursday, bands of Egyptians kept up efforts to blast out of the Israeli encirclement and reach Suez. There were sharp and bloody engagements. Official announcements in Cairo that Egyptian forces were counterattacking in Sinai only confirmed popular fears that the Israelis were pushing forward. Egyptian optimists hopefully suggested the Arab retreat was a tactic to lure the Israelis deep into the desert, better to destroy them. But apprehension was growing. The Israelis already held the entire coast of south Sinai, including the flaming oil fields at Ras Sudar, set afire by the retreating Egyptians. Brigadier General Abraham Yoffe, called up three weeks earlier from his civilian job of running Israel's national parks, commanded one of the first columns to reach Suez. The first he knew his men had reached the canal was when a light tank commander asked permission to wash his feet there.

"I said 'no,'" the burly, balding Yoffe laughed, "and he's still unwashed."

Yoffe rather incongruously admitted that one of his worries in the moment of triumph was what Egyptian prisoners might think of the unmilitary, ragtag appearance of the Israeli reservists who had beaten them.

By Friday, Egypt and Jordan had accepted the cease-fire proposed by the United Nations. Cairo radio declared: "At

2:30 this afternoon quiet reigned on the front, and all operations had ceased in observance of the cease-fire order . . .”

In the Sinai, thousands of Egyptian soldiers wandered without water, prey of 25,000 Bedouin tribesmen who felt no kinship with either side. Some bands of Egyptian soldiers threw their arms into the air and tried to surrender to low-flying Israeli airplanes. According to several Israeli reports, thirst-crazed Egyptian stragglers plodding out of Sinai were fired on by their own troops dug in on the western bank of the Suez Canal. There was speculation this may have been designed to prevent stragglers from spreading the word in Cairo of the magnitude of the Egyptian defeat.

One Egyptian officer, a Brigadier General named Ahmed E. Abd el Naby, handed his captors a calling card. It gave his position as “Military, naval and air attaché. U. A. R. Embassy, Pakistan.” Brig. Gen. Ariel Sharon, the Israeli officer who received the handsomely engraved card, remarked, “They’ve got calling cards, but they can’t fight.”

The Egyptian’s account of his desert war was revealing. He had been commanding an armored brigade, when after one Israeli air attack, he was ordered to retreat. He abandoned his tanks immediately and fell back with his brigade intact. But upon encountering Israeli roadblocks, his troops panicked and fled; the General himself hid from the enemy for several days, until thirst drove him to surrender. He had high praise for the kindness of the Israeli patrol who captured him, but when asked about the attitude of his troops toward Nasser after their painful experience, he stated emphatically that they were still devoted to him.

For himself, the General had one personal regret, “I lost my luggage, which I bought in London a month before,” he said, “and my transistor radio.”

Brigadier General Yeshayahv Gavish, southern Sinai front commander for Israel, said his troops had 3,000 Egyptian prisoners of war “in hand.” Gavish estimated Egyptian casualties in the Sinai at 7,000 to 10,000 killed. He said his own troops suffered 275 killed, 800 wounded and 61 tanks destroyed or damaged, a figure lower than the number of operative tanks captured from the enemy.

It was now Syria’s turn.

As Jewish units moved toward the Syrian border from the

Jordan front, soldiers tossed notes to cheering villagers along the way, asking that their families be phoned and told, as one said, "You saw me at this place and I was all right at this time."

The women tossed fruit to the troops. Some of it had been dipped first in germicide. One matron explained: "So they shouldn't get sick at such a time."

On Thursday, Syria had begun to step up artillery fire from the mountains on the Israeli plains settlements below—on the kibbutzim of Ein Gev and Tel Kafir. Israel had a particular grievance against the Syrians, who were responsible for most of the terrorist attacks. They had killed civilians indiscriminately and made life a nightmare in border villages. Of all the Arab states, perhaps it could be said that Syria was most immediately responsible for the current war. Syria, ruled by military hotheads, was the country Israel wanted to punish the most.

The Israeli attack was well matched to the rough, fortified terrain. At noon Friday, one column of infantry and light tanks attacked due east at the northernmost tip of Israel. A wave of Centurions operating as mobile artillery moved in frontal attack on the main ridges to help shield bulldozers under fire carving roads from the flank of the Syrian position. Infantrymen mounted on half-tracks advanced under heavy Syrian artillery fire toward the main Arab salient. It was bloody fighting under continuous shelling. But by nightfall, Israelis were inside Syria and had hacked new roads which would permit tanks to sweep behind the fortified ridges and toward Damascus to the northeast.

On Saturday, Israel continued the attack with reinforcements shifted from the victorious Sinai campaign. The Israelis raced to punish Syria before a cease-fire could be voted in New York. From the Syrian side heavy shelling continued. Reporters listening to intercepted radio messages heard firing instructions transmitted in Russian. Later, it was reported that Israel had captured five Russian officers on the Syrian front, but the report was officially denied. Meanwhile Israeli armored units, having taken the heights of the Golan Plateau overlooking the Sea of Galilee, pushed into El Quneitra, an important road junction twelve miles east of the border.

Afterward the Israelis said the Syrians fought better than the Egyptians. One battalion attacking the Syrian line suffered

twelve percent casualties, including the battalion commander. But when the Arab defense line was cracked, civilians and soldiers alike fled north. One Arab officer driving a white Volkswagen rammed head-on into an Israeli tank, successfully committing suicide. Soon, roads into El Quneitra were clogged with Israeli vehicles as the Jewish soldiers took up blocking positions facing Damascus in case a cease-fire was not signed.

The final cease-fire was signed the following day, Sunday, June 11, in El Quneitra, at a joint meeting of Israeli and Syrian officers with United Nations military representatives. Except for occasional sniping, quiet settled on the battlefield.

In the vast sweep around Israel's borders, the war was over. In six days, Israeli armed forces had destroyed Arab air-power, crushed two armies and badly hurt a third. They had overrun an area four times the size of Israel. The Syrians were the last to go and undoubtedly Israeli troops could have taken Damascus had they chosen to do so.

Israel's reported losses were astonishingly low, compared to Arab casualties, but still heavy for a nation of two-and-a-half million. During the six days of fighting, Tel Aviv spokesmen said, Israel suffered 679 killed and 2,563 wounded, of whom 255 had medium-to-serious wounds.

General Rabin believed that three factors led to low loss of life among his soldiers. First, the knowledge of each man that he was fighting for his life and the existence of his country. Second, the capability of the men themselves and the high morale of the troops. Third, the high degree of flexibility within the entire chain of command and the "capability to exploit the moments in battle during which commanders can change the situation into one producing victory."

In the wake of the defeat, Syria immediately criticized Egypt's strategy in fighting the war. Instead of permitting destruction of individual armies on separate, not mutually supported fronts, Syria said forces on its frontier and on the Sinai frontier should have dug in and fought a defensive war to tie down Israeli units. Meanwhile, both countries should have poured forces into Jordan to support a single front offensive that would have allowed them to march to the sea across the narrow waist of Israel.

One hundred thousand Palestine refugees had fled across the River Jordan from the lands Israel had taken on the west.

United Nations officials in Amman said many refugees had been ordered to leave by Israeli officers. The Security Council called on Israel to allow the refugees to return, but the issue was far from settled. Obviously, Israel's victory had only exacerbated the grievous, long-smouldering refugee problem.

The chaos with Egypt during the short war was vividly recalled by British refugees, who like the Americans, were spirited out under darkness. "We left everything behind, everything," said an elderly woman. "Our homes, our furniture, my clothes, my jewels. It was terrible in Alexandria, terrible. The mob killed a man, smashed him, just because he had a pale face and blue eyes. He turned out to be Egyptian."

After Egypt accepted the cease fire, a woman from the British consulate asked an Egyptian officer whether the nightly blackout would remain in effect. She was horrified when he replied without hesitation, "Yes, so we can come into your houses and drink your blood."

In Cairo, reinforcements had arrived—far too late. After pledging assistance to Egypt, Algeria sent two MIG squadrons to help in a war already lost. Truckloads of Algerian troops were reported in southern Tunisia on their way to Egypt.

The war moved again to the United Nations. Charges and countercharges already were being shouted, despite the words of the Koran: ". . . they shall hear no vain discourse nor accusation of sin, but (only) the saying, 'Peace! Peace!'"

— CHAPTER VIII —

CEASE-FIRE

U.S. and Soviet Union favor end to the fighting. Security Council votes cease-fire. Babel in the United Nations. Israeli attack on U.S.S. *Liberty*. The war ends.

WHILE THE Israeli army was sweeping toward Suez, both the United States and the Soviet Union reached the conclusion that a cease-fire was in order. After the first day of hot-line jockeying between the two great powers, the Kremlin had come to accept the view that Israel need not retreat behind the boundaries that were hers on Sunday. The Soviet position was not yet publicly known and was to cause great surprise when it was finally announced. It meant that it was the Soviet Union and not, as many Americans had feared, the United States who had abandoned its Middle Eastern friends. Exulting in its diplomatic victory, the Johnson administration felt that the moment had come for the major powers to stop the fighting in the Middle East.

The second day of the fighting, like the first, found the President wide awake and at work in his bedroom long before dawn. The log shows he made his first phone call to the situation room at 4:29 A.M. to get a briefing on the Middle East. At 6:40 he arrived for his first meeting of the day with Vice-President Humphrey, Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Undersecretary of State Katzenbach, Llewellyn E. Thompson—American Ambassador to Moscow, McGeorge Bundy, and Clark Clifford.

Clifford is one of those men known in Washington as “an old crony.” A courtly, handsome, highly successful lawyer, Clifford was special counsel to President Truman and chief

planner of the famous 1948 whistlestop campaign. He later performed many and varied services for President Kennedy. Currently he holds no official position except head of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which has no operational responsibilities. But he is nevertheless one of President Johnson's closest advisers and a frequent backdoor visitor to the White House.

Bundy was another extraordinary name on the list of those present at the meeting. He had first served President Kennedy and then Mr. Johnson in the capacity that Rostow later assumed. Lean and boyish in appearance, Bundy is an acerbic Harvard academician who acquired a reputation as a crisis manager of formidable talents. He helped manage the Cuban missile showdown between Kennedy and Khrushchev in October, 1962, and then the Dominican Republic intervention for Johnson in 1965. A few months later, he left government to become President of the Ford Foundation, but Johnson extracted a promise from him that he would return to Washington whenever he was needed.

At the morning meeting in the situation room, the President and his advisers apparently set the pattern for American bargaining on a cease-fire at the United Nations.

At the United Nations, Goldberg and Federenko argued throughout most of the day on a resolution to stop the fighting. Goldberg, playing the superior hand given him by Israeli military victories, steadfastly held out for a simple cease-fire with no troop withdrawals. Federenko finally saw that the United States would not budge on this point and that he could not hope to win agreement for a resolution demanding a withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the lines they held two days before. He consented to a motion for a simple cease-fire, without any conditions.

Since 10:30 A.M., the fifteen members of the Security Council had been on call for an urgent meeting. It was late afternoon before Federenko caved in and authorized Denmark's Hans Tabor, Council President for the month of June, to call the delegates to their circular meeting-table in the Council chamber.

It took Tabor only seven minutes to accomplish the necessary action. He called the meeting to order, read the short text of the resolution the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed upon, asked that there be no debate on it and called

for a show of hands. The agreement was unanimous.

But that was only the beginning of the evening. The Council promptly embarked on a long debate on the war that was to monopolize television network prime time throughout the United States. Among those who watched was the President.

(The White House is wired so that virtually wherever the President goes he can monitor three television sets, one tuned to each of the major networks, and select whichever sound he wants to hear. He also has his office wired to receive the programs of all four radio networks, plus WAVA, an all-news station in Washington. In addition, he keeps the tickers of the Associated Press and United Press International clacking away in soundproof boxes behind his desk in the majestic Oval Office.)

After the resolution was passed, the President decided that he would go on television with a short statement supporting it. At 8 P.M., after Federenko had completed his speech and during a station break, Lyndon Johnson suddenly appeared on television screens throughout the land.

"The cease-fire vote of the Security Council opens the hopeful path away from danger in the Middle East. It reflects responsible concern for peace on the part of all who voted for it," the President said. "The United States has warmly supported this resolution. We hope the parties directly concerned will promptly act upon it. We believe a cease-fire is the necessary first step, in the words of the resolution itself—a first step forward to what we all must hope will be a new time of settled peace and progress for all the peoples of the Middle East.

"It is toward this end that we shall now strive."

The stage was then turned over to Israel's Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, who had arrived in New York just a few hours earlier. Eban, who had suffered heavily at home for counseling caution while his countrymen favored action, had earned the right to admonish. He had lived through two condemnations of Israel by the UN for aggression, while watching the Arab states perform their provocations with no hint of reprimand. Now he could make the UN squirm. Israel was in no hurry for a cease-fire. With every hour that passed, it embellished its victory. Eban wanted to let the world know what Israel had tolerated before making war—and what it demanded before it would make peace.



Eban reviewed the political position in which Israel found itself when Nasser shut off the Gulf of Aqaba. "Israel was and is breathing with only a single lung." He conjured up a picture of 80,000 Egyptian troops and 900 tanks massed on the Sinai border Monday morning. He re-created the vision of Israeli radars suddenly recording mass flights of Egyptian planes toward Israel.

"In short, there was peril for Israel wherever she looked," he said. "There was an apocalyptic air of approaching peril, and Israel faced this danger alone."

Then he made allusion to the failures of the Western world and here his criticism of the United States, though veiled, was strong. Referring to Israel's "most unusual patience" since the blockade began, he said:

It existed because we had acceded to the suggestion of some of the maritime states that we give them scope to concert their efforts in order to find an international solution which would ensure the maintenance of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba for ships of all flags.

Now he needled the United Nations and particularly U Thant, who sat stolidly through the address, for the withdrawal of the peace-keeping force from Sinai two weeks before. "People in our country and in many countries ask: What is the use of the United Nations presence if it is in effect an umbrella which is taken away as soon as it begins to rain?"

Still he gave no hint of whether Israel would accept the cease-fire resolution. While the delegates waited anxiously, the television cameras dramatized the conflict in the Council chamber by focusing regularly on the almost mummylike visage of Egypt's El Kony. In comparison, the portly Eban looked like a cherub.

Finally, Eban declared that Israel would accept the cease-fire proposal, but only on condition that it be fully accepted by all the other belligerents. He did not try to avoid antagonizing Israel's Arab neighbors. Israel, he indicated, would demand a victor's peace. He outlined these terms:

Acceptance of Israel's statehood and total elimination of the fiction of her non-existence.

Authentic intellectual recognition by her neighbors of Israel's deep roots in Middle Eastern reality.

Peaceful settlement of disputes, without attempts to "exploit tensions" or "inflame passions."

He ended on a philosophic note, reminding the council: "I am convinced men and nations do behave wisely after they have exhausted all other alternatives. . . . What has anybody gained from this?"

When Eban finished, attention turned to the Arab reaction to the cease-fire. The job of answering Eban fell to George J. Tomeh, the heavy-handed delegate from Syria. Tomeh's speech was a condemnation of Israeli aggression in bitter terms and also a reiteration of the Arab charges that the United States and Great Britain participated in the bombing.

Goldberg answered the Syrian charge by once again offering the UN a conducted inspection of the American Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. Such an inspection, he said, would disprove the charges at once.

"Put up or shut up," he angrily told the Syrian.

But Tomeh's speech avoided the key point of the evening's debate. What would the Arabs do about the cease-fire resolution? He deliberately dodged the question. It seemed that when Iraq's delegate, Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi, branded the resolution "a surrender to Israel," that the Arabs had decided to reject the proposal.

So the Security Council meeting broke up Tuesday night with the matter unsettled. For the time being, the guns would keep booming and airplanes flying in the Middle Eastern holocaust. The next move seemed to be up to the Arabs.

Throughout the world, the eruption of the Mideast war evoked intense emotional responses not only among men fearful it would escalate into nuclear Armageddon but also among those with close religious, nationalistic or political ties to the combatants. Also interested were those who, no matter how tenuous their association with either side, realized the outcome might well affect their own fortunes. For example:

Some forty-eight hours or more after the fighting started, Premier Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam was opening a housing project in a Saigon slum when someone thought to

ask where his sympathies lay. "I'm for Israel," he replied without hesitation.

In North Vietnam, President Ho Chi Minh already had rushed out with a statement supporting the Arabs and condemning the United States and Britain.

In Paris, the Gaullist government proclaimed its neutrality and argued that it could thereby play a vital role by keeping channels of communication to both sides open. De Gaulle, convinced that world problems can only be solved by world powers, proposed a Big Four meeting, but Russia rejected it. Though France had armed the Israelis and, according to reports, was now supplying them with spare parts, De Gaulle apparently sought to husband the goodwill he had painstakingly built up in the Arab world since the Algerian war. Thus Israel was without the friend it had counted on in earlier crises. But throughout France there was strong popular support for Israel. Even before the war started, several thousand Frenchmen, only about half of them Jews, volunteered to serve as replacements for Israeli workers and farmers who were mobilized as reservists. Once the conflict flared, thousands more marched through Paris streets singing the French and Israeli anthems and chanting "Israel will live."

The French Left was divided. Though the Communist party was naturally anti-Israel, such men as Jean-Paul Sartre, the Leftist foe of the United States' stand in Vietnam, was among the first of his countrymen to come out in Israel's support. In the Leftist weekly, *Nouvel Observateur*, publisher Jean Daniel, also a critic of American policy and an ardent supporter of the developing nations, said in an editorial on the eve of the war: "Is Israel threatened with death? Yes, undoubtedly. Can we accept this? No, at no price."

Across the channel in Britain, Israel's other ally in the 1956 war, the reaction was a good deal stronger. London, like Washington, had been accused by Egypt of joining in the attack on the Arabs, and the reaction was instantaneous. In marked contrast to the angry dissension at the time of the 1956 attack, there was now complete solidarity behind Prime Minister Wilson, who denounced Egypt's charges as a "monstrous fabrication." Throughout the week, British spokesmen resorted to far harsher terms than the Americans in replying to Arab allegations.

To the sound of cheers from both sides in Commons, Wilson

branded as "blackmail" the Arab's cut-off of oil to Britain and America and the severance of diplomatic relations by the Arab nations. At the height of the Arab-Wilson exchanges, Conservative leader Edward Heath pledged his party's full support to the Labor government. In London there were massive demonstrations and pledges of sympathy for Israel. As early as May 28, a huge throng gathered in a "solidarity with Israel" rally at the Speaker's Corner of Hyde Park and marched two miles to the Israeli embassy to present a statement of support. Ninety members of Parliament were among signers of the document. At the end of a week of crisis, the British Zionist Federation was able to announce that 9,750,000 pounds (\$27,300,000) had been raised for Israel by the Joint Palestine Appeal.

In sharp contrast, the Indian government, an international schizophrenic, had words of praise for Nasser and criticism for the United States. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi—heavily dependent on American food shipments to keep Indians alive and herself in office—called Nasser a "force for progress."

India's traditional neutralist and "anti-imperialist" sentiments were intensified in the crisis by the loss of three members of the Indian contingent of the UNEF who were killed, as the Indian representative told the Security Council, "in a wanton strafing attack on the withdrawing columns of these forces by Israel." (Ultimately, 11 Indians on the UN force died.) While other UN delegations were working on a cease-fire, India was trying to curry favor with the Arabs by obtaining a condemnation of Israeli "aggression."

In the Communist countries, Western embassies were attacked. One of the wildest outbursts was in Sofia, where Arab and African students descended on the United States, British and Israeli embassies. But when 1,500 shouting Arab, Cuban and North Vietnamese students tried to attack the British and American embassies in Moscow, the Soviets rolled up an impressive array of manpower and vehicles to block the demonstrators. The Russians, obviously determined to head off any Big Power incident, summoned thousands of men from the army and the police, plus bumper-to-bumper trucks, to seal off the embassies from the mobs.

Later in the week, Moscow was host to the representatives of the European Communist countries, who drafted a statement condemning Israel and promising assistance to the Arabs only.

Rumania—who alone among the Communist countries had not broken relations with Israel—refused to sign the document.

Nowhere, however, was the anti-Israeli reaction more violent than in Communist China, where huge demonstrations were staged in support of the Arab cause. Reuters reported that a mob forced its way into the British diplomatic mission in Peking. The Chinese also seized on the crisis to improve their standing with the Arabs. An editorial in the official party newspaper, *People's Daily*, attacked Russia as “betrayers of the Arab people” and accused the Soviet Union of conspiring with the United States to dominate the Middle East. However, in contrast to their action in 1956, when they offered “volunteers” to Egypt, the Chinese Communists this time limited their support to daring words and noisy demonstrations.

The Arabs made a fruitless appeal to Japan for support. Ambassadors of seven Arab states called on Foreign Minister Takeo Miki in Tokyo to ask that Japan put its “great prestige in the Afro-Asian world” on their side. Miki replied that Japan would take no side because she was dedicated to world peace. He added that Japanese businessmen were greatly concerned about the Suez Canal, since a large part of the country's imports and exports pass through the waterway, and asked the ambassadors what they could do about that. To this, the Arabs were silent, since the matter was all but out of their hands.

Despite the cease-fire voted by the Security Council on Tuesday night, the fighting was still raging on Wednesday, June 7. Israeli armies were smashing Arab lines virtually at will, making a mockery of a decade of Soviet aid. Now, if there was to be a meaningful cease-fire, the initiative belonged to Federenko and his Arab clients.

The Soviets were still under pressure from the Arabs to obtain an Israeli withdrawal from the conquered lands. Through most of Wednesday morning, Federenko kept vacillating. At one point, he stated that he could conduct no further business until he had consulted with Moscow. Whereupon, with an expansive smile, Goldberg agreed that the Soviet diplomat should “take all the time you need.” At 10:40 A.M., Federenko finally called Tabor and demanded an emergency session of the Security Council by 11 o'clock.

Tabor, though unable to comply with Federenko's time schedule, did get the fifteen representatives to sit down for a meeting at 12:30, when, to the amusement of some, the Rus-

sians asked for a further delay. A report had appeared from Cairo on the wires of Agence France-Presse that the U.A.R. had accepted the cease-fire. Federenko apparently wanted time for El Kony to telephone Cairo to check it. When the report proved false, Federenko asked again for the meeting, declaring he would brook no delay. With great patience, Tabor, a soft-spoken Scandinavian with a low-keyed sense of humor, reminded Federenko of his own previous obstructionism only hours before. Finally, the meeting got underway.

In his resolution, Federenko called for an *immediate* cease-fire, avoiding the demand that Israel withdraw and saying nothing about aggression. It was pointed out that there was no way for the Council, several thousand miles from the scene of the fighting, to implement an *immediate* cease-fire. It was finally agreed that the cease-fire be scheduled to take effect at 4 P.M. that afternoon.

Once again Eban consented to the resolution on the condition that the Arabs similarly agree to stop fighting. Once again, the Arab delegates, for their own good reasons, refused to give their assent.

All day long, however, there had been reports that Jordan wanted an end to the fighting because, as King Hussein later explained, certain friendly states had not lived up to promises. As yet few officials in the United States comprehended the magnitude of the defeat the king had suffered. But forty-seven minutes after the Council's deadline, Eban notified Tabor that the guns had been silenced on the Israeli-Jordanian line.

"We welcome, we favor, we support, we accept," the cease-fire, Eban said. But he added that the other belligerents continued to fight on. He noted that there were problems even in Jordan, since troops of other Arab countries—specifically Egypt—were still waging war from Jordanian territory.

The Arabs remained determined to show that they had not softened in their hostility to the West. By the end of the day on Wednesday, seven countries—Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Mauritania—had severed diplomatic relations with the United States. The State Department announced that the actions "apparently are based on a misrepresentation of the United States role in the Mideast conflict." Obviously, the Arabs were setting the stage for a long-term claim that the United States was responsible for their defeat. *Al Ahram*, an official Cairo newspaper, quoted King Hussein as having

told Nasser that American planes "struck my home with rockets."

Subsequently, the Arab states announced that they would no longer supply oil to the United States. The Johnson government called an "oil emergency" but scarcely seemed troubled by the move. Only 5 percent of American oil now comes from the Middle East. Further, the government figured that the Arabs needed the revenue as much as the United States needed the oil and that an extended embargo was unlikely.

Lyndon Johnson could not do much now to affect events in the Middle East. Neither, for that matter, could Moscow. The positions of both countries were well staked out. It was now up to the participants on the battlefields to stop shooting.

The two superpowers could, however, begin thinking of the future. President Johnson demonstrated that he had the long-range problems of the Middle East in mind that day by his appointment of McGeorge Bundy to head a special committee of the National Security Council on the Middle East. Bundy took a leave of absence from the Ford Foundation and moved into a suite of offices in the Executive Office Building, amid premature speculation that he might become the next Secretary of State if he performed well in his new job. Though the precise mission of the committee was left somewhat vague, no doubt intentionally, the President envisaged nothing less than permanent peace in the Middle East as its long-range goal.

The committee's responsibilities were formidable indeed. American companies had huge investments in oil facilities in the Arab countries. The Suez Canal had to be reopened. Johnson was anxious to maintain whatever strategic advantage the United States had acquired over the Soviet Union. All of these objectives had to be balanced against a commitment to the only Western-style democracy in the area—Israel. The commitment was not only political but moral. It involved not only the protection of Israel but the preservation of American interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

On Thursday afternoon, June 8, nearly ten thousand American Jews crowded into Lafayette Park, across the street from the White House, to celebrate Israel's triumph and demonstrate in behalf of Israeli-American solidarity. The mass meeting had been scheduled earlier as a solemn expression of support for Israel in its hour of need. It turned out to be a gigantic victory rally.

For Baltimore grocer Ben Krieger, carrying a pro-Israel placard in the 88-degree Washington sun, it was the next best thing to taking part in Israel's struggle. He left his wife to tend the store and boarded a chartered bus bound for Lafayette Park. Krieger, now in his sixties, had fled World War II persecution—first from Poland, then Russia. "It must not happen the same in Israel," he told a reporter as he wiped perspiration off his partly bald head.

For Steven Luger, a 19-year-old George Washington University student from Mamaroneck, New York, the reason for the demonstration was clear. "The idea is to show the President there is a large body who support Israel's action," he said.

"Mr. President, you don't have to be Jewish to support Israel," proclaimed the banner carried by Luger and two friends.

Many in the crowd, predominantly in the 15- to 25-year-old bracket, joyously sang "Hatikvah," the Israeli national anthem, alternated with "God Bless America." Some like Mrs. Sonya Korrostoff of Philadelphia wept openly during the singing.

At one point, chanting, clapping circles of young and old joyously did the hora, a Hebrew folk dance, in the park. The statue of Lafayette, the Frenchman who served valiantly in the American Revolution suddenly sprouted Israeli flags. The enthusiasm was unparalleled.

The rally grew in numbers and spirit.

"Look at this crowd," a gray-haired man wearing a *yarmulke* exclaimed to his companion. "We have so many friends. I never knew we had so many friends."

"It's funny," the companion said, "they never come into the store." There were lots of jokes. All week long Israeli war jokes ("Have you heard the latest from the Middle East? . . . Israel refused to take the Red Sea as part of a settlement because it has no boardwalks") piled on more Israeli war jokes.

There was no joy across Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House's iron fence. Some 130 demonstrators marched back and forth chanting: "Nasser! Nasser! Palestine is Arab! Palestine is Arab!"

James S. Doyle, Washington bureau chief of the Boston Globe, tried to tell one of the perspiring leaders of the demonstration that Egypt had just accepted the UN cease-fire resolution.

"You're a Jew," the demonstrator snapped, though Doyle

has the face and speech of the Boston Irishman he is. "Don't listen to him, he's a Jew."

Many of the pro-Arab demonstrators, some wearing bright robes and red fezzes, carried signs as imaginative as the pro-Israel demonstrators. "Mr. Congressman, Israel is not the 51st state," chided one.

One of the scores of buses bringing in the Jews stopped in the bumper-to-bumper traffic in front of the White House fence. The teen-age passengers, many wearing *yarmulkes*, shouted the lyrics of an Israeli folk song. The pro-Arab demonstrators rushed for the bus. Washington metropolitan police—in extra-large numbers, with vacations canceled—stopped them before they got close.

Both Arabs and Jews also took the opportunity of the day's festivities to present their arguments to whatever politicians would listen.

Before gathering in the park, some five hundred Jews jammed into the white marble, red-draped Senate caucus room to hear key Senators affirm their faith in Israel's cause. Senator Robert F. Kennedy invoked the words of his assassinated brother in a plea for reason. "If we cannot end now our differences," he said, "at least we can help make the world safe for diversity." The New York Democrat urged that Israel be recognized by her Arab neighbors as an independent, existing nation, and that "our hand of friendship" be extended to the Arab peoples.

Shortly before the demonstrations ended, both delegations presented petitions at the northwest gate of the White House. They were accepted by Undersecretary of State Katzenbach and Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

Later that day, the twenty-one Presidents of Jewish organizations who had tried earlier to warn Washington of the impending war called with other influential Jews on Vice-President Humphrey. It was the Jewish community's first face-to-face meeting with a top government official since the crisis began. For an hour and a half, they discussed the problems and frustrations created by the war, and the possible policy that the United States might adopt to take Israel's new situation into account. But, as one participant said, "It was mostly one sided. It's hard for anyone to get a word in edgewise when the Vice-President gets going." If there

remained any doubt about the dedication of American Jewry to the Israeli cause, one had only to read about the vast outpouring of money generated by the emergency. Dollars came in torrents. The flow was so fast during the days after the outbreak of fighting, that U.J.A. and Israel bond officials were unable to determine a total figure. "This is without any parallel in the history of American Jewry," one official said. There was some reluctance even to estimate how much was received because early reports of the generous contributions were immediately seized upon by the Arabs for their own propaganda purposes. With uncounted millions still flowing in, the total after a few days of fighting and uneasy truce was put at \$125 million for the U.J.A., plus \$50 million more in Israel bonds. A few individuals gave \$1 million each. They included publisher Walter H. Annenberg of the *Philadelphia Inquirer*; Charles C. Bassine, Chairman of the Board, and Eugene Ferkauf, Chairman of the Executive Committee of E. J. Korvette; realtor Jack D. Weiler and financier William Rosenwald. And the major contributors were by no means limited to Jews. Robert T. Stevens, President of J. P. Stevens & Company, gave \$250,000, and Roger Milliken, President of Deering Milliken, a textile company, donated \$300,000.

Donations came from some surprising quarters. There was one, for instance, from Kiki, the Egyptian belly dancer at Washington's Algiers Restaurant. She turned out to be Jewish. "I'm donating half of everything I earn to the United Jewish Appeal," she confessed, as she went her undulating way dressed in shawls and a few beads.

Somewhat surprisingly, Jewish leaders said they sensed virtually no overt anti-Semitism during the days of crisis. Arab attempts to provoke anti-Semitic feelings failed dismally. If anything, the Jewish leaders said, an opposite effect may have developed. They credited it to the nationally televised debates of the Security Council, in which the Jews were depicted as the foes of the Soviet Union. One of the prime shibboleths used by many anti-Semites to justify their bigotry is that Jews are "all a bunch of Communists." But this was a difficult line to maintain when the Soviet delegate, Fedorenko, was defending the Arabs every half hour on nationwide TV. "It knocked the props out from under them," one Jewish official said. The John Birch Society also came out on the Israeli side.

On the very day that American Jews celebrated so joyously—and while Americans generally were cheering them on—a tragic incident occurred that could have destroyed much of the goodwill that had recently been created. The Israeli air force had deliberately attacked the communications ship U.S.S. *Liberty* which had been cruising in the eastern Mediterranean some fifteen miles north of the Sinai Peninsula.

In the course of the attack, thirty-four Americans were killed and seventy-five were wounded. The ship took one torpedo hit and was heavily strafed, but managed to limp back for repairs to the harbor at Malta. The moment the *Liberty* flashed its first emergency message, jet aircraft were catapulted off the decks of the *America* and *Saratoga*, our carriers sailing with the Sixth Fleet four hundred miles away. Both launched armed attack-planes and fighter cover. American seamen went to battle stations.

In Washington, President Johnson became fearful that the Soviets, monitoring the Sixth Fleet with radar, might misinterpret the sudden dispatch of aircraft. Without further delay, he ordered the "hot line" activated, and it chattered a message to the Soviet leaders in Moscow, explaining that an American ship had been attacked and that the American combat planes were streaking to investigate. It assured the Russians that the United States was not joining the war.

Within minutes of the attack, Israel said it had occurred in error and sent a formal apology to the United States. The admission came before the jets reached the stricken *Liberty*. The American planes returned to the carriers.

The *Liberty* incident raised many questions—including that of what the United States would have done had the attack been made by the Arabs.

The 11,000-ton vessel was an unusual ship. Actually, it was a spy ship, crammed with electronics equipment, designed for the complex espionage business of the modern age. Her forest of antennae were a tangle of steel sensors. Their electronic fingers could pluck from the air the messages passing around the world in scores of codes and dozens of languages. Equipped with her own computers, she could decode or break cryptographic languages considered unbreakable by the governments which send them. When the *Liberty* was attacked, it was intercepting battlefield messages from both Egyptian

and Israeli forces in the Sinai battle, as well as unknown higher-level messages between governments.

Why the *Liberty* was so close to the battlefields is unclear. For normal interception of even low-power battlefield radios, the sensitive equipment aboard the ship could probably have operated just as efficiently from forty to fifty miles at sea. Instead, she was moving slowly in an area which merchant shipping was avoiding during the conflict.

Israel had not been told the *Liberty* was operating in the area. Asked why no such information was sent to the warring nations, Defense Department spokesmen took the normal Pentagon position: that the *Liberty* was cruising in international waters and that there was thus no need to inform any nation of her presence. But the "high seas" explanation, while technically valid, was a weak point in the tragedy. The United States had quietly been advising the nations involved in the war about locations of all other Sixth Fleet ships. The *Liberty*, a converted merchant ship, might have been particularly hard to recognize and could have been mistaken by Israeli pilots for an Egyptian freighter.

The following day, Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol sent a personal message to President Johnson expressing his own sympathies. "I was deeply grieved by the tragic loss of life on the U.S. navy ship *Liberty*," Eshkol said. "Please accept my deepest condolences and convey my sympathies to all the families."

The attack, in any case, took the *Liberty* out of electronic espionage action. Down at the bow and listing ten-degrees to starboard, the stricken ship limped northward toward a Mediterranean rendezvous with two high-speed destroyers carrying additional doctors and medical corpsmen.

Among the dead was Allen M. Blue of Silver Spring, Maryland, identified by the Pentagon as a "Department of Defense technical representative." Only when this identification was questioned did the Pentagon admit that Mr. Blue had actually been an employee of the National Security Agency, the super-secret government body dealing in codes, ciphers and communications for the U.S. Intelligence community.

The *Liberty* incident was a close call. It could have meant severe trouble for both the United States and Israel. Obviously, there was much more to the episode than either country wanted to admit. But Israel quickly agreed to make restitu-

tion for the American casualties. There both sides were apparently willing to let the matter lie, although the U.S. navy convened a board of inquiry to investigate.

On Thursday, the United States and the Soviet Union resumed their contest for diplomatic advantage. Once again, they tried for a cease-fire but this time each introduced contradictory resolutions. The American document called for a cease-fire and the start of a peace negotiation that did not insist on maintaining the territorial integrity of all the nations in the area. The shift meant that this country would not object to new frontiers in the Middle East. The Soviets introduced another resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal and condemnation as an aggressor. Federenko's presentation was seen as one more attempt to recoup the Soviet Union's lost prestige in the Arab world.

More drama was taking place off-stage than on. Egypt's El Kony, scheduled to speak after Goldberg, was called to the telephone. His Foreign Minister in Cairo, was on the line with instructions that he should immediately accept the cease-fire. El Kony returned to his seat and wrote out a message which an aide took to UN Undersecretary Ralph Bunche, who was sitting behind U Thant. Bunche handed the message unread to U Thant. U Thant read it and handed it to Tabor. Three minutes later, Goldberg was finished speaking and Tabor announced that the Egyptian no longer wanted the floor. Instead, the Secretary General said he had an important announcement to read.

Speaking precisely and without color in his voice, U Thant took up the piece of paper that El Kony had submitted and read:

I have the honor to inform you, upon instructions of my government, that it has decided to accept the cease-fire call as it has been prescribed by the resolutions of the council on 5 and 6 June, 1967, on the condition that the other party cease fire.

An Egyptian counteroffensive that morning in the Sinai desert had failed. Gideon Rafael, the Israeli delegate, smiled across at Eban, his Foreign Minister. Across the room, El Kony sat like the Sphinx. The Israeli victory was now official.

As a functionary translated the message into French, visitors in the room began to gasp. Only once before—on September 22, 1965, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, unexpectedly accepted a cease-fire with India—had war ended in the Security Council chamber. It was a moment for hope.

On Friday morning, however, there was still fighting on the Syrian frontier. The Council passed still another resolution demanding a cease-fire. Tomeh, the Damascus delegate, rejected it on the grounds that Syria was fighting in self-defense. Rafael announced that Israeli troops were attacking only Syrian artillery batteries. Finally, after two long sessions, the Council adopted a resolution proposed by the United States and refined by the Soviet Union calling on both sides to accept the jurisdiction of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, a relic of the 1948 war.

After a vain series of Security Council meetings conducted at a variety of unusual hours, Norwegian Lieutenant General Odd Bull, head of UNTSO, announced that he had arranged a cease-fire on the battlefield for 12:30 P.M. Saturday, New York time. Once again the stubborn war appeared to have been brought to a close. The weary UN delegates looked forward to a weekend of rest. Again on Saturday and Sunday, however, the Council was called into emergency session to hear charges of Israeli violations. Finally, at 4:30 A.M. Monday, the Council drafted and passed still one more cease-fire resolution—the fourth since the war began. Once again, the Western nations beat back an attempt by the Soviets to brand Israel the aggressor. Instead the Council asked all the combatants in the area—without naming them—to stand down. That night U Thant cancelled still another emergency session on the grounds that the cease-fire was effective.

The war was over at last.

– CHAPTER IX –

AFTERMATH OF DISASTER

Israel winds up in control of strategic Arab territories. The future of Suez and Aqaba. Nasser's out—and in again. U.S. policy ambiguous. Low ebb at the UN. Big Power puzzle.

WHEN THE brief Arab-Israeli War of 1967 ended, Israeli troops were in control of a vast area outside their own borders and were far behind the 1948 armistice lines. They had reached the banks of the Suez Canal to the southwest and approached Damascus to the north. They had swarmed south into Sharm El Sheikh on the Strait of Tiran and Gaza on the Mediterranean.

To the east, the Israelis had captured the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem and occupied the salient which bulged west across the Jordan River to within seven miles of the coast. In one of their most important thrusts, they had driven east over the escarpment bluffs on Syria's border, then fanned out swiftly north toward Lebanon and south to positions east of the Sea of Galilee.

Israel had crushed the Egyptian and Jordanian armies and soundly beaten the Syrians. But vastly more important, the territory which Israel overran was tremendously significant to the internal security of the Jewish state.

At Sharm El Sheikh, the Israelis held the key to their port of Elath, which receives most of Israel's oil imports. It was the blockade of Elath which had triggered the war. By driving Jordan from the west bank of the Jordan River, Israel denied the Arabs access to its most vulnerable frontier. By capturing the Syrian heights, Israel eliminated the artillery emplacements from which the Syrians had for years methodically shelled the

frontier kibbutzim. And in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, they held territory politically important for bargaining in the long days ahead.

Before the shooting stopped, Israeli spokesmen were vague about the captured territory they wished to retain. It was assumed that for religious reasons they planned to keep Jerusalem. But Israel obviously did not want all the territory it had conquered; there was too much there to swallow, particularly inhabited as it was by hundreds of thousands of Arabs. Israel had to give up some of it, but gave no indication of what or how much.

In a television broadcast before the war ended, Defense Minister Dayan said Israel should keep the western part of Jordan, all of Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, and should secure guarantees of free navigation through the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba. He told the Arabs his country would draw "a new map, not of the Middle East but of Israel," unless negotiations took place. "If you don't want to talk to us, to sit down with us, then we will stay where we are," he warned the Arabs.

Although the Gaza Strip with its more than 300,000 Arab refugees was "more a problem than a gift," Dayan said, "I don't think we should in any way give back the Gaza Strip to Egypt, nor the western part of Jordan." He suggested vaguely some kind of "arrangement" that might, at the same time, assure the Arabs of autonomy and the Israelis of security. As for the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal, Dayan said Israel should keep its troops in place "until we are sure that we would have free navigation."

It was Dayan who demonstrated Israel's lack of faith in the United Nations to work out a Middle East settlement. "We should do better without any mediation or any third party," he said. "I don't remember a single important problem that was solved through diplomacy or the United Nations negotiations."

More discreetly, Avraham Harman, Israel's ambassador to the United States, put it this way: "We cannot have a resumption of a tolerated state of belligerency, which is what we've had. There's only one way of solving it: The parties should meet and recognize each other's right to exist."

Some of the statements by Israeli leaders might have been meant to establish positions for bargaining. But if the Israelis

expected counter-suggestions from the Arabs, they were disappointed. The vanquished in the war kept insisting boldly on restoration of the *status quo ante*.

Then, on June 12, after all the warring Arab states except Algeria had agreed to a cease-fire, Premier Eshkol staked out Israel's position this way:

Be under no illusion that the state of Israel is prepared to return to the situation that reigned up to a week ago. Alone we fought for our existence and our security. We are entitled to determine what are the true and vital interests of our country, and how they shall be secured.

Israel would not withdraw to its old lines, as it had in 1956, and depend on the international community for its safety. Now, Eshkol said, Israel would depend only on itself.

Officially, the United States Government was ambiguous in its statements on frontier changes. In reality it favored a redrawing of borders that would strengthen Israel's natural defenses. It favored the right of passage for Israeli ships in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. Above all it sought Arab recognition of the existence of Israel.

Israel seemed equally firm in its demand that it receive diplomatic recognition from its Arab neighbors.

Certainly the pattern of a Middle East settlement was slow in emerging, but Israel held a strong hand and its vanquished foes were in a poor position to press for any advantage. Yet it would be premature to believe that Israel and the rest of the world had heard the last of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

In six days of war Nasser proved himself one of the most inept military leaders in modern history. His grandiloquent Arab alliance and military command was exposed to the world as the weakest of "paper tigers."

But even before disaster overcame him, Nasser was working to overcome his humiliation. His first excuse, expressed before he capitulated, was that his defeat had been fashioned not by Israel but by the United States and Great Britain. The second, proclaimed after the cease-fire, came when he fired eleven of his highest-ranking military officers, including Field Marshal Mohammed Abdul Hakim Amer, as if they alone were responsible for the defeat.

Then, gambling on his popularity with Cairo's mobs, Nasser, in a tearful television appearance, acknowledged his responsibility for the U.A.R.'s "grave setback" on the battlefield and offered to "return to the ranks of the public." In less than an hour, thousands of Egyptians, many rolling up in government trucks, were thronging Cairo's streets to demand hysterically that he remain in office. Reading the mob's temper accurately, and fully appreciating their master's touch in mob manipulation, Nasser's Cabinet met and refused to accept his proffered resignation. The National Assembly followed suit. From other Arab leaders, stunned by the magnitude of their defeat, came cables pleading that he stay on the job.

If internal pressures mounted against Nasser, many observers agreed that they would come from the armed forces. "Just wait until that bitter shoeless army gets back to Cairo," said one Western diplomat who had been stationed in the Egyptian capital. There were reports in Beirut that some of Nasser's younger officers, particularly in the air force, were seething over the humiliating defeat into which he had led them. It was precisely such bitter anger over Egypt's 1948 defeat which had produced Nasser.

In some Arab capitals there was speculation that Nasser no longer was in full control in Cairo, that he was only a caretaker being tolerated in office until his subordinates and, perhaps, Moscow chose his successor.

The Russians, on whose tolerance much of Nasser's future depended, were noncommittal. Moscow roared unceasingly about "Israeli aggression" and supported Arab negotiating demands. But the first Arab leader entertained in Moscow after the disastrous war was Algerian President Colonel Houari Boumedienne, not "The Boss."

In defeat, Nasser lapsed into near-silence and withdrew from the public eye. When he did speak out it was to hint to his poverty-stricken people that darker and hungrier days lay ahead. One of his broadsheets called on Egyptians to donate their wedding rings to the government to help defray its hard currency shortage. That shortage, already deepening with the loss of revenues from the Suez Canal, will become worse as tourism falls away to nothing.

Meanwhile, in Jordan, King Hussein's position was equally shaky. Smarting over his defeat, the little monarch seemed certain to encounter even more violent opposition than before

the war. If the Arab world's radicals came to power, they almost certainly would attempt to depose him as too moderate. While Israel could agree to a reasonable peace settlement with Hussein, whom at one time they regarded with some respect, any such agreement would turn his people and most of the eastern Mediterranean Arab states against him.

There was no immediate indication of any change in Syria's fanatic regime, the Arab government which was closest to being a Russian satellite. To reaffirm his credentials as a fire-eater, however, Syrian President Nouredin Al Atassi went on the road. He flew to Algiers to confer with President Boumedienne, then flew to Cairo for talks with Nasser. There were unconfirmed reports that Al Atassi and Boumedienne were urging Nasser to begin a guerrilla war against Israel.

One of the strangest reported episodes of the war, denied immediately after its publication, was the alleged refusal of Lebanon's Commander in Chief, Emile Bustani, to fight Israel. The story was that Premier Rashid Karami summoned Bustani and ordered him to open a campaign against the Israelis to help the Syrians. Bustani is said to have replied: "When you wear this uniform, you can condemn the army to destruction. But while I wear it, you cannot." Bustani's position caused a violent quarrel between the two men, which was later patched up by Lebanon's president, Charles Helou.

Among the African Arabs, neither Tunisia's Habib Bourguiba nor Libya's King Idris seemed in any trouble for their half-hearted efforts in the Arab-Israeli War. Little was heard from Baghdad of the war's effect on Iraq's rulers, whose participation in the conflict was also limited.

Of all the Middle Eastern Arab rulers, Saudi Arabia's King Faisal seemed to have emerged the most unruffled. As far as can be determined, not a single Saudi soldier or airman clashed with an Israeli in the six-day war. Faisal's small but reasonably efficient army and air force, therefore, remain intact. Faisal shrewdly refused to join the other Arab leaders who broke diplomatic relations with the United States. He cut off oil sales to the United States and Britain, but the duration of that move is in doubt.

With the heat out of the crisis, the Arabs started back to their individual ways. The Lebanese returned to business. The Sudanese went back to competing with Egypt in cotton. The Moroccans and Algerians will resume their perpetual quarrel-

ing about their border. The Saudis can be counted on to try to keep Nasser out of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Syrians to upstaging Nasser and showing that they, not he, are the *avant garde* of Arab socialism. Everyone once again shouts his belief in Arab unity, and practices the opposite.

The roots of these contradictions do not lie in the state of Israel. They are buried deep within the Arabs themselves. Israel serves as the focal point upon which this vague but intense desire of every Arab for unity can be directed. Israel is the one thing almost all Arabs can agree upon. But if there were no Israel, a substitute would have to be invented.

The Middle Eastern war of 1967 was a luxury its participants could ill afford. Though Israel's already strained economy was hit hard by the fighting, the Egyptian and Jordanian economic systems tottered on the brink of chaos.

Egypt, already in debt some \$4 billion to the East and West, facing a chronic balance-of-payments deficit and a shortage of foreign exchange, was in deep trouble before the short war began. Some one hundred of its state-owned plants and factories were closed or operating part-time because of Nasser's lack of currency to import necessary raw materials. Food production lagged behind the booming population growth. Loans were proving increasingly difficult to obtain—and to repay.

After the war began, Nasser closed the Suez Canal, thereby halting toll revenues which total some \$200 million yearly in sorely needed foreign exchange. Israeli troops overran two of Egypt's Sinai oilfields, which had yielded some \$100,000 in daily profits. Tourism to Egypt halted, cutting off revenues which had been estimated at \$60 to \$100 million annually.

How long Egypt's predominantly agricultural society could stagger along under these new blows was uncertain. But it was obvious that Egypt's thirty million people were in for far more privation and suffering.

Unable to turn to the West for aid, Nasser was reduced to looking to his richer Arab neighbors and to Moscow for help. There were rumors Kuwait had made a sizeable contribution to the cause of Arab unity, which Nasser could tap. But it was uncertain how the Russians would respond to new pleas for assistance. A Cairo newspaper said Communist China had offered Egypt a \$10 million loan and 150,000 tons of wheat. Unless Egypt has an exceptional food crop this year, even such a donation will not be sufficient to stave off hunger.

Jordan's economy, unstable before the war, was even shakier as the conflict ended. The United States had been extending direct budgetary support, but this practice would be threatened if Congress objected to Hussein's ties with Nasser. During the war Jordan lost to Israel its one significant source of foreign exchange—the Old City of Jerusalem, with the holy places that thousands of tourists visited yearly.

Syria was in better economic condition than its allies before the shooting began and was less hard-hit by the conflict. Production had fallen off when the leftist regime nationalized its industry. A serious drought in 1966 reduced harvests, and heavy investments in military programs have caused an export-import imbalance. But, overall, Syria's basic economy was more soundly balanced than Egypt's or Jordan's, though the shock of the war will have its effect.

The extent of the damage to Israel's economy is yet to be determined, but it will be significant. Even before the war, Israel was struggling under a balance-of-payments deficit and an increase in unemployment. The economy suffered further during the mobilization slowdown. Some of the war's costs were offset by huge donations to Israel from abroad, but they will not be sufficient to offset all Israel's problems. But Israel has a resilience and a modernity that the Arab states cannot equal and will no doubt recover much sooner than her neighbors.

Deeply entwined in the outcome of the war were the political futures of Levi Eshkol and Moshe Dayan, the old and the young, the dove and the hawk, the European immigrant and the *sabra*. How would each fare in the uncertainties of postwar politics?

The situation seemed ideal for the accession of General Dayan—young, hawk, *sabra*—to the premiership in the 1969 elections, perhaps even before. Already the Rafi Party, in which he is a leader, had offered to join with the dominant Mapai Party, but Eshkol, Mapai's leader, declined the offer. The Rafi Party, which former Premier David Ben-Gurion formed in 1965, stands "for self-reliance in matters of national security" and "peace with the neighboring countries from a position of strength." This point of view was certainly confirmed as valid during the six days in June.

The war brought unprecedented national unity to the Israeli

government. Israel went into the fighting with, practically speaking, every one of the dozen parties and alignments of parties represented in the government, save for the Communists.

Within a few days after the shooting had stopped, however, that unity began to dissolve. The question of military credit—was Dayan the architect of victory or was it Major General Itzhak Rabin, the Chief of Staff?—provided the pretext for political split.

General Dayan, perhaps with the hope of becoming Israel's Dwight D. Eisenhower, was not overly generous with the credit. Just after the fighting ended, he lauded Rabin's leadership. But a week later he told an interviewer: "Whoever says that I came in and found everything ready is only trying to throw sand in the eyes."

In the moments of triumph that followed the war, Dayan stood ten feet tall in comparison to Abba Eban, another hopeful politician and proven statesman, who had been first in an Israeli popularity poll just six months before. Eban barely survived the government unification that brought Dayan back to power four days before the conflict. The people had lost patience with his emphasis on negotiating his way out of crisis.

In the weeks following victory, Eshkol was vulnerable to pressure to dissolve the government of national unity. If, after all, the Rafi of Dayan and Ben-Gurion should merge with Mapai, it could mean the retirement for good of such familiar names and faces on both sides as Eshkol, Mrs. Meir and Ben-Gurion. But the time had been approaching anyway when many of the leaders raised in European ghettos would give way to the *sabras*, who represent a new generation.

In overrunning the Gaza Strip and the Jordanian bulge on the west bank of the Jordan River, Israeli forces magnified again the already torturous refugee problem in the Middle East.

Capture of the Gaza Strip placed on Israel's shoulder the burden of the 300,000 refugees already there, as well as of the rest of the Palestinian Arab population.

But in taking the west bank of the Jordan, the Israelis not only overran more than one-half million refugees of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, they created many thousands more. As the

Israelis swarmed over the west bank bulge, thousands of Arabs fled east across the Jordan River. Many were apparently encouraged by Israel to go. Thus hundreds of thousands of Arabs, new refugees and old, were undoubtedly homeless once again—as a result of war.

The Arab refugee problem, proven insoluble in the nineteen years between 1948 and 1967, had become even more snarled and troublesome. Unless there is the will on all sides—which appears highly unlikely—the refugee problem will, more than ever, be an irritant in Middle Eastern affairs.

And what about President Johnson's role in the crisis and its effect on his political standing at home?

At the outset the President shrank from bold action. He did not, for example, order an American ship to run the Gulf of Aqaba blockade, which some critics believe might have forestalled the war. Rather, he turned to the ineffective UN and experimented—unsuccessfully—with the cumbersome device of joint action by maritime powers.

This is probably what any President would have done in the circumstances. The White House read the mood of the American people as being one demanding that the Administration keep the country out of fighting on a second front, let alone out of World War III and a nuclear confrontation with the Russians. A balky Congress reflected this mood, inhibiting bold measures by the President. The Vietnam War limited America's immediate military effectiveness in the Middle East, and other maritime powers had no zest for intervention.

Intelligence reports convinced the President that the Israelis could swiftly defeat the Arabs alone. Thus he could concentrate on averting a Soviet-American confrontation.

In this, his moves seemed sure-footed enough. Throughout, however, he was sustained by good luck because of Israeli victories. If Israel had failed, he might have had a disaster on his hands. As it was, he was able to look good by playing it cool in the national interest. Politically, he scored by keeping the country out of war.

The Middle Eastern War of 1967 did not do the good name of the United Nations any service. The United Nations and the Arab-Israeli dispute have grown up together. Three times in the last nineteen years, the UN has been unable to prevent the outbreak of Middle Eastern war, although between the

wars, the UN did a creditable job of overseeing the peace. In the wake of the 1967 War and Kosygin's cheerless visit to the UN, the Security Council seems destined for a long round of empty talk featuring propaganda above statesmanship. It is unlikely that the UN will play a central part in the crafting of the peace terms.

By mid-June, the very real agony of the Middle East had been turned into concern over what effect this latest war would have on the course of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Not long ago, diplomacy was rich with the word "*detente*." If only the Vietnam War would go away, the Soviets and the Americans could get along famously. Lyndon Johnson wants to build bridges to the East. Alexei Kosygin wants to put a Fiat in every comrade's garage. Both want to neutralize Communist China's growing power. So it was said.

There were those who insisted that the very term "Cold War" was passé and should go the way of "Iron Curtain," which is no longer considered an acceptable description of geopolitics.

What with the Soviet Union already resuming arms shipments to the Middle East, it will be a long time now before people think about throwing "Cold War" out of the diplomatic lexicon. The hot-line messages, the attempts at remaining aloof from battle, the vain efforts at obtaining a cease-fire could not keep the White House and the Kremlin from going down the line—but not to the wire—for their Middle Eastern clients. If anything the blow to Soviet prestige that resulted from the defeat of the Arab armies has intensified the "Cold War."

There is a special danger to a war that brings with it the sense of exultation to millions as this one did. Unlike Vietnam, it was a short, decisive and brilliantly fought war. Unlike Vietnam it did not rend this country in two and sorely trouble the conscience of so many Americans. It was a war with bigger-than-life heroes; it was a religious spectacle; it was the underdog triumphant, David versus Goliath.

But much more important, it was another tragic failure in world diplomacy. It was the third time around on the same stage with the same characters and it never should have happened. Once again, too many men in elevated positions of the greatest authority miscalculated, misjudged and made a mess

of it. Many thousands were killed in just six days. The world could have lived through another exercise in what a late Secretary of State called brinkmanship, another eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. We have endured so many crises that we have developed this special language for them. This time the Great Powers were determined not to let it happen — and used the hot line to make sure it did not.

There can be no denying that Israeli generals and soldiers acquitted themselves gloriously on the battlefield. The question now is whether her diplomats, those of the Arabs, and those of the Big Powers can do half as well at the peace table; if not, their failure may ultimately mean the failure of mankind; but if so, there may be more hope for peace — *shalom, salaam*—in the Middle East than some believe.

CHRONOLOGY

1966

Nov. 12—Three Israeli soldiers killed, five wounded, when their command car is wrecked by a land mine in northern Negev.

Nov. 13—Israel retaliates, charging twelve other previous Arab attacks; destroys forty homes in Jordan village of Es Samu; Jordanian and Israeli planes exchange fire.

Nov. 15—Israel charges Syrian subversion was behind attacks from Jordan.

Nov. 25—UN Security Council censures Israel, 14-0, for Nov. 13 attack on Jordan; says it violated armistice agreement.

Dec. 8—Syria calls on Jordanians to overthrow King Hussein, saying he is afraid to strike back at Israel for Es Samu raid. Hussein government says that rioting against Hussein was financed by two "outside Arab sources," apparently Egypt and Syria.

1967

Jan. 8-11—After week of border clashes in Galilee area, Israel and Syria file cross complaints with Security Council.

Feb. 15—Syria and Israel abandon attempts to mediate their border dispute. Talks had been held at U Thant's urgent request.

Feb. 18—Syrian soldier killed by Israelis inside Israeli border near Sea of Galilee.

April 7—Israeli pilots claim to shoot down six Syrian MIGS in dogfights over Galilee; Syria claims five Israeli jets; infantry skirmishes also reported. Israel protests to UN.

May 5—Israeli town of Ramin shelled from Lebanon.

May 8—Arab terrorists bomb highway five miles inside Israel.

May 11—Israel delegate Gideon Rafael warns UN Israel is "fully entitled to act in self-defense" unless Syria changes its "unrealistic and aggressive policy." U Thant says Arab attackers have shown "more specialized training than has usually been evident" before; deplores raids.

May 14-15—U.A.R. and Syrian military chiefs meet in Damascus. Egypt alerts armed forces; begins moving troops to Sinai in observance of 1966 pact with Syria; 58,000 U.A.R. troops reported on Israeli frontier within week.

May 17—Damascus radio claims Syrian armed forces are at "maximum preparedness"; 12,000 Syrians reported on Israeli border.

May 18—At U.A.R. request, U Thant approves withdrawal of UN peace-keeping force from Gaza Strip and Sharm El Sheikh on Gulf of Aqaba. Arab troops quickly take over both positions. Israel steps up mobilization. Iraq consults with U.A.R. and Syria on military cooperation.

May 19—U Thant warns removal of UN force "may have grave implications for peace."

May 20—Israeli tanks reported on Sinai frontier; twelve Arab states support U.A.R. military actions.

May 21—U.A.R. orders total mobilization of 100,000 army reserves.

May 22—Nasser announces blockade of Gulf of Aqaba, says "if the Israelis want to threaten us with war they are welcome." Washington warns U.S. citizens against visiting Arab countries.

May 23—Israeli premier Levi Eshkol warns that blockade constitutes "an act of aggression against Israel" and is "gross violation of international law." President Johnson says U.S. is firmly committed to political independence and territorial integrity of all Mideast nations; calls on Egypt to abandon "illegal" blockade moves; laments UN decision to remove peace-keeping force from Sinai.

May 24—U.A.R. mining of Strait of Tiran reported. UN Security Council starts meeting on crisis.

May 26—Nasser warns that Israeli attack could bring all-out conflict in which Arabs' "main objective will be the destruction of Israel."

May 27—U.A.R. issues economic directive to put country on war footing. Israel reports seven soldiers killed by Egyptian mine near Gaza Strip. Thant reports to UN on May 23-25 visit with Nasser.

May 28—Nasser tells U.A.R. National Assembly that Soviet Premier Kosygin has promised to support Egypt in blockade.

May 29—Nasser says negotiated peace is out of the question, says Russia has pledged to block any U.S. intervention on behalf of Israel.

May 30—Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan sign mutual defense pact, solidifying Arab front.

May 31—Britain, Netherlands, Portugal support U.S. initiative to challenge Egyptian blockade; U.S. carrier *Intrepid* starts through Suez Canal; U.S. proposes "breathing spell" resolution in Security Council.

June 1—Maj. Gen. Moshe Dayan becomes Israel's Defense Minister.

June 2—British Prime Minister Wilson says in Washington that Mideast crisis could lead to general war unless U.A.R. blockade is broken. One Syrian, two Israelis killed in first border clash in two weeks. France declares its complete neutrality.

June 3—Israel tells UN blockade must go; says it will accept nothing less than free passage in Gulf of Aqaba. Security Council unable to agree on any action.

June 4—Nasser accepts President Johnson's invitation to send a top aide to Washington to discuss Aqaba blockade; names U.A.R. Vice-President Mohiedin for trip. Israeli Cabinet disturbed; holds emergency sessions.

June 5—War breaks out. Israel claims major victories. UN Security Council stalls on cease-fire resolution with both sides apparently determined to fight it out.

June 6—Israel advances on all fronts. Security Council approves cease-fire resolution. Egyptian charges of U.S.-British participation in Israeli air raids vigorously denied; Nasser breaks diplomatic relations with U.S., closes Suez Canal. Arabs cut off oil to U.S. and Britain.

June 7—Israelis converge on Suez; blockade smashed. Israelis accept cease-fire provided Arabs do same; Jordan accepts but U.A.R. refuses.

June 8—U.A.R. and Syria agree to cease-fire; six Egyptian divisions trapped in Sinai desert; Israelis attack U.S.S. *Liberty*, killing 34; issue apology. White House discloses Washington-Moscow hot line used for first time in diplomatic crisis.

June 9—Nasser says he is resigning, then changes mind. Israeli-Syrian fighting continues, despite cease-fire.

June 10—Syria and Israeli agree to cease-fire; Israel rules out any return to 1948-49 armistice lines; U.S. declares oil emergency.

June 11—Nasser fires his top generals. Thant tells Security Council Israeli armor still advancing in Syria. Israelis say 679 Israelis dead, 2,563 wounded. Jordan puts dead at 15,000. No Egyptian or Syrian figures.

June 12—Premier Eshkol warns Israel will refuse to retreat to prewar frontiers; Arabs reject Eshkol's call for bilateral peace talks outside UN, insist on Israeli retirement to prewar positions.

June 13—Jordan and Syria accuse Israel of driving thousands of Arabs out of occupied territory. President Johnson affirms U.S. commitment to protect territorial integrity of all Mideast nations.

June 14—UN Security Council rejects Soviet resolution condemning Israel as aggressor. Soviets move for General Assembly session.

June 15—Moscow announces Kosygin will head Soviet delegation to Assembly session, voted despite U.S. opposition.

June 16—Kosygin confers for two hours in Paris with De Gaulle.

June 17—Kosygin arrives in New York heading fifty-man Soviet delegation to Assembly meeting.

